CA Unpub Decisions

David Laver Young appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of attempting to make a criminal threat and resisting and deterring a police officer. Young argues: (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the offense of attempted criminal threats; (2) the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on unanimity; and (3) the court erred in imposing a fine pursuant to Penal Code section 3000, subdivision (b)(1). None of his contentions have merit, and we affirm the judgment.

David A. Worthington (Worthington), a soils engineer, was persuaded to loan $300,000 to his client, Kenneth Fuller (Fuller), a real estate investor and broker. However, Worthington had to borrow money himself in order to make the loan. Fuller signed a promissory note secured by deed of trust to document the loan. Not having received payment, Worthington filed a complaint against Fuller. The court entered a judgment of judicial foreclosure in favor of Worthington. Fuller, the appellant in this matter, claims the court erred on a number of grounds. Fuller apparently thinks he should not have to pay the money back. We don’t see it that way.
However, we agree that the provision of the promissory note requiring Fuller to pay $75,000 in interest was usurious and that the court erred in decreeing that Fuller owed Worthington that amount. We also agree that the payments made by John Turpin should have been credited to principal and we conclude that prejudgment interest should have been based on the running principal balance as reduced by the application of Turpin’s payments to principal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

This is an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer by JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) and California Reconveyance Company (collectively defendants) to a second amended complaint (the complaint) filed by Jeremy Coats (plaintiff) and Michael R. Coats.[1] The complaint alleged claims against defendants for quiet title and other causes of action related to foreclosure proceedings. Defendants demurred, arguing, among other things, that because neither plaintiff was listed on the title of the subject property or were borrowers on the pertinent loan, they did not have standing to bring suit. The demurrer, to which no opposition was filed, was sustained on those grounds without further leave to amend. We agree with defendants that the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer, and therefore affirm.

Appellant Joseph Anthony Sotelo appealed from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct presentence credits. He contended he was entitled to additional presentence conduct credit under the amendments to Penal Code section 4019.[1] Respondent agreed appellant was entitled to additional presentence credit but disagreed about the amount due. After the Supreme Court decided People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, Sotelo conceded that respondent’s calculation of his presentence conduct credit was correct. He waived his right to oral argument and requested this court issue an opinion awarding him the additional 196 days of conduct credit forthwith. We do so.

Appellant James Wesley Shropshire appeals from the judgment entered on a jury verdict convicting him of conspiracy to commit robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 212.5, subd. (a)/182, subd. (a)(1))[1] and vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), and a court finding that a prior strike conviction allegation was true. (§ 667, subds. (c)-(j); § 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e).) The court imposed a prison term of 13 years, four months consisting of the six-year upper term doubled to 12 years on the conspiracy count and a consecutive 16-month term on the vehicle theft count. On appeal, appellant contends the court violated section 654 by failing to stay sentence on the vehicle theft because the theft, as one of the overt acts charged in the conspiracy to rob offense, was incidental to his single objective to secure money and leave the area. We will affirm.

Defendant Travis Eugene Clements appeals from a judgment entered after a plea of no contest, raising only an issue concerning entitlement to additional pretrial conduct credit. Subsequent to the filing of the briefs in this appeal, both the Supreme Court and this court have rejected the argument defendant presents in this appeal. Applying those relevant precedents, we reject defendant’s contention and affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant and appellant Ivan Tapia guilty of one count of vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851), and he subsequently admitted an allegation that he committed the offense while on bail, within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.1.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior theft crimes under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101, subdivision (b).[1] We affirm.

Defendant, Lasalo Lindon Tonga, and a codefendant, Samiu Alo Latuhoi, were tried before the same jury and found guilty as charged of one count of second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.)[1] The evidence showed that, on September 19, 2010, Latuhoi took two 18-packs of Budweiser beer worth approximately $30 from a Circle K store in Chino Hills, and defendant aided and abetted the robbery by directing Latuhoi to take the beer and by helping Latuhoi forcibly get the beer away from the store clerk, Adrian Reveles.[2]
In a bifurcated trial, the trial court found that defendant had a prior conviction for robbery in 2009, which constituted a prior strike and a prior serious felony conviction or “nickel” prior. (§ 667, subds. (a)-(i).) The prior robbery conviction was based on defendant’s act of forcibly taking an 18-pack of beer from a 7-Eleven store, without paying for it, or by driving the getaway vehicle. Defendant pled no contest to the 2009 robbery charge, and was sentenced to 180 days in jail plus three years’ formal probation on the conviction.
At the time of his sentencing on his current robbery conviction in September 2011, defendant was 24 years old. The court denied his Romero[3] motion to strike his prior strike and sentenced him to 11 years in prison.[4] Defendant was further ordered to pay $4,369 in restitution to Reveles for a broken tooth he suffered during the robbery, and the order was made joint and several against defendant and Latuhoi. (§ 1202.4.)
On this appeal, defendant claims: (1) the prosecutor committed

Carmen C. seeks writ review of a juvenile court order terminating her reunification services in the dependency case of her son, Isaiah C., and setting a section 366.26 hearing. Carmen contends the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) and the court failed to give notice of the proceedings to alleged father L.M., also known as Louis M. We dismiss the petition.

In October 2010, the fourth delinquency petition for 15-year-old Edward A. alleged two counts of rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)) with an aiding and abetting allegation (Pen. Code, § 264.1) attached to count 1. Edward was detained in juvenile hall, then released to his father on home supervision with electronic surveillance. In December, Edward admitted violating the terms of his home supervision and he was detained in juvenile hall. In January 2011, home supervision with electronic surveillance resumed, and the petition was amended to add a gang enhancement to each count. In May, Edward entered a negotiated admission to violating the curfew condition of his probation and the court committed him to the Breaking Cycles program for a period not to exceed 365 days. On October 19, 2011, the petition was amended again by adding a third count, sexual battery (Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (a)). That day, Edward entered a negotiated admission to count 2 and the remaining counts and the enhancements were dismissed with a Harvey waiver (People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754).
On October 27, 2011, Edward was arrested for violating probation by associating with gang members and evading the police. In November, after an evidentiary hearing, the court found Edward had violated a gang condition of his probation. In February 2012, the court committed 16-and-one-half-year-old Edward to California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a maximum term of 10 years four months. Edward appeals. We affirm.

Robert E. Williams entered into a plea agreement under which he pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,[1] § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and admitted that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The remaining charges and allegations were dismissed. At the time of the plea the trial judge indicated he would accept a "lid" on the sentence of five years and that he would consider any lesser sentences including probation.
Prior to sentencing, defense counsel (George Osper) informed the court that Williams wished to withdraw his plea and that there would be a conflict of interest if Osper was to bring the motion. The court then held a "Marsden type motion," referring to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
Following the Marsden hearing the trial judge relieved Mr. Osper and Ms. Stacie Patterson was appointed to represent Williams.
Approximately two months later, Ms. Patterson advised the court that she could not, in good faith, file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea as Williams had requested. The court again held a Marsden type hearing. After hearing from Patterson and Williams, the court denied Williams's request for new counsel and denied Williams's request to withdraw his guilty plea. Williams was then sentenced to a determinate term of five years in prison.

Plaintiff and respondent Target Corporation (Target) brought a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and for trespass damages against defendant and appellant Canvass for a Cause (CFAC), seeking to restrict or prevent CFAC from pursuing its canvassing and soliciting activities outside of various Target store entrances, such as on sidewalks located in large or small shopping centers, or stand-alone Target stores.
The matter is before us on CFAC's appeal of the trial court's order denying CFAC's special motion to strike Target's complaint, under anti-SLAPP provisions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (i).)[1] CFAC asserts that the entire action against it should be stricken, because it impermissibly attacks CFAC's protected free speech activities of going to places such as Target stores to engage in "face-to-face conversations with the voting public" about human rights issues, chiefly its views on marriage and equality.[2]

Defendant Michele Lynn Hickok pleaded no contest to possession of methamphetamine. She now contends the trial court erred in (1) denying her motion to suppress evidence, and (2) imposing a $59 jail classification fee and a $287 jail booking fee without determining defendant’s ability to pay them.
We conclude (1) the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress because she consented to the warrantless search of her bedroom; and (2) we will remand the matter to permit a determination regarding defendant’s ability to pay the booking and classification fees.

In the early morning hours of June 7, 2008, 17-year-old Frank Abella (defendant) and an acquaintance, James Washington, killed a mentally and physically handicapped man as he sat outside a 7-Eleven store sipping coffee. Tried separately as an adult, defendant was convicted of murder ( "Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)" Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); further undesignated section references are to the "Penal Code" Penal Code), robbery ( "§ 211" § 211), and torture ( "§ 206" § 206). The jury also found defendant used a deadly weapon in connection with the murder and torture ( "§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)" § 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and the murder occurred during the commission of the robbery ( "§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)" § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)). Defendant was sentenced on the murder under "section 190.5, subdivision (b)" section 190.5, subdivision (b), to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), while sentence on the other offenses was stayed with the exception of a one-year enhancement.