CA Unpub Decisions

A felony complaint was filed against defendant and appellant Raymond Kitilya, charging him in count 1 with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),[1] in count 2 with second degree commercial burglary (§ 459), and in count 3 with misdemeanor battery (§ 242). On the date of arraignment, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of second degree robbery. Pursuant to the case settlement agreement, the remaining counts were dismissed and defendant was sentenced to two years in state prison. Defendant filed a notice of appeal based on “the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea.” His request for a certificate of probable cause was denied.
Counsel was appointed to represent defendant on appeal. On November 16, 2012, appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issues but asked this court to independently review the record for arguable contentions pursuant to People v Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Defendant was advised by letter from this court of his right to submit a supplemental brief on appeal within 30 days.
Defendant filed a supplemental letter brief raising the following issues: (1) the alleged “victim had nothing to do with the sales department, he was neither” security nor “a certified employee,” and he approached defendant with a knife; (2) the victim was not even a citizen, “judging on his English”; and (3) defendant was arrested in Montclair, not in Pomona.

D.W. (father) appeals from a dispositional order declaring his daughter, N.W., a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).[1] Father contends that there was not substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b) as it pertains to him because there was insubstantial evidence that he had care, custody and control over N.W. when she was injured.[2] We hold that father’s appeal is nonjusticiable, and in any event, father’s contention has no merit. Accordingly, we affirm.

Amer and Nadeela Hanna sued Sue Anne Gabriel, successor trustee of the Murray Ray Mickelson Trust, and Nancy R. Smith, trustee of the Nancy R. Smith Trust, on claims relating to a contract that provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party. Defendants prevailed and sought an award of attorney fees in the amount of $73,791.40, plus $945 of attorney fees for appearing at the hearing on the attorney fees motion itself. Defendants supported the motion with a declaration from one attorney, describing the work that he and other attorneys performed in representing defendants in this case, including the number of hours worked and billing rates. Defendants submitted no billing records in support of the motion, claiming that such records were privileged, but they offered to provide the records to the court for in camera review.
The trial court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, awarding attorney fees in the amount of $49,045.00. The court calculated that amount by deducting the following amounts from the total that was requested (and disallowing the $945 requested for the hearing): $8,098.00 incurred in connection with certain discovery motions, which were the subject of a previous award; $9,450.00 for work that the court determined was excessive; and $7,198.40 for work that the court determined was insufficiently substantiated by the evidence submitted by defendants. Plaintiffs timely appealed from the fee award.
On appeal, plaintiffs expressly concede that defendants are entitled to an award of attorney fees. Plaintiffs challenge only the amount of the award. We review the trial court’s determination of the amount of an attorney fees award for abuse of discretion. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

Anthony Hicks appeals the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of robbery, false imprisonment by violence, kidnapping for the purpose of robbery and criminal threats. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 236, 237, subd. (b), 209, subd. (b)(1), 422.)[1] The jury found Hicks personally used a firearm in the commission of robbery, false imprisonment by violence and kidnapping for the purpose of robbery. The trial court sentenced Hicks to life with the possibility of parole for kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, plus 10 years for the associated firearm enhancement. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) The trial court imposed concurrent terms on the remaining counts.
Hicks contends the conviction of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery is not supported by sufficient evidence, the conviction of false imprisonment by violence must be reversed as a lesser offense included within kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, the concurrent term imposed for robbery must be stayed pursuant to section 654, the trial court erred in failing to award presentence custody credit with respect to the concurrent terms, and the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect a conviction of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery in violation of section 209, subdivision (b)(1).
We reject the claim of insufficient evidence to support the conviction of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery but accept the People’s concession the remaining claims are meritorious. We also agree with the People’s assertion a $40 court security assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) and a $30 court facility assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373) must be imposed as to counts 1 and 6. We therefore reverse the conviction of false imprisonment by violence in count 3, order the term imposed with respect to count 1 stayed pursuant to section 654, modify the abstract of judgment to reflect custody credit against the concurrent terms, and order a $40 court security assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) and a $30 court facility assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373) as to counts 1 and 6. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and respondent Belen Escobar De-Ortez filed a complaint against defendants and appellants Salvador Ortiz Acuna and Angelica Veronica Bugarel seeking, inter alia, to quiet title and transfer legal title to her on properties on Short Avenue and Bullis Road in Compton. Following a court trial based on disputed evidence, judgment was entered transferring title to both properties to plaintiff and awarding damages against Acuna, plaintiff’s former husband, in the amount of $189,212. A motion to vacate the judgment based upon extrinsic fraud was denied. Sanctions were imposed upon defendants’ attorney in the amount of $4,480 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7[1] for filing a frivolous motion. Defendants filed a notice of appeal from the judgment, the order denying the motion to vacate the judgment, and the order imposing sanctions.
Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss defendants’ appeal in its entirety on June 22, 2012. After receiving defendants’ response and plaintiff’s reply to the response, this court on July 17, 2012, granted the motion to dismiss the appeal from the judgment as untimely.[2] We permitted the appeal to proceed as to the orders denying the motion to vacate the judgment and imposing sanctions.

Appellant Larry Sikes was convicted by a jury of second degree robbery and possession of a controlled substance. In a bifurcated trial the jury found that appellant had suffered two strike priors. Appellant was sentenced to state prison as a “three striker” to a total term of 25 years to life. He contends that the trial court erred in not dismissing one or both of the prior strikes (see People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero)). We will affirm.

Jose Trinidad Alvarez appeals from the judgment following his conviction for sexually abusing two family members. We affirm.

Plaintiff Heriberto Lopez appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendant Aramark Uniform and Career Apparel, LLC (Aramark) after an order granting Aramark’s motion for summary judgment on Lopez’s complaint alleging disability-related employment claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.) (FEHA). We affirm.

Both parties to this appeal do good deeds. Respondent Los Angeles Regional Food Bank (the Foodbank) is a charitable nonprofit corporation that distributes food to homeless and indigent families and individuals in Los Angeles. Appellant New Life In Christ Full Gospel Church (New Life) is a religious corporation that operates a church in Los Angeles and participates in distributing food to those in need as an affiliated agency of the Foodbank.

Defendant Carlos Paniagua appeals from the order denying his motion for unconditional release under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6608. At the time the motion was made and denied, defendant had been adjudicated a sexually violent predator and committed for treatment. That adjudication was reversed in People v. Paniagua (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 499. Therefore, counsel for defendant argues as follows: that “the underlying judgment in the current case should be treated as void. Welfare and Institutions Code section 6608 only allows a petition for conditional release or unconditional discharge to be filed by a person who has been committed as a sexually violent predator. At this point in time, my client has not been committed as a sexually violent predator.” Defendant’s requested remedy is that “this Court summarily reverse the underlying judgment and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to dismiss my client’s Section 6608 petition as moot given the absence of an underlying sexually violent predator commitment.”

Appellant, then age 17 (but now 18[1]), a juvenile with an extensive history of charging petitions and resulting orders since he was 14, was charged in May 2012 with violating his probation by failing to obey all laws. After a contested dispositional hearing, the juvenile court concluded that he should be placed in confinement with the New Foundations program. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, he appeals and asks this court to determine if there are any issues deserving of further briefing. We have done so, find none, and hence affirm the juvenile court’s order.

Appellant T.T. (mother) challenges an order of the trial court granting the request of respondent J.P. (father) for attorney fees for his legal costs associated with this action brought under California’s Uniform Parentage Act (Family Code section 7600 et seq., hereinafter UPA).[1] In doing so, mother, who never married father, contends the trial court relied on the wrong statute, section 2030, as the basis for the order. While section 2030 is the provision authorizing an award of attorney fees in marital dissolution cases, section 7605 is the provision authorizing such an award under the UPA, and thus should have been relied upon in this action. We agree the trial court erred in relying on section 2030 instead of section 7605 in awarding fees to father, but nonetheless affirm on the ground that the error was harmless because the same result would have been reached under either statute.[2]

Following a no contest plea, the trial court found defendant Santiago Servin Mendez guilty of a felony violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a)[1] (lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years). The court denied probation and sentenced defendant to the midterm of six years’ state imprisonment. Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in denying probation. We disagree and affirm.

Johan Burkes (Mother) appeals an order that denied her permission to relocate to Quebec City, Canada with her son before August 2014. She contends the order is premised on insufficient evidence, that the court abused its discretion when it denied her request for judicial notice of Father’s convictions for driving under the influence, and that it erred when it allowed the court custody mediator to testify as an expert.
The order is supported by ample evidence. The trial court considered Father’s history of alcohol abuse and did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mother’s request for judicial notice. The challenge to the testimony of the court-appointed mediator was forfeited in the trial court. Thus, we affirm.