CA Unpub Decisions

Following defendant Johnny Wayne Rogers, Jr.’s, convictions for spousal abuse (Pen. Code, § 273.5; undesignated statutory references that follow are to the Penal Code) and receiving stolen property (§ 496), the trial court imposed a fine under section 672. Defendant contends the trial court erred in utilizing this statute as the basis for the fine and therefore the fine must be stricken. We agree the court erred, but find the issue forfeited by defendant’s failure to object to the stated statutory basis of the fine in the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

In September 2011, defendant Michelle Sophia Walker pled no contest to two counts of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a))[1] and admitted that she knew each victim was age 65 years or older (§ 667.9, subd. (a)). In exchange, 19 related counts were dismissed with a Harvey waiver.[2] Defendant was sentenced to prison for four years eight months and was awarded 361 days’ custody credit and 180 days’ conduct credit.
On appeal, defendant contends principles of equal protection entitle her to additional presentence conduct credit. Specifically, she claims the October 2011 amendment to section 4019 must be applied retroactively so that her 361 days’ custody credit entitle her to 361 days’ conduct credit. We affirm.

In case No. 10F4986, after his motion to suppress was denied, defendant entered a plea of no contest to driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), having previously been convicted three or more times of DUI within 10 years, and admitted violating probation in case No. 10F4939, in exchange for a stipulated state prison sentence of two years eight months and the dismissal of the remaining counts and allegations. The court sentenced defendant accordingly.
Defendant appeals, challenging the denial of his suppression motion. We will affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Nathaniel Kinsey of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury or with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1))[1] and found true an allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court found true allegations that defendant had a prior serious felony conviction (§§ 1170.12, subd. (b), 667, subds. (a)(1), (d)) and had served a prior prison term within the last five years (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant was sentenced to a 17-year state prison term.
On appeal, defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that his prior conviction for violating section 245 was a serious felony and a strike. We affirm.

URT: *
Defendant Kenneth Patterson appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of “no contest” to two counts of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2))[1] (counts 1 & 4). With respect to both counts, defendant admitted that he personally used a firearm in the commission of the crime under section 12022.5, subdivision (a). With respect to count 1, defendant admitted that the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b).
Pursuant to the agreed-upon disposition, the trial court sentenced defendant to a total prison sentence of 20 years. In count 1, the trial court imposed the midterm of three years plus a consecutive 10 years for the firearm allegation and a consecutive five years for the gang allegation, resulting in a sentence of 18 years for that count. In count 4, the trial court imposed a consecutive sentence of one year (one-third the midterm) for the assault and a consecutive one year (one-third the low term) for the gun allegation. The trial court granted the People’s motion to dismiss the remaining counts and allegations, i.e., shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246) (count 2); attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)) (count 3); an allegation of personal discharge of a firearm in the attempted murder count (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)); and all of the gang allegations accompanying these counts.

Appellant Anthony S. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders establishing dependency jurisdiction over his daughter Samantha (born May 2010) and requiring him to submit to random drug testing as part of his reunification plan. Father contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)[1], that past instances of domestic violence between him and Samantha’s mother, Laura C. (mother), [2] placed Samantha at current substantial risk of serious physical harm. Father further contends the court abused its discretion by ordering him to submit to random drug testing because there was no evidence that he had any substance abuse problem.
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, and the juvenile court’s drug testing order was not an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

A modification decision.

Appellant Mi. S. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders establishing dependency jurisdiction over his children M. (born December 1998) and Z. (born August 2000) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)[1] and removing them from his custody. Father contends that because he sent the children to live with their mother in Georgia before the section 300 petition was filed, there was no current risk of harm to either child within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b) and no valid basis for the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings.
There is substantial evidence in the record that the children were at substantial risk of harm. We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Robert C. Schneider, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Mario L. (minor) appeals from the denial of a petition to vacate an order for restitution and abstract of judgment (Judicial Counsel form No. CR-110/JV-790) on the ground that it was issued after he turned 21 years old, when the juvenile court’s jurisdiction terminated by operation of law. In the alternative, minor seeks correction of the amount of the judgment to reflect the original restitution order of $12,988. We conclude that the juvenile court acted within its authority in issuing the order and abstract of judgment, but did not correctly state the original restitution order. We thus order the juvenile court to issue a new order and abstract of judgment showing the correct amount, and we affirm the order denying the petition.

Alma Frontanez (appellant) appeals from an order granting respondent Terence K. Chan’s (respondent) motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV motion) following trial in this personal injury action. Appellant was injured when she stepped into an uncovered water meter box on a public sidewalk on February 29, 2008. In granting respondent’s JNOV motion, the trial court held that appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence to show that respondent had a duty of care to inspect or cover the water meter box or to warn of its hazards on the day that appellant fell. We affirm.

Plaintiff Michael Chung appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted defendants Steven Bookspan and Hahn Kim’s motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8.[1] Chung contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen his case after the court granted defendants’ motion for judgment. Chung also contends the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the judgment.
Defendant Steven Bookspan appeals from a postjudgment order denying his motion for attorney fees under section 2033.420. We affirm.

This case returns to us following our prior opinion in Zubarau v. City of Palmdale (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 289 in which we affirmed and reversed parts of the trial court’s judgment and remanded the matter to allow plaintiff and appellant Alec Zubarau to move for an award of attorney fees with respect to two of his three causes of action. On remand, the trial court denied Zubarau’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 (section 1021.5). Zubarau appeals the trial court’s ruling. We reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand the matter for the trial court to consider whether the claimed attorney fees were necessary and reasonable.

Appellants Stephen and Susan Sanford challenge a trial court order appointing Audrey Hughes as limited conservator of Jason Sanford. Jason is Stephen Sanford’s son, and Susan Sanford’s stepson. We affirm the order.

Appellant A. C. (minor) appeals from a dispositional order of the juvenile court, challenging the amount of restitution he was ordered to pay for graffiti removal. We affirm the judgment.