CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Carlos Gonzalez pleaded no contest to felony evasion of a pursuing police officer and misdemeanor driving on a suspended license ( "Veh. Code, §§ 2800.2, subd. (a), 14601.2, subd. (a)" Veh. Code, §§ 2800.2, subd. (a), 14601.2, subd. (a)), and admitted he had a prior strike conviction and had served a prior prison term ( "Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12" Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12).[1] In accordance with the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to five years in state prison. On appeal, he contends the trial court (1) coerced his plea and (2) violated "section 1204.5" section 1204.5 by reviewing, prior to defendant’s change of plea, the preliminary hearing transcripts and the People’s motion in limine, which contained information regarding his prior criminal history. We affirm.

On December 7, 2011, police arrested appellant James Pak for misdemeanor domestic battery of his girlfriend, a crime seen by at least two witnesses. Six days later on December 13, 2011, appellant grabbed a cell phone from the hand of a fellow bus passenger. When the cell phone’s owner tried to recover his phone, appellant threatened the owner with a tire iron.

Following an adjudication and disposition hearing, the juvenile court sustained a petition charging minor and appellant Jay T. (the minor) with battery causing great bodily injury. On appeal, his appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) requesting that this court independently review the entire record to determine if there are any issues, which if resolved in the minor’s favor, would require reversal or modification of the judgment. Accordingly, we notified the minor that he could brief any grounds of appeal, contentions, or arguments he wanted us to consider. The minor did not file a response brief.
Based on our independent review of the entire file, we conclude that there are no arguable issues on appeal. We therefore affirm the adjudication and disposition orders from which the minor appeals.

Appellant mother seeks to reverse the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights with respect to her son. She contends that the trial court’s finding that the “beneficial parent-child relationship” exception did not apply was not supported by the evidence. Thus, she argues, the order based on such finding was erroneous. We disagree and hold that the mother failed to produce evidence sufficient to show that the child would benefit from continuing a relationship with her or that termination of her parental rights would be detrimental to her son.

Defendant and appellant George Cullors appeals from an order revoking his probation for a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. On appeal, defendant’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record to determine if there are any arguable issues. On November 5, 2012, we gave notice to defendant that counsel had failed to find any arguable issues and that defendant had 30 days within which to submit by brief or letter any grounds of appeal, contentions, or arguments he wished this court to consider. Defendant did not file a responsive brief or letter. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Clifton Rochelle Carr was convicted by jury of possession of cocaine base for the purpose of sale, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5. The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of five years to be served in county jail, with custody and conduct credits totaling 180 days.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. This court appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issues but requesting this court to independently review the record for arguable appellate contentions pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Defendant was advised by letter from this court of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days. The 30-day period has elapsed, and no supplemental brief has been received from defendant.

Guadalupe G. (Mother) appeals from the December 28, 2011 and January 27, 2012 jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court adjudging minors Christopher P. and Richard P. dependents of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300, subdivisions (a) (serious bodily injury), (b) (failure to protect), and (j) (abuse of sibling).[1] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s jurisdictional findings and argues that the dispositional orders should be reversed or modified. We conclude the jurisdictional findings were supported by the evidence and the court did not abuse its discretion in making the dispositional orders. We affirm the orders of the court.

A jury convicted appellant William Tillman of one count of possession of a weapon in a penal institution (Pen. Code, § 4502, subd. (a)).[1] The jury acquitted appellant of a second count of the same offense. Appellant admitted a prior conviction and the court sentenced him to two years in state prison comprised of one year (one-third of the middle term of three years) doubled to two years for the prior strike conviction. The sentence was to be served consecutively to the sentence he was already serving.

Minor Andy F. (minor) appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court. His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues. On August 3, 2012, we notified minor of his counsel’s brief and gave him leave to file, within 30 days, his own brief or letter stating any grounds or argument he might wish to have considered. That time has elapsed and minor has submitted no letter or brief. We have reviewed the entire record and finding no arguable issues, we affirm the judgment.

Ibrahim Brown pled no contest to one count of receiving stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a). On appeal, the parties agree the trial court incorrectly calculated an award of presentence conduct credits. However, they disagree on the number of days of conduct credit the trial court should have awarded, based on conflicting interpretations of Penal Code section 4019, subdivision (h).[1] We conclude Brown is entitled to 107 additional days of conduct credit, modify the judgment accordingly, and otherwise affirm.

Defendant and appellant Kevin D. Moore was convicted by jury of first degree residential burglary with a person present, in violation of Penal Code section 459.[1] The jury was unable to reach a verdict in count 2 on a charge of attempted robbery, in violation of sections 664 and 211. In a separate proceeding, the trial court found defendant had suffered 11 prior convictions under the three strikes law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and four serious felony prior convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1).)
The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of 45 years to life in state prison. For the burglary conviction, defendant was sentenced to state prison for 25 years to life pursuant to the three strikes law for the burglary. That sentence was enhanced by five years for each of the four prior serious felony convictions under section 667, subdivision (a).
In his timely appeal from the judgment, defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to prove the allegation that he suffered a section 667, subdivision (a), prior serious felony conviction in case No. A192827, because the prosecution presented no proof of the nature of the prior offense from the record of conviction. The Attorney General concedes the insufficiency of the evidence as to this one prior serious felony conviction but argues the proper remedy is to reverse the finding on the prior conviction allegation and remand to the trial court for retrial. We agree and accordingly affirm the judgment of conviction, reverse the finding that defendant suffered a prior serious felony conviction in case No. A192827, and remand the matter for further proceedings on that allegation to the trial court.[2]

The jury found defendants and appellants Chanthoeurn Chhuon and Srun Ly guilty in count 1 of home invasion robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),[1] in count 2 of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), and in count 3 of making criminal threats (§ 422). Allegations that a principal used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (e)(1), and that the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C), were found true with respect to both defendants on all counts. The jury also found, as to all counts, that Chhuon personally inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). Chhuon admitted he suffered four prior convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)‑(d)) and within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Ly admitted that he suffered two prior convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law and section 667, subdivision (a)(1).

Appellant Fuchs & Associates, Inc. (Fuchs) sued its former client, respondent Elke Lesso, for unpaid attorney fees of $647,688.13. The matter was submitted to binding arbitration. The arbitrator found that Fuchs was not entitled to recover any additional fees beyond those already paid and that its attorney fee lien was invalid. On appeal from the judgment confirming the arbitration award, Fuchs makes several contentions, including that the arbitrator exceeded his authority, the arbitration hearing should have been continued, and there was manifest disregard of the law. We affirm.

Appellant, E.R., then a minor, was adjudicated to have committed the crime of vandalism of property (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a)), a misdemeanor, in this delinquency proceeding (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602). He raises a single ground on appeal: that the evidence does not support the adjudication. We conclude that it does, and affirm the adjudication.