CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Keith Rondeau appeals from a sentence imposed following a negotiated plea agreement. He was charged in a two-count felony complaint with attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 664/187, subd. (a)), with personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a)). As part of the plea agreement, the complaint was amended to add a third count, for assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), to which defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere, and the other counts were dismissed. Under the terms of the plea agreement, it was agreed that defendant would be referred to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for a diagnostic evaluation under section 1203.03, and that the Department’s report would be submitted to the trial court to be considered at sentencing. Upon receipt and consideration of the section 1203.03 report, the trial court found that defendant was not a suitable candidate for probation, and sentenced defendant to three years in state prison. Defendant appeals, arguing that he was denied due process because the report, upon which the trial court relied in sentencing him, was based upon erroneous information. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Kenneth Ray Smith was tried by a jury on three felony counts arising from two separate shooting incidents. As to the first incident, the jury acquitted defendant of the murder of Jeremy Solomon (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), count 1)[1] and the attempted murder of Kevin Randolph (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a), count 2).
As to the second incident, the jury convicted defendant of the first degree murder of Overland Campbell and found true the special circumstance allegation of an intentional killing committed to benefit a criminal street gang. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(22), count 3.) It also found true the criminal street gang and firearm enhancement allegations. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), 12022.53, subds. (c), (d), (e)(1).) The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for life without parole and imposed and stayed the criminal street gang and firearm enhancements.
In his appeal from the judgment, defendant raises issues concerning the erroneous admission of evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and refusal to sever counts 1 and 2 from count 3. Finding no error, we affirm.

Timothy Jones appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury on one count of kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (a)) and one count of pandering by encouraging (Pen. Code, § 266i, subd. (a)(2).) He was sentenced to a term of eight years on the kidnapping charge and a consecutive term of 1 year 4 months on the pandering charge. He contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence recordings of his jailhouse telephone calls. We disagree, and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Lee James Daniels pled no contest to one count of possession of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and was sentenced to two years in state prison. Defendant’s counsel has raised no issue on appeal and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (See Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant has not filed a supplementary brief. We find no arguable issues and affirm.

In this appeal, appellant Ann Postag (Postag), individually and as trustee of the Bette B. Postag Trust, seeks a remand to the trial court for additional damages to adequately compensate for emotional distress and the reduction in the market value of her home. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Mark Paul Solorzano (appellant) contends his conviction by jury for willfully and unlawfully delaying peace officers in the performance of their duties is not supported by sufficient evidence. We agree and reverse the conviction on that count.

This appeal arises from the adoption by a conservation district of a resolution interpreting an existing conservation easement to permit the establishment of a wildlife preserve on agricultural land. The preserve was proposed in the environmental impact report (EIR) prepared for a neighboring quarry project, as one potential means of mitigating the impact of the quarry on certain protected species. However, neither the conservation district’s resolution nor the conditions attached to approval of the quarry’s EIR actually required that the preserve be established. We hold that under these circumstances, adoption of the resolution interpreting the easement did not constitute “approval of a project” within the meaning of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21000 et seq.).[1] We therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of appellants’ petition challenging the resolution under CEQA, and seeking an injunction against the adoption of similar resolutions without prior CEQA review.

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of forcible rape in concert (Pen. Code, § 264.1) and forcible oral copulation in concert (Pen. Code, § 288a, subd. (d)(1)). He complains in this appeal that the prosecutor committed misconduct, and he was improperly denied a hearing on his motion for substitution of counsel (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). We conclude that under the circumstances no Marsden hearing was required, and no prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct was committed. We therefore affirm the judgment.

The trial court denied a motion for class certification filed by plaintiffs, who seek to represent a class of persons with mobility disabilities who allegedly have been denied equal access to the pedestrian right of way, Civic Center, parks, and libraries in Marin County as a result of access barriers. Because the trial court improperly denied the motion based on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, we reverse.

Appellants Dale Joseph Evert Coley and Shane Austin Peters were jointly tried before a jury and convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder with true findings on related firearm and gang allegations. (Pen. Code, §§187, 664/187, 12022.53, 186.22.)[1] Both appellants argue that the findings on the gang allegations were not supported by substantial evidence; that the trial court should have granted a motion to reveal the identity of confidential informants who supplied information to the prosecution’s gang expert; that the failure to order disclosure of the informants’ identities violated their right to confront witnesses; and that the court should have ordered the identity of the jurors disclosed under Code of Civil Procedure sections 206 and 237. Appellant Coley additionally agues that the court should have granted the motion for self-representation he made at his sentencing hearing; that he is entitled to additional presentence credits; and that the cumulative effect of various errors deprived him of a fair trial. Appellant Peters argues that he was subjected to multiple punishment for the finding on the gang allegation, contrary to section 654. We affirm.[2]

In this appeal, Jose Alvarez (appellant) raises issues concerning presentence custody credits and clerical errors related to the abstract of judgment. For reasons that follow, we modify the judgment to include an additional seven days of presentence credits; as so modified we affirm the judgment.
Between 2006 and 2011, appellant was convicted on charges in four different cases.[1] The facts underlying the convictions are not relevant to this appeal. However, we set forth in detail the chronology of events in the four different cases.

Respondent Evan Auld-Susott is the nephew of appellant Daniel C. Susott. They had a dispute regarding the care of 89-year-old Kathryn Susott, who was Evan’s grandmother and Daniel’s mother.[1] Evan held a durable power of attorney for Kathryn. He was also the trustee of several Sussott family trusts as well as the general partner of the Susott family’s limited partnership. Daniel was a beneficiary of the Sussott family trusts and a limited partner of the family partnership.
At the time the Susott family decided to move Kathryn from her Carmel home into an assisted living facility, Daniel was residing in Kathryn’s home. On the day Kathryn moved out, Evan caused a three-day notice to quit to be served on Daniel. Evan also sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) limiting Daniel’s contact with Kathryn in the assisted living facility.

This case arises out of an insurance dispute. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Federal Insurance Company (Federal), after determining as a matter of law that Federal owed no obligation to defend or indemnify its insured, Abigail Abbott Staffing Services, Inc. (Abbott), against a claim of liability arising out of Abbott’s negligent referral of an employee who later embezzled money from Abbott’s client.

A modification decision.