Tresch v.
of Sonoma
Agricultural Preservation and Open Space Dist. Bd. of Directors
Filed 1/4/13
Tresch v. County of Sonoma Agricultural Preservation and Open Space
Dist. Bd. of Directors CA1/4
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
JOSEPH W. TRESCH et al.,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
COUNTY OF SONOMA
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION AND OPEN SPACE DISTRICT BOARD OF DIRECTORS et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents;
JOHN BARELLA et al.,
Real Parties in
Interest and Respondents.
A133472
(Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. SCV
249021)
I.
Introduction
This
appeal arises from the adoption by a conservation district of a resolution
interpreting an existing conservation easement to permit the establishment of a
wildlife preserve on agricultural land.
The preserve was proposed in the environmental impact report (EIR)
prepared for a neighboring quarry project, as one potential means of mitigating
the impact of the quarry on certain protected species. However, neither the conservation district’s
resolution nor the conditions attached to approval of the quarry’s EIR actually
required that the preserve be established.
We hold that under these circumstances, adoption of the resolution
interpreting the easement did not constitute “approval of a project†within the
meaning of the California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21000 et seq.).
dismissal of appellants’ petition challenging the resolution under CEQA, and
seeking an injunction against the adoption of similar resolutions without prior
CEQA review.
II.
Facts
and Procedural Background
Under
California law, counties may establish special districts for the purpose of
preserving open space and agricultural land through the purchase of
agricultural conservation easements restricting the development and use of
privately owned land. (See § 5500
et seq. [formation of special districts]; § 10200 et seq. [California
Farmland Conservancy Program Act]; § 10211 [defining agricultural conservation
easements]; see also Civ. Code, § 815 et seq. [conservation
easements].) The County of Sonoma Agricultural Preservation and Open Space District (the District) is one such conservation
district.
manages the District. The members of the
District Board consist, by law, of the members of the board of supervisors of
respondent Sonoma County (the County), serving ex officio.
In
2001 or 2002, respondents John Barella and the John E. Barella and Andrea M.
Barella Trust (collectively Barella) purchased a tract of land in
County consisting of a parcel containing a potential gravel quarry site
(the Quarry Parcel), together with an adjacent parcel of 758 acres (the
Easement Parcel). In 2004, the District
paid Barella some $2.2 million in exchange for Barella’s agreement to
burden the Easement Parcel with a conservation easement (the Easement). The Easement prohibits the owner of the
Easement Parcel from carrying out “any nonagricultural commercial or industrial
activity or use†on the land.
After
the District purchased the Easement, Barella divided the Easement Parcel into
two separate parcels. Barella sold the
western parcel (the Wilson property) to Ken and Clairette Wilson, who were not
named in the petition and are not parties to this appeal. The eastern parcel (the Tresch property) was
sold to appellants Joseph W. Tresch and Kathleen M. Tresch as trustees of the
Joseph W. and Kathleen M. Tresch Revocable Trust (the Tresch parties).
In
2003, Barella submitted an application to the County to develop a gravel quarry
(the Quarry) on the Quarry Parcel.
Approval of the Quarry required a zoning change, a use permit, a
reclamation plan, and an environmental impact report (EIR). A draft EIR for the Quarry was circulated in
2008. A proposed final EIR was released
in October 2009, but at a hearing before the County’s planning commission (the
Planning Commission) in December, its approval was postponed, and the hearing
was later rescheduled for April 1, 2010.
On
April 1, the Planning Commission recommended that the County Board approve the
proposed final EIR, and approve a particular alternative described in the EIR
as the environmentally superior alternative for development of the quarry. After the Planning Commission vote, however,
larvae of the California tiger salamander (CTS), a federally designated
endangered species, were discovered on the Quarry Parcel, at a location near
the Easement Parcel. It was also
discovered that the Quarry Parcel served as habitat for the California
red-legged frog (CRLF), which is listed as threatened under federal law, and
identified by the California Department of Fish and Game as a species of
special concern.
In
the wake of the discovery that the CTS and the CRLF (the protected species)
lived on the Quarry Parcel, the County determined that the EIR for the Quarry
had to be revised and recirculated.
Ultimately, the County imposed conditions on its approval of the Quarry
that required Barella to “implement measures to minimize and avoid take†of the
CRLF, and to comply with the federal Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C.
§ 1531 et seq.) with respect to the CTS.
On
July 21, Barella’s counsel wrote a letter to the District asking (among other
things) that the Easement be clarified or amended “to allow, concurrent with
grazing, 105 acres of the Easement [Parcel] to be utilized as a . . .
preserve†(the Preserve) for the protected species. The letter explained that “[i]mprovements
associated with the [P]reserve would consist primarily of expanding the size of
an existing stock pond and constructing an additional stock pond, both of which
could be used by cattle and as habitat for the two [protected] species.†On August 12, Barella’s counsel followed up
on the earlier letter by indicating that one of the two owners of the Wilson
property concurred in Barella’s request.
Neither of the owners of the Wilson property had any other involvement
in the events at issue in this case.
On
September 29, Barella’s counsel wrote to the District again. The letter asked the District to “acknowledge
that the preservation of [the protected species], in tandem with historic
grazing activities, and the enhancement of historic grazing activities and
species preservation through the construction of a .15 to .25 acre stock
pond[,] are consistent and permitted uses under the [E]asement on the Wilson
property.†The letter also stated that
the reason for the request was the possibility that approval of the Quarry
might be conditioned on the improvement of an existing road to serve the
Quarry, rather than the creation of a new access road across the Wilson
property. Barella’s counsel sent the
County a similar letter on October 13, opining that “the existing terms of the
[E]asement over the Wilson [property] allow species preservation in tandem with
the historic grazing operationâ€; acknowledging that the District staff did not
agree; and contending that “at most a technical clarification of the existing
[E]asement is needed.â€
On
October 19, the County Board, acting as such and also as the District Board,
held a public hearing on the EIR for the Quarry, the permit for the Quarry, and
Barella’s request for clarification of the Easement. At the conclusion of the hearing, the County
Board tentatively voted to certify the EIR and approve the Quarry, but rejected
the proposal to create an access route to the Quarry through the Wilson
property. At the same meeting, the
County Board and/or District Board declined to act on Barella’s request for a
clarification of the Easement to permit establishment of the Preserve on the
Wilson property, and instead directed further staff consideration of the issue.
On
October 28, an advisory committee to the District voted to recommend denial of
Barella’s request to establish the Preserve on the Wilson property. On November 9, the District’s staff released
a report concluding that the proposal to establish the Preserve was not consistent
with the terms of the Easement, and should not be allowed without an amendment
to the Easement’s terms. However, the
report indicated that creation of the Preserve would be acceptable if the
Easement were amended, with the consent of all the owners of the Easement
Parcel, and the Preserve were reconfigured.
On
December 7, the District’s general manager wrote to the District Board
recommending that if the District Board wished to grant permission to establish
the Preserve, it should require an amendment to the Easement rather than
interpreting the existing Easement to permit the Preserve under its existing
terms. Despite this recommendation, on
December 14, the District Board passed Resolution No. 10-0925 (the
Resolution) interpreting the Easement to allow the establishment of the
Preserve, subject to certain conditions.
On
the same date, the County Board cast final votes to certify the EIR for the
Quarry, and to grant final approval to the Quarry project, subject to various
conditions as to mitigation. The
documentation for the Quarry and its EIR, as approved by the County Board, did
not include any interpretation or amendment of the Easement with regard to the
establishment of the Preserve.
name="_ftnref6" title="">[6]
On
December 22, the District Respondents filed a notice with the clerk of the
County stating that the Resolution was neither a discretionary act nor a
project within the meaning of CEQA.
Alternatively, the notice stated that the Resolution was exempt from
CEQA because its purpose was to maintain the open space character of the
Easement Parcel and to allow preservation and restoration of natural
conditions, including plant and animal habitats.
Having
exhausted their administrative remedies, appellants
filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Sonoma County Superior Court on
January 26, 2011. This was followed by a
first amended petition (the Petition), filed on March 25, 2011, which is the
operative pleading for purposes of this appeal.
The Petition pleaded two causes of action: one seeking a writ of mandate
requiring the District Respondents to set aside their approval of the
Resolution, based on an alleged violation of CEQA, and to prepare a new EIR for
the Quarry, and the other for injunctive relief, seeking to enjoin the County
Board and the District Board from adopting similar interpretations of similar
conservation easements “to advantage other development projects†in the future,
without considering their environmental impact under CEQA. The Barella parties were named in the
Petition as real parties in interest, but the owners of the Wilson property
were not made parties to the proceeding.
Barella
and the District respondents each separately demurred to the Petition. On July 29, the trial court filed a 26-page
order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, and entered a judgment
dismissing the action. This timely
appeal ensued.
III.
Discussion
A. Order Sustaining Demurrer to
CEQA Petition
1. Standard of Review and
Applicable Legal Principles
Appellants’
first contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in concluding that the
Petition did not state a cause of action for violation of CEQA.
presents only questions of law, so we review the trial court’s decision de
novo. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42.) Here, the
trial court sustained the District’s demurrer to the CEQA cause of action on
the ground that the District’s adoption of the Resolution did not constitute
approval of a project within the meaning of CEQA. Our first task on this appeal, then, is to
assess de novo the correctness of this legal conclusion. (Muzzy
Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372,
381-382 (Muzzy Ranch);
Berkeley (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 974, 984 [“Whether a particular activity
constitutes a project in the first instance is a question of lawâ€].)
CEQA
generally prohibits governmental agencies from approving projects that have
significant impacts on the environment without first completing the
environmental review process, and either mitigating those impacts or finding
mitigation to be infeasible and the impacts to be justified by overriding
considerations. (§§ 21002, 21002.1,
21006, 21081.) CEQA defines a “projectâ€
as “an activity which may cause either a direct physical change in the
environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the
environment,†and which is undertaken, financially supported, or permitted by a
public agency. (§ 21065.) “An activity that is not a ‘project’ as
defined in the Public Resources Code [citation] and the CEQA Guidelines
[citation
is not subject to CEQA.
[Citation.]†(
When
an activity is a project for CEQA purposes, public agency actions constituting
“approval†of the project must be made in compliance with CEQA. “Approval†of a project occurs when a public
agency makes a discretionary decision “ ‘which commits the agency to a
definite course of action in regard to a project,’ †including “ ‘the
issuance by the public agency of a discretionary contract
. . . , permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for
use of the project.’ †(CEQA
Guidelines, § 15352; see Save Tara
v. City of West Hollywood (2008) 45 Cal.4th 116, 129 (Save Tara).) Where a public
agency’s action is limited to determining whether existing regulations have
been complied with, the action is not discretionary for CEQA purposes. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15357.)
As
Barella points out, the District’s adoption of the Resolution, in and of
itself, neither caused a direct physical change to the environment nor
committed the District to any definite course of action. The Resolution, by its terms, does not commit
the District or any other agency to approve any particular location, size,
configuration, or improvements with regard to the Preserve. All it does is confirm that the terms of the
Easement do not preclude the possibility that the Preserve, in some form, could
be established on the Wilson property.
Appellants
argue that the District’s adoption of the Resolution nonetheless required
compliance with CEQA on the following grounds: (1) the mitigation activity
allowed under the Resolution is an integral component of the planned Quarry,
and the Quarry itself is unquestionably a project for CEQA purposes;
(2) if the Resolution is not considered part of the Quarry project,
Barella will be allowed to establish the Preserve without ever complying with
CEQA; and (3) the Resolution has a reasonably foreseeable indirect impact
on the environment due to the possibility that its adoption will set a
precedent for the District to interpret other conservation easements to permit
the use of the underlying land for the benefit of commercial projects. In assessing these arguments, we bear in
mind, as we must, our Supreme Court’s direction that “the Legislature intended
[CEQA] ‘to be interpreted in such manner as to afford the fullest possible
protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory
language.’ [Citation.]†(Laurel
Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47
Cal.3d 376, 390; accord, Muzzy Ranch,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 381.)
2. Relationship of the
Resolution to the Quarry Project
We
turn first to appellants’ argument that adoption of the Resolution constituted
a project because it was an integral part of the overall approval of the
Quarry. In so doing, we recognize that
“CEQA’s conception of a project is broad [citation], and the term is broadly
construed and applied in order to maximize protection of the environment
[citation]. This big picture approach to
the definition of a project (i.e., including ‘ “the whole of an
action†’) prevents a proponent or a public agency from avoiding CEQA
requirements by dividing a project into smaller components which, when
considered separately, may not have a significant environmental effect. [Citations.]
That is, the broad scope of the term ‘project’ prevents ‘the fallacy of
division,’ which is the ‘overlooking [of a project’s] cumulative impact by
separately focusing on isolated parts of the whole.’ [Citation.]â€
(Nelson v. County of Kern
(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 252, 271.)
In
addition, as already noted, because this appeal arises from an order sustaining
a demurrer, we must assume the truth of the Petition’s factual
allegations. Thus, we assume that when
the Board approved the EIR for the Quarry, it based its decision, in part, on
the understanding that the terms of the Easement would not prevent
establishment of the Preserve as a means of mitigating the effect of the Quarry
on the protected species.
Critical
to our analysis, however, is the fact that the conditions for the Quarry set
forth in the EIR do not require the
establishment of the Preserve. Rather,
as to the CRLF, the conditions require only that Barella “minimize and avoid
take†of the species, and obtain “formal consultation†with the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and “issuance of a project-specific
[b]iological [o]pinion.†As to the CTS,
the conditions require that Barella comply with the federal and state laws
protecting endangered species; consult with USFWS; if necessary, obtain a
permit from the California Department of Fish and Game; and consult with the
Army Corps of Engineers regarding compliance with the Clean Water Act with
respect to the Quarry’s impact on wetlands.
Nothing in these conditions makes establishment of the Preserve
inevitable, or (in the words of the CEQA Guidelines) “commits the [District Respondents]
to a definite course of action in regard to†mitigating the Quarry’s impact on
the protected species. (CEQA Guidelines,
§ 15352.)
In
short, while the Resolution clarifies that establishment of the Preserve is
permissible in principle under the existing terms of the Easement, the
Resolution neither requires nor permits any specific action, or any physical
change to the Wilson property.
Similarly, the conditions on the EIR for the Quarry leave it up to the
federal and state agencies involved to determine what mitigation efforts will
be needed in regard to the protected species.
Thus, the conditions of the EIR for the Quarry neither included nor
relied upon the District’s interpretation of the Easement to permit the
Preserve. Moreover, nothing in the
record suggests that Barella cannot satisfy the conditions of the EIR as to the
protected species without creating the Preserve, if there are other means of
sufficiently mitigating the Quarry’s effect on the protected species. Thus, both legally and as a practical matter,
it is possible for the Quarry project to go forward even if the Preserve is
never created.
The
cases on which appellants rely are distinguishable on this basis. In RiverWatch
v. Olivenhain Municipal Water Dist. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1186, the main
project was a landfill. The landfill’s
initial EIR was rejected because it did not adequately address the landfill’s
water requirements. The proponent of the
landfill then entered into a contract with the Olivenhain Municipal Water District
(OMWD) to supply the landfill with a specified quantity of recycled water,
which would be transported by truck. The
OMWD did not conduct any environmental impact analysis before entering into the
contract, and Riverwatch filed a petition for a writ of mandate to require the
preparation of an EIR. The court held
that the activity of trucking recycled water from OMWD to the landfill site,
which would include expansion of a roadway, construction of a loading pad, and
significant trucking activity, was part of the landfill project for purposes of
CEQA. (Id. at pp. 1202-1205.)
In
San Joaquin Raptor/Wildlife Rescue Center
v. County of Stanislaus (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 713, the court held that the
expansion of a wastewater treatment plant and the construction of connecting
sewer lines were part of a set of housing development projects for CEQA
purposes, because they were “crucial elements without which the proposed
projects cannot go forward.†(
Cal.App.3d 818, the court held that an EIR for a proposed sand and gravel mine
was inadequate because it ignored the mine’s need for a water supply. The EIR was incomplete without that
discussion, because it was clear that “the currently existing water delivery
equipment cannot adequately supply the water needs of a sand and gravel mine,â€
and “[a]dditional facilities [would] have to be built.†(Id.
at p. 829.)
In
each of these cases, as the foregoing discussion demonstrates, an activity that
was an essential element of a project, without which the project could not
proceed, was held to be part of the project for CEQA purposes. Here, however, as already discussed, the
District’s adoption of the Resolution was not necessary in order for Barella to comply with the conditions of the
Board’s approval of the EIR. Nor did the
Resolution obligate the District to
permit the Preserve to be established on the Wilson property. Rather, the Resolution merely clarified that
it would not be inconsistent with the existing terms of the Easement for the
Preserve to be established, provided certain conditions were met. Barella has cited no authority holding that
an activity is part of a project for CEQA purposes even if the project could
have gone forward without the approval of that activity. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the
passage of the Resolution was part of the Quarry project for CEQA purposes.
3. Evasion of CEQA Compliance
The
Board’s resolution approving the EIR for the Quarry did not include a
requirement that CEQA review be conducted before any improvements associated
with the Preserve could be constructed.
Based on this omission, appellants argue that if the Resolution is not
treated as part of the Quarry project, it is possible that the eventual
construction of the Preserve-related improvements will evade CEQA review
altogether. Appellants contend that in
order to prevent this, the Preserve must be treated as part of the Quarry project
for CEQA purposes.
In
support of this argument, appellants rely on Cedar Fair, L.P. v. City of Santa Clara (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1150
(Cedar Fair); City of Santee v. County of San Diego (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 55 (
Cal.App.4th 1594 (Rohnert Park); and
High Sch. Dist. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 772 (Stand Tall), disapproved in part in Save Tara, supra, 45
Cal.4th at pp. 132-134. Based on
these cases, appellants contend that when an agency preliminarily agrees to a
contemplated development project, the agency may forego CEQA review only if the
parties expressly agree that CEQA review will be conducted at a later
stage. Thus, appellants argue, the Resolution
does not pass muster as a purely preliminary measure, because the Resolution
does not expressly require future CEQA compliance before the improvements
associated with the Preserve can be constructed.
An
examination of the facts of the cited cases, however, demonstrates that they do
not stand for the broad proposition that all preliminary agency activities
regarding land use must be conditioned on later CEQA compliance. Cedar
Fair, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th
1150, arose from a CEQA challenge to an agreement to negotiate in good faith,
on specified terms, regarding the erection of a new professional football
stadium. Santee, supra, 186
Cal.App.4th 55, involved the selection of proposed sites for the construction
of a new prison. Rohnert Park, supra, 131
Cal.App.4th 1594, involved the potential construction of a casino by an Indian
tribe, and the tribe’s agreement to fund related improvements for the adjacent
city. Stand Tall, supra, 235
Cal.App.3d 772, involved the selection of a site for the construction of a new
high school. As these brief summaries
show, in all of these cases, it was clear from the nature of the proposed
projects that CEQA compliance would be required before the projects could go
forward. Accordingly, in holding that a
preliminary step in the direction of the projects was not “approval of a
project†under CEQA, the courts relied in part on the fact that the public
agencies having jurisdiction to conduct CEQA review had committed themselves to
performing it at a later stage.
Here,
on the other hand, the District does not have general authority to regulate
land use on property covered by conservation easements. Rather, the District’s authority is limited
to enforcing the easements it holds, by ensuring that particular uses of
conserved land are consistent with the contractual terms of the governing
easement. It is the County, through the
County Board, that is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the development
and use of privately owned land in the County—including land subject to
conservation easements held by the District—is carried out in compliance with
CEQA and other applicable state statutes.
(Compare Civ. Code, § 815.7 [enforcement of conservation easements
by injunction] with Sierra Club v. Napa
County Bd. of Supervisors (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 162, 172 (
constitution, municipal entities such as counties have plenary authority to
enact land use regulations and control their own land use decisions, subject to
state law].) Thus, it would not have made
sense for the Resolution, by its terms, to require a CEQA review process that
the District has no authority to conduct.
Conversely,
however, the District’s decision that establishment of the Preserve would not
be inconsistent with the terms of the Easement does not exempt the actual
construction needed to create the Preserve from review by the County, as well
as any other regulatory authority having jurisdiction. Thus, if and when the Preserve is actually
established, the County and any other agencies whose discretionary permission
is required for the construction of the related improvements will have an
opportunity to review the Preserve project.
At that point, these entities will be required by CEQA to determine
whether any CEQA exemption applies, and if not, to order that an EIR be
prepared for the Preserve improvements.
improvements is such that no discretionary approval from the County or any
other agency is required prior to their construction, then CEQA will be
inapplicable. In that event, no CEQA
review would have been required in connection with the establishment of the
Preserve, even if the Resolution had not been adopted. Accordingly, the District’s adoption of the
Resolution, in and of itself, neither resulted in the evasion of any CEQA
review that otherwise would have been conducted, nor permitted the future
construction of the Preserve in violation of applicable CEQA requirements.
4. Potential Indirect
Environmental Impact
As
already noted, appellants argue, in the alternative, that the Resolution was a
project because of its potential use as precedent for the use of conservation
property for the benefit of commercial projects. Appellants cite no authority, however, for
the proposition that the potential precedential effect of an agency’s
interpretation of an existing legal instrument affecting land use constitutes
an indirect environmental impact within the meaning of CEQA.
In
any event, we are not persuaded by appellants’ arguments. All the District did, in adopting the Resolution,
was to determine that it would not be inconsistent with the terms of the
Easement to establish the Preserve on a small portion of the Easement Parcel,
while maintaining the overall historical use of the Easement Parcel as grazing
land. Moreover, the Resolution provides
that the only physical changes to the property contemplated in connection with
the establishment of the Preserve are the creation of one or more stock ponds,
not to exceed half an acre in total size, and the erection of fences to exclude
livestock from the habitat areas of the protected species. Significantly, these physical changes were
already expressly permitted under the existing terms of the Easement. In addition, as already noted, the Resolution
requires the owner of the Easement Parcel to obtain written permission from the
District before actually constructing any new stock ponds, thus giving the
District the opportunity to ensure that any actual physical changes to the
Wilson property are carried out consistently with the terms of the Easement.
In
short, nothing in the Resolution allows any use of the Wilson Property that is
incompatible with the underlying intent of the Easement. Moreover, the Resolution does not permit any
commercial use or development of the Wilson Property, and even expressly
prohibits the sale of mitigation credits.
Accordingly, appellants have not persuaded us that the District’s
adoption of the Resolution constituted approval of a project under CEQA because
it set a precedent for the approval of the use of conservation property for the
benefit of commercial development, or for any other use incompatible with the
underlying purpose of conservation easements.
5. Discretionary Act
Appellants
also argue that the adoption of the Resolution was a discretionary act. This argument begs the question,
however. It is true that a public agency
action must be discretionary in order for CEQA to apply. (Sierra
Club v. Napa, supra, 205
Cal.App.4th at pp. 176-177.) If an
action by a public agency does not constitute approval of a project for CEQA
purposes, however, the fact that the action is discretionary, in and of itself,
will not make CEQA applicable.
Numerous
cases illustrate the principle that not all discretionary decisions related to
land use are subject to CEQA. For
example, in Parchester Village
Neighborhood Council v. City of Richmond (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 305, a city
entered into a contract with an Indian tribe to provide municipal services to
the tribe’s proposed casino. The
decision to agree to the contract was unquestionably discretionary. Nonetheless, the court held that the city’s
entry into the agreement was not approval of a project for CEQA purposes,
because the city did not unconditionally commit itself to making any related
physical changes. In
Santa Barbara v. Santa Barbara County Assn. of Governments (2009) 179
Cal.App.4th 113, the court held that the adoption of a retail sales and use tax
to fund contemplated future transportation projects was not approval of a
project. This result was reached even
though the transportation projects themselves would ultimately require CEQA
review. In Baird v. County of Contra Costa (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1265,
modified at 33 Cal.App.4th 1464, the court held that CEQA review was not
required in connection with a county’s discretionary approval of a proposal to
expand an existing residential treatment
facility, because the expansion would not cause an adverse change in any physical
conditions within the affected area.
Morgan Hill Unified School Dist. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 464 held that the
decision to form a community facilities district in anticipation of future
school construction was not a project for CEQA purposes.
In
short, we need not consider whether adoption of the Resolution was a
discretionary action on the part of the District, or a ministerial one. Because the adoption of the Resolution, even
if discretionary, did not constitute approval of a project for CEQA purposes,
respondents’ demurrer was properly sustained on the basis of appellants’
failure to state a cause of action under CEQA.
B. Dismissal of Cause of Action
Seeking Injunction
The
Petition included a second cause of action seeking to enjoin the District and
the District Board from interpreting conservation easements similar to the one
at issue in this case in such a way as to permit similar mitigation in order to
benefit other development projects, without first complying with CEQA. The trial court dismissed this cause of
action on the ground that the Petition had failed to name an indispensable
party, to wit, the owners of the Wilson property. Appellants contend this was error, arguing
that approval of the Resolution was sought and obtained by Barella, not by
Wilson, who merely concurred in Barella’s request, and thus that Wilson was not
an indispensable party.
We
need not reach this issue. An injunction
is a remedy, not a separate cause of action.
(Coachella Valley Unified School
Dist. v. State of California (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 93, 125-126 [complaint
seeking writ of mandate and declaratory relief based on same underlying facts
did not state separate causes of action, but asked for different forms of
relief; where facts alleged did not state cause of action for mandamus,
declaratory relief was also unavailable]; MaJor
v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 623 [“a cause of
action must exist before injunctive relief may be grantedâ€].) In the present case, appellants’ prayer for
injunctive relief was predicated entirely on their cause of action for
violation of CEQA. We have concluded
that the Petition’s allegations did not state facts sufficient to plead such a
cause of action, because the District’s adoption of the Resolution did not
constitute approval of a project within the meaning of CEQA. By the same token, appellants have not stated
a valid claim for injunctive relief based on their contention that the District
Respondents may adopt similar resolutions in the future. Accordingly, appellants’ prayer for
injunctive relief was properly dismissed, albeit on different grounds than
those given by the trial court. (See
Cal.App.4th 625, 631 [appellate courts review trial court’s rulings, not its
rationale, and are not bound by trial court’s reasoning].)
IV.
Disposition
The
judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall
recover their costs on appeal.
_________________________
RUVOLO,
P. J.
We concur:
_________________________
REARDON, J.
_________________________
BASKIN, J.
Public Resources Code unless otherwise noted.
sustaining a demurrer, we assume the truth of the facts stated in appellants’
first amended petition for writ of mandate (the Petition), and base our
decision on those facts, supplemented by facts of which we take judicial
notice. (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.)
