CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant David V. appeals from an order of wardship entered following findings he was a minor in possession of a concealable firearm for the benefit of a criminal street gang. He was ordered home on probation. Appellant contends the recovered handgun and his statements to police were the product of an unlawful detention, and the evidence was insufficient to support the gang enhancement findings.[1]

Defendants and appellants Centurion Property Management Group II, LLC, Centurion Partners, LLC, and Francesco Mileto appeal from the judgment entered in favor of respondent CRE Venture 2011-2 LLC. We affirm.

Weber DeSiqueira appeals from a trial court order staying his lawsuit and ordering contractual arbitration. The order compelling arbitration is not appealable. Further, it was not the “death knell” of DeSiqueira’s case because it is neither impossible nor impracticable for him to proceed with his individual claims. Finally, there are no exceptional circumstances warranting treatment of the appeal as a writ of mandate. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Lucky Pettis Clark appeals the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of first degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.) He contends the trial court erred in permitting the People to introduce evidence of an uncharged burglary to show his intent in the charged burglary. We find no error in the admission of the evidence. Moreover, even if error is assumed, it was harmless. We therefore affirm the judgment.

We reverse an attorney fee award made pursuant to Family Code section 2030 (section 2030) because there was no evidence the party ordered to pay the fees – appellant Rebecca Nation – had the ability to pay them. Although there was evidence that Nation’s mother, a nonparty, had the ability to pay, Nation’s mother could not be ordered under section 2030 to finance her ex-son-in-law’s litigation.

Bernardo Fuentes appeals the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of assault with a firearm on a peace officer in which he personally discharged a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a felon. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (d)(1), 12022.53, subd. (c), former § 12021, subd. (a)(1).)[1] Fuentes contends the judgment should be modified to reflect a stay pursuant to section 654 of the concurrent term imposed for possession of a firearm by a felon. Fuentes also requests an independent review of the in camera hearing on his Pitchess motion (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531). (See People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1228-1232.)
Fuentes’s sentencing contention fails because the evidence reveals Fuentes possessed the firearm prior to the assault. (People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 22.) With respect to the Mooc request, review of the in camera hearing reveals no abuse of the trial court’s discretion. We therefore affirm the judgment.

The plaintiff homeowners filed a complaint alleging the defendant mortgage broker, investor, escrow officer and escrow company conspired to defraud them by recording unnecessary liens against their property as part of a scheme to steal the equity in the property. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendants, finding the plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden of proof and the statute of limitations barred their claims. The homeowners appeal. We affirm.

Appellant, Marcia B., appeals from an order granting respondent, Beth C., presumptive parentage status under Family Code section[1] 7611, subdivision (d). The court found that Beth C. was Ian B.’s legal parent pursuant to section 7611, subdivision (d) because Beth C. received Ian B. into her home and held him out as her son. Before this court, Marcia B. argues that the lower court’s finding should be reversed because the court’s interpretation of section 7611 was erroneous and the judgment is counter to public policy. As we shall explain, the evidence presented supported the court’s conclusion and appellant’s “policy” arguments are unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendant and appellant, Fernando Hernandez, appeals his conviction for murder, premeditated attempted murder (2 counts), possession of a firearm by a felon, dissuading a witness, and aggravated assault, with firearm and gang enhancements (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664/187, 12021 (former), 136.1, subd. (c)(1), 245, 12022.53, 186.22).[1] Hernandez was sentenced to state prison for a term of 205 years to life.
The judgment is affirmed as modified and remanded with instructions.

Real parties in interest Ventura County Sheriff's Department (Sheriff's Department) and County of Ventura (County) terminated Pablo Lazaro's employment as a deputy sheriff after he failed to pass field patrol training. The Ventura County Civil Service Commission (Commission) upheld his termination. Lazaro appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of mandamus. We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's decision and affirm.

A jury acquitted Mack Fuller on charges of transportation of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) and possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5), but found him guilty of one count of possession of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)), a lesser included offense of the possession for sale charge. On appeal, Fuller contends the prosecutor engaged in several instances of prejudicial misconduct, and that the trial court erred in denying him probation pursuant to Proposition 36. Fuller also asserts, and the People concede, that the abstract of judgment is incorrect. In addition, Fuller requests that we review the in camera proceedings the trial court conducted pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). We direct the trial court to modify the abstract of judgment, and otherwise affirm.

Bernards Bros., Inc., a general contractor, and Seaboard Surety, its bonding company, appeal from a judgment awarding damages, statutory penalties, prejudgment interest, costs and attorney fees to Bernards’s subcontractor, G&W Builders. G&W cross‑appeals claiming that the court should have awarded attorney fees pursuant to the payment bond as well as the prompt payment statutes. We affirm the judgment except as to the cause of action for late progress payments and remand the matter to the trial court for a calculation of the resulting attorney fees and costs and recalculation of G&W’s prejudgment interest.

In recent years, many cities have decided that promoting the increased use of bicycles improves the quality of life and promotes a variety of public policies. Since 1997, San Francisco has been one of these cities. A decade later, an upgrade to the City’s statutory Bicycle Plan generated an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) of more than 2,000 pages that was certified by the City’s Board of Supervisors. Two groups and one individual objected, to no avail, to the trial court ruling that that the EIR complied with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.[1]). Only the individual, Rob Anderson, continues the attack, appealing from the trial court’s order. He contends that the EIR is riddled with fundamental procedural and substantive legal error, and that the massive administrative record of more than 36,000 pages will not support numerous findings of the trial court. Aided in large measure by the trial court’s comprehensive written decision, we reject all of Anderson’s challenges to the EIR itself. However, he does identify a defect in the process when the EIR was certified by the Board of Supervisors, which failed to make a handful of findings required by CEQA. We therefore must reverse in order that this omission may be corrected.

This action concerns a challenge to the nonjudicial foreclosure sale of rental residential property in San Jose which had been owned by William Cheng and Janet Cheng (collectively, appellants). They appeal from a judgment entered against them after a court trial. We will affirm the judgment and the subsequent order granting attorney fees and costs.