CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Ramiro Rodriguez Ramirez was charged in a felony complaint with possession of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a), count 1.) Defendant initially pled not guilty. Subsequently, he filed a motion to quash the search warrant and suppress evidence (the motion), and the People filed an opposition. The parties stipulated to having the motion and preliminary hearing heard by the trial court concurrently. The motion was denied. An information was then filed charging defendant with possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)), and defendant pled not guilty. Defendant filed two more motions to quash the search warrant and suppress evidence[1], and the last motion was denied. Defendant then pled guilty to count 1, and the court placed him on supervised probation for drug offenders pursuant to Proposition 36 (Pen. Code, § 1210 et seq.).
Defendant filed a notice of appeal based on the denial of the motion to suppress. We affirm.

J.F., a minor, appeals after a final judgment declaring him a ward of the juvenile court. After admitting certain charges, the juvenile court committed the minor to the Department of Juvenile Justice for four years. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Paul Failla appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. (Pen. Code, §§ 4852.01, 4852.06.)[1] We affirm.

Jeffrey T. appeals following the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing in the juvenile dependency case of his son, Stephen T. Jeffrey contends the jurisdictional findings and the order removing Stephen from his custody are unsupported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

P.S. and Michael S. (together, the parents) appeal following the first postpermanency planning review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.3)[1] in the juvenile dependency case of their daughter, E.S. The parents contend the juvenile court erred by failing to make orders to promote progress toward returning E.S. to their custody. We affirm.

Defendant Athanasios Preovolos (Preovolos) appeals a judgment entered after the jury awarded plaintiff Sandra Terry (Terry) $22,000 in lost wages as compensatory damages for his sexual harassment of her. On appeal, he contends that under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), lost wages for employee sexual harassment cannot be awarded unless the plaintiff was actually or constructively discharged from employment. We conclude an employee victim of sexual harassment under FEHA can be awarded compensatory damages, including lost wages, proximately caused by the harassment, regardless of whether he or she has been actually or constructively discharged from employment.

A jury convicted Robert Andrew Poizner of committing lewd and lascivious acts with a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a), counts 1-6, involving victim Austin G. and counts 22-23, involving victim Evan W.); committing lewd acts upon a 14 to 15-year-old child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (c)(1), counts 12 & 14, involving Brandon P.); exhibiting harmful matter to a minor (Pen. Code, § 288.2, subd. (a), counts 7, 8 & 15); distributing or exhibiting harmful matter to a child (Pen. Code, § 313.1, subd. (a), counts 16, 19 & 27); contributing to the delinquency of a minor (Pen. Code, § 272, subd. (a)(1), counts 17, 20, & 21); dissuading a witness (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (b)(1), counts 18 & 25); and disobeying a court order (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (a)(4), counts 26 & 28). The jury acquitted Poizner of two counts of lewd and lascivious acts with a minor as to Brandon P. (counts 9 & 10) and found him guilty of the lesser included offense of sexual battery (Pen. Code, § 242; counts 11 & 13). As to counts 1-6, 22 and 23, the jury found true allegations that Poizner committed his crimes on multiple victims. As to counts 2, 5 and 22, it found true allegations that Poizner engaged in substantial sexual conduct with a child under the age of 14, and as to counts 2 and 5, that he used obscene matter. (Pen. Code, § 1203.066, subds. (a)(8) & (9).) It found true allegations that Poizner committed the dissuasion offenses of counts 18 and 25 while on bail. (Pen. Code, § 12022.1, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced Poizner to an indeterminate term of 75 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of seven years.[1]

Justin J. (father) appeals from (1) a judgment declaring his children dependents of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300, subdivision (b),[2] and (2) a subsequent order requiring him to participate in a substance abuse program. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he had a current substance abuse problem or to support the trial court’s order requiring him to participate in a substance abuse program. We agree and will reverse the judgment (in part) and the order.

Antoinette G., the mother of the child, A. G., appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders. The mother argues there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).[1] In addition, the mother contends the juvenile court erred by declaring the youngster a dependent child rather than implementing a voluntary case plan under section 360, subdivision (b). We disagree and affirm the jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

B.G. is the subject of these dependency appeals. In one, Dario G., her father (Father), seeks reversal of the trial court order denying his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] motion for reconsideration of the order terminating reunification services. If that order is overturned, he argues, the section 322.26 order terminating his parental rights also must be reversed. C.C. (Mother) appeals the order terminating her parental rights, arguing that if Father’s appeal is successful, the order terminating her parental rights also must be reversed. We find no abuse of discretion with respect to the trial court’s denial of Father’s section 388 motion. Consequently, we shall affirm the orders from which these appeals have been taken.[2]

After a jury convicted defendant Tony Caracci of two counts of first degree burglary (§ 459)[1] and one count of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), defendant admitted that he had been convicted of a serious felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b) – (i) & 1170.12, subds. (a) – (d)).

A jury found Alfredo Montez guilty of one count of first degree burglary and one count of making criminal threats. On appeal, Montez contends: (1) insufficient evidence supported the criminal threats conviction; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the victim to testify that he remained frightened at the time of trial; (3) Montez’s Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation and cross-examination were violated during a bench trial on his prior convictions; and (4) the trial court improperly failed to award him presentence conduct credits. We modify the judgment to reflect conduct credits and otherwise affirm.

In a plea bargain, appellant Milton Valencia Chavez pled nolo contendere to two felony narcotics counts. The crimes were committed on March 9, 2011, the criminal complaint was filed on March 11, 2011, the plea was entered on September 28, 2011, and sentencing was on October 7, 2011. Appellant was in local custody for 141 days, and received credit against his sentence for that time. The issue in this case is whether he was entitled to conduct credit at the enhanced rate of two days for each two days served. The trial court ruled that he was not. He contests that ruling in this timely appeal.[1]

Appellant claims to be the biological daughter of the late Michael Jackson[1] and Barbara Ross-Lee, the sister of Diana Ross. Appellant contends that because Jackson is no longer alive and Ross-Lee “is lying and hiding the tru[th],” genetic testing (presumably of Jackson’s relatives) must be “done [to] establish[] paternity and biological relations.”
Appellant claims that after being kidnapped from Haiti at a young age, she was adopted by members of the “mafia” in the Netherlands. Because the adoption was terminated at age 13, she has “no mother and no father” and “no family history.”
In June 2011, appellant filed the present family court petition for determination of paternity and genetic testing (petition). The sole participants at the October 3, 2011 hearing on the petition were appellant, who was in pro. per., and Attorney Alan Watenmaker, who specially appeared on behalf of the executors of Jackson’s estate, respondents John Branca and John McClain.[2]
At the October 3 hearing, the court stated that because Jackson was deceased, it had no jurisdiction to require his relatives to undergo genetic testing and the matter belonged in the probate court. Watenmaker explained that appellant had requested genetic testing of Jackson’s relatives in the probate court, but that her request had been denied. Appellant did not dispute Watenmaker’s statement.
The court dismissed the petition, stating: “The case is dismissed, court does not have jurisdiction to hear the matter.” Appellant timely appealed from the order of dismissal.