CA Unpub Decisions

Respondent California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) dismissed appellant James Salas from his employment as a parole agent after determining that he had engaged in misconduct. Salas appealed the dismissal to the California State Personnel Board (Board), which upheld the dismissal. Salas thereafter filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus in the superior court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.[1] The court denied the petition and entered judgment in favor of the CDCR and the Board.
On appeal, Salas contends that “it does not appear that there is any indication that the trial court applied the correct standard of review” with respect to the Board’s decision and that the matter should be remanded so that the court may apply the proper standard. He also argues that there is not substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings. Salas further contends that his dismissal from employment was “grossly disproportionate to the alleged wrongs.”
For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Deotis Lee Thompson appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5 - counts one, three) and one count of transporting cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a) - count two). Defendant admitted the allegations that he had previously committed a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)‑(i), 1170.12), had served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)), had a prior conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11370.2, 11370, subds. (a), (c)), and was out on bail when he committed two of the charged offenses (Pen. Code, § 12022.1). The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 10 years and eight months in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to suppress evidence; (2) denied his motion to disclose the confidential informant; (3) admitted evidence of his prior drug sales; and (4) imposed attorney’s fees without holding a hearing to determine his ability to pay. Defendant also contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. We conclude that the matter must be remanded for a hearing on defendant’s ability to pay attorney’s fees. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed.

Vered Marash appeals from a judgment resolving issues over spousal and child support in proceedings arising from the dissolution of her marriage to respondent Zachary Whitman.[1] Vered contends that the family court abused its discretion by using Zachary's actual rather than imputed income to calculate support, by ordering her to reimburse Zachary for his overpayment of temporary support, by refusing to deviate upward from guideline child support, and by failing to consider fully the parties' relative circumstances in determining permanent spousal support. We find no abuse of discretion in the court's support orders, with the exception of a Dissomaster calculation error both parties recognize. We further agree with Vered's final contention, that the court failed to make findings on Vered's request for pendente lite attorney fees under Family Code section 2030.[2] We will therefore remand this matter for recalculation of child support and for consideration of attorney fees under section 2030.

Michael B. in propria persona seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a dispositional hearing denying him reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing[1] as to his three-month-old daughter L.B.[2] We deny the petition.

Respondent EarthRenew, Inc. (ER), as the developer of a specialized organic fertilizer product (the Product), sought to market the Product in the Western United States. Appellant Crop Production Services, Inc. (CPS) is a large distributor of agricultural products in that region. In May 2009, an agreement was signed by representatives of ER and CPS, giving CPS the exclusive right to retail the Product in the Western United States and obligating CPS to purchase a large percentage of the Product to be produced there by ER (the Contract). At that time, ER was in the process of raising capital through a private placement facilitated by Royal Bank of Canada, which would provide the financing needed for the construction of production facilities in the Western United States. ER informed CPS of this fact and that, in seeking such financing, ER was relying on the revenue it would receive from the Contract with CPS. Two months after the Contract was signed, CPS filed a lawsuit for declaratory relief asking the trial court to declare the Contract void or invalid based on an alleged lack of authority of the person who signed it on behalf of CPS. The next day, a CPS director personally contacted Royal Bank of Canada and notified it of CPS’s lawsuit to nullify the Contract with ER. As one might expect, ER’s financing efforts through Royal Bank of Canada fell through. ER then filed a cross-complaint which, after an amendment, included tort causes of action against CPS for deceit, intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage (the amended cross-complaint).[1] CPS responded by filing a special motion to strike the tort causes of action in the amended cross-complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (also known as an anti-SLAPP motion).[2] The trial court denied the motion on the ground that CPS failed to make a threshold showing that the tort causes of action in the amended cross-complaint arose out of conduct protected by section 425.16. CPS appeals from that order, arguing that (i) it demonstrated the challenged causes of action arose out of protected conduct, and (ii) ER failed to establish a probability of prevailing on those causes of action. We agree with CPS on both points, and accordingly reverse with instructions that the trial court enter a new order granting the special motion to strike.

Mother, C.H., and father, A.F., appeal from a judgment terminating their parental rights to S.F., born in 2007, and A.F., born in 2010. The children became dependents due to neglect, based on lack of supervision and the parents’ drug use, as well as a history of domestic violence. (Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] § 300, subd. (b).) After one year of services, mother was awarded sole custody of the children. However, six months later, the dependency was reactivated when the parents engaged in domestic violence in the presence of the children and it was learned they were using drugs. Because the parents failed to comply with drug testing, the court denied services when it reestablished jurisdiction, and scheduled a hearing to select and implement a permanent plan of adoption. (§ 366.26.) Subsequently, parental rights were terminated.
On appeal, both parents argue there was a beneficial parent-child relationship warranting continuation of the relationship. In addition, mother argues the court erred (a) in denying reunification services;[2] and (b) denying her petition to modify the order denying services and setting the section 366.26. (§ 388.) We affirm.

The probate court appointed petitioner and appellant Stanley Sniff, the Riverside County Public Administrator, as the special administrator for the estate of the decedent, Marilyn Yokaitis. (§ 8540 et seq.) Objector and respondent, Heidi Morandini (Morandini), is the surviving adult daughter of decedent and the residuary beneficiary of the bulk of the estate. Donald Yokaitis (Donald) is decedent’s surviving spouse.
The issue on appeal is whether the Public Administrator is entitled, under section 7621, subdivision (d), to be paid a statutory bond fee of about $265,000 in lieu of payment of a bond premium (in-lieu bond fee). Morandini opposes payment of the fee on the grounds the Public Administrator did not have to post a statutory bond under section 8542 and also waived any bond fee.
After reviewing supplemental briefing regarding the applicability of section 8542, we have concluded that, when the Public Administrator was appointed as a special administrator in this case, it was not required to post a bond. We agree with the probate court’s finding that the parties waived any bond fee that may have been required under section 7621. We affirm the judgment.[2]

During a traffic stop, defendant Larry Dale Chapman was caught with 143.5 grams of methamphetamine hidden in his car. A jury convicted defendant of two crimes: possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and transportation of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a).) Defendant admitted two prior drug offense convictions (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11370.2, subd. (c), 11378) and four prior prison terms. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).) The court sentenced defendant to 14 years in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because the court denied defendant’s request to appoint private counsel. Defendant asserts various instructional and evidentiary errors related to his chief defense, which is that “[defendant] was entrapped by the woman he loved, who was acting as an agent of the officer who detained and searched him.” The record, however, does not offer sufficient evidence to support these contentions, which defendant attributes to the court’s “errors, myopic rulings, and prosecutorial misconduct.” We reject defendant’s claims of error and affirm the judgment.

Respondent D.M. (mother) appeals judgment entered following a trial on a petition to establish paternity, in which the court awarded mother and M.F. (father) equal visitation and joint legal and physical custody of Samantha F. (Samantha). Mother contends she was deprived of a fair trial before an unbiased judge, in violation of her state and federal constitutional due process rights. She argues the trial court’s judges and staff conspired to deprive her of a fair trial because she filed several motions for disqualification of judicial officers under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1.[1]

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Johnny Acosta of first degree murder (count 1—Pen. Code § 187, subd. (a)).[1] The jury additionally found true allegations defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a hammer, in committing the count 1 offense; had incurred two prior strike convictions; and two prior serious felony convictions. The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of incarceration of 81 years to life. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in not instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 627 on its own motion, and in not holding a constitutionally adequate Marsden hearing.[2] We affirm the judgment.

A.S. appeals orders entered at a jurisdictional and dispositional hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300, subdivision (b), and 361. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held that review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting [her] custody of a child or [her] status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny A.S.'s requests to review the record for error and to address the Anders issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)

A.G. appeals orders entered at a jurisdiction and disposition hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300 and 360 et seq. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.

Sean S. appeals findings and orders entered at a permanency plan and selection hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held that review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny Sean's requests to review the record for error and to address the Anders issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
Sean's counsel requests leave for her client to file a supplemental brief in propria persona (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835) and also asks this court to order counsel to brief any arguable issue (Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75, 88). The requests are denied.

Monica A., the mother of Karina P., Monique M., Raymond R., Jr. (Raymond), and Danny T., Jr. (Danny), appeals the dispositional orders removing the children from her custody after the juvenile court sustained dependency petitions alleging the children were at risk because of domestic violence in the family home (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c)(1)).[1] Danny T., Sr. (Danny T.), the father of Danny, also appeals the removal of his son from parental custody. The parents contend the removal orders were not supported by substantial evidence. Monica also contends the court did not comply with the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963).