CA Unpub Decisions

Carrie L. (mother) seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested 12-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.22, subd. (a))[1] terminating her reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her 12-year-old daughter M.S. and two-year-old son, T.S. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding that she was provided reasonable services and that there was not a substantial probability the children could be returned to her custody. She seeks an order from this court directing the juvenile court to vacate its section 366.26 hearing and to continue reunification services. We decline to do so and deny the petition.

Sandra seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452 (rule)) from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested 18-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing as to her three youngest children, eight-year-old I.P., six-year-old A.P., and five-year-old M.P. We deny the petition.

Tammy C. appeals from the juvenile court’s order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating her parental rights to Jacob R.[1] She contends the Tulare County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) failed to adequately notice all Indian tribes pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C., § 1901, et seq.) and that the juvenile court failed to make a determination on whether ICWA applied in her case. We reject her contentions and affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.

This court has previously addressed a similar dispute between the parties. (Adoption of A.M. (June 29, 2009, E043937) [nonpub. opn.].) The prior opinion addressed the trial court granting the biological father’s motion for judgment on the mother’s and stepfather’s petition to terminate the biological father’s parental rights to his child, A.M. This court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, concluding substantial evidence reflected the biological father never intended to abandon A.M.
In August 2010, A.M.’s mother, petitioner and respondent L.M. (Mother), again petitioned the trial court to terminate the parental rights of A.M.’s biological father, objector and appellant M.M. (Father). (Fam. Code, § 7822.)[1] The trial court concluded Father abandoned A.M. and terminated Father’s parental rights. Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. First, Father asserts the trial court erred by relitigating the termination issue due to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Second, Father asserts the record does not support a finding that he intended to abandon his son, A.M. Third, Father contends the trial court abused its discretion by not following the recommendation made in the social study report. We reverse the judgment.

Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) raising a possible, but not arguable issue. We offered Roope the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal, but he has failed to respond.

Michael Dow Atkinson appeals a judgment following a jury verdict finding him guilty of evading a police officer while driving recklessly, three other offenses involving driving a vehicle, and being under the influence of a controlled substance. On appeal, Atkinson contends his convictions of the four offenses involving driving a vehicle must be reversed because the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that he drove the vehicle.

The jury convicted Aarmayl Abdullah (also known as Aarmayl Crawford)[1] of possessing cocaine base for the purpose of sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5; count 1); transporting a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 2); possessing methamphetamine for the purpose of sale (Health & Saf. Code, §11378; count 3); and felony child endangerment (Pen. Code,[2] § 273a, subd. (a); count 4).

Debbie B., mother of the minors, appeals from orders of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.[1]) Mother contends the finding that C.G. and K.G. were likely to be adopted within a reasonable time was not supported by substantial evidence because C.G. had exhibited aggressive behavior directed at K.G. in the past and K.G. required a high level of supervision. We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of adoptability. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s orders.[2]

The trial court granted probation to defendant Darrel Mark Andersen following his convictions for dissuading a witness by force or threat (Pen. Code, § 136.1), assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)), misdemeanor spousal battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1)), and misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 242).[1] The jury found defendant not guilty of spousal rape, corporal injury to a spouse, criminal threats, corporal injury to a child, false imprisonment by violence, and cruelty to an animal. The two misdemeanor battery convictions were lesser included offenses to the charged offenses of corporal injury to a spouse and corporal injury to a child.
The victims were defendant’s wife, Tina, and daughter, Bailie. Defendant’s son Beau no longer lived at home. Defendant was a Highway Patrol officer.

F.R. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders finding his children, B.R. and J.R., dependent children of the juvenile pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (d)[1] because he sexually abused J.M., and removing B.R. and J.R. from the custody of R.M. (mother). Father contends that there was not substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that he sexually abused J.M., and to support the order removing B.R. and J.R. from mother’s custody. We affirm.

Christopher M. appeals from the dependency court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order relating to his three-year-old son Joseph W., claiming the findings and order are not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Arzzie Henderson, also known as Ozzie Henderson, appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction by jury of sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352).[1] The trial court found the allegation that appellant had suffered a prior felony strike within the meaning of Penal Code sections 1170.2, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) to be true, but dismissed the strike because it was remote. It sentenced appellant to state prison for the upper term of five years. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his Marsden[2] motion, thereby depriving him of his right to counsel.
We affirm.

Michael Esparza, also known as Miguel Ruiz, appeals from the judgment entered upon his convictions by jury of two counts of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422, counts 3 & 4),[1] and one count each of disobeying a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4), count 5) and misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a), count 6).[2] The trial court sentenced appellant to state prison for the upper term of three years on count 3 and to concurrent sentences on counts 4, 5 and 6. Appellant contends that his concurrent sentence on count 4 should have been stayed pursuant to section 654.
We affirm.

A jury convicted defendants, Ditrick Wells, Edward Tyler and Keisha Gordon, of multiple crimes against one or more victims: second degree robbery (Pen. Code,[1] § 211); kidnapping to commit another crime (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)); forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)); forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)); sodomy by use of force (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)); assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); and attempted extortion (§ 524). [2] The trial court sentenced Mr. Wells to 548 years to life in state prison. Mr. Tyler was sentenced to 472 years to life. Ms. Gordon was sentenced to 205 years to life. We modify the judgments to: reverse the 8-year terms (as to Mr. Tyler and Ms. Gordon) and the 16-year terms (as to Mr. Wells) imposed on each of the sex offense convictions; impose $880 in court operations assessments and $660 in court facilities assessments as to Mr. Tyler; impose $300 in court facilities assessments as to Ms. Gordon; impose $510 in court operations assessments as to Mr. Wells; impose a $10,000 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45) as to each defendant; award Mr. Wells 443 days of presentence custody credit plus 66 days of conduct credit for a total of 509 days; and award Mr. Tyler and Ms. Gordon 441 days of custody credit plus 66 days of conduct credit for a total presentence custody credit of 507 days. We also modify the judgment to impose a concurrent 25-years-to-life term on count 12 as to Mr. Wells. Upon remittitur issuance, the trial court may correct its failure to set forth in the minutes its reasons for exercising its section 1385, subdivision (a) discretion in sentencing Mr. Wells on count 10. Alternatively, the trial court may revisit its decision. In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed.