CA Unpub Decisions

Luis Enrique Fernandez appeals from the judgment entered upon his convictions by jury of first-degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), count 1)[1] and attempted second-degree robbery (§ 211, count 2). As to the murder charge, the jury found to be true the special circumstance allegation that it was committed in the course of committing an attempted robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The jury also found to be true as to both counts the allegation that the offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) and the allegation that appellant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced appellant on the murder charge to a life term without the possibility of parole and on the robbery charge to the high term of five years, doubled as a second strike, plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement.
Appellant contends that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the felony-murder conviction and robbery special circumstance, (2) the trial court erred in refusing to give the requested voluntary intoxication instruction, thereby lightening the prosecution’s burden of proof and violating appellant’s rights to due process and trial by jury, and (3) imposition of the second-strike sentence based on a juvenile adjudication violates his rights to due process and to equal protection.
We affirm.

Defendant David Cohn was arrested after sending sexual communications to an undercover FBI agent posing as a 13-year old girl in an internet chat room. Cohn was charged with attempted contact with a minor with the intent to commit a sexual offense (Pen. Code, § 664, 288.3, subd. (a))[1]; arranging a meeting with a minor for lewd purposes (§ 288.4, subd. (a)(1)); possession of matter depicting a minor engaging in sexual conduct (§ 311.11, subd. (a)); five counts of attempting to send harmful matter with the intent to seduce a minor (§ 644, 288.2, subd. (b)); and four counts of attempted lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 664, 288, subd. (a)). A jury found Cohn guilty on all counts.
On appeal, Cohn challenges his conviction and sentence on numerous grounds, including, in part, insufficiency of the evidence, admission of improper expert testimony, prosecutorial misconduct, instructional error, violation of section 1009 and violation of section 654. In addition, he contends that sections 288.2, subdivision (b) and 288.3, subdivision (a) violate the United States Constitution. We affirm.

This case concerns the rights of the Town of Fairfax (Town) to easements over the property owned by respondents John R. and Marlia Berg (the Bergs) located at 36 Meadow Way in the Town (the Berg property). The Town appeals from a judgment finding that the easements were private appurtenant easements that did not allow public access, and that the public’s use of the easements created a prohibited burden or surcharge on them. The Town contends that the court: (1) erred in its interpretation of the easements; (2) abused its discretion in failing to grant an equitable easement over the Berg property; and (3) failed to accord the Town’s interpretation of the easements the deference to which it was entitled. We affirm.

Minor B.C. was declared a dependent child of the court. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 362.)[1] K.T., minor's mother who was deported to Mexico and then bypassed for reunification services, argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by leaving all decisions regarding Internet contact between mother and minor entirely to the discretion of the Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (Department).
We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

Defendant Arturo Nava pleaded no contest to assault with a deadly weapon (former Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)).[1] On September 30, 2011, the trial court imposed a three-year prison sentence, suspended execution of the sentence, and placed defendant on probation for three years with various terms and conditions. Relevant to this appeal, the probation conditions generally prohibit defendant from possessing alcohol and controlled substances, and require that he stay away from the victims. The court granted defendant 301 days of presentence custody credits, consisting of 201 actual days plus 100 days conduct credit under section 4019.
On appeal, defendant contends that the probation conditions restricting his possession of alcohol and controlled substances and requiring that he stay away from the victims are unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad. He also argues that he is entitled to additional conduct credit under the October 2011 version of section 4019.
For reasons that we will explain, we will modify the judgment relating to the ordered conditions of probation and affirm the judgment as so modified.

Appellant International Fidelity Insurance Company, through its San Jose agent, issued bail bonds upon two misdemeanor arrests, first of Saul Contreras and later of his alias, Javier Escobar. In separate proceedings the trial court learned that defense counsel had lost contact with the defendant, and on each occasion it ordered the bond forfeited. Appellant contends that these orders were improper because the attorney was authorized to appear on Contreras's behalf at each pretrial hearing. We agree and therefore must reverse the order denying appellant's motion to vacate forfeiture of the bonds.

Appellant Brent Wei-Teh Lee (Father) and respondent Maria Cordray (Mother) were romantically involved starting sometime before 1993, though they never married. They are the parents of two children, a boy, Branden, born in 1993, and a girl, Bria, born in 1995. The parties separated in 2002, with the children residing primarily with Mother but still spending significant time with Father. A 2002 court order set guideline child support at $4,632 for the two children payable monthly by Father to Mother based on Father’s 33 percent custody timeshare and his monthly self-employment income of $33,333, with no income on Mother’s side. The court also made a specific finding that Father’s 1999 net worth was $10,000,000. In 2003, the parties stipulated to reduce child support to $3,300 per month. In 2008, Father once again sought to reduce his monthly child support payment, but the court denied his motion in early 2009, finding that it lacked sufficient information or evidence to warrant the requested reduction.

The mother contends the juvenile court erred when it terminated reunification services and set the matter for a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) We find no error.

Soobok L. Hong hired Creed Consulting Inc. (Creed) to remodel her house. She then sued Creed seeking to recover the $85,000 she paid it under the statute that allows a party to recover “all compensation paid to [an] unlicensed contractor” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, subd. (b)),[1] on the theory Creed failed to carry workers’ compensation insurance, which resulted in automatic suspension of its contractor’s license during the time it worked on her house. Hong successfully moved for summary adjudication on this claim. After she dismissed her remaining causes of action and Creed dismissed its cross-complaint, the trial court entered judgment in Hong’s favor for $85,000. Creed raises several issues, one of which has merit: the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of a printout Hong’s attorney made from the California Contractors State License Board website to prove Creed did not carry workers’ compensation insurance. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for a trial on that cause of action.

Cynthia S. appeals from the juvenile court’s summary denial of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] petition, the court’s order terminating her parental rights under section 366.26, and the denial of her request for a continuance of the permanency planning hearing (§ 366.26 hearing). We affirm.

Defendants City of Anaheim (City) and City Council for the City of Anaheim (Council; collectively defendants) approved a residential infill project of 32 single family homes (Project) to be developed by real parties in interest Melia Homes, Inc. and Donovan Anaheim LLC (collectively real parties). Before approving it, defendants undertook an initial study and, finding the Project would not result in significant environmental effects, adopted a negative declaration. Plaintiff Arthur E. Stahovich, trustee of the Arthur E. and Marjorie L. Stahovich Family Trust (1986) filed a petition for writ of mandate and a complaint for declaratory relief alleging defendants violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.; all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated) because they failed to require an environmental impact report (EIR). He also alleged defendants violated the zoning requirements set out in the Anaheim Municipal Code (AMC). The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants and real parties, and plaintiff appealed.
Plaintiff raises several issues, contending (1) there is substantial evidence supporting a fair argument there may be significant environmental impacts on noise, land use and planning, drainage, and traffic, necessitating an EIR or, alternatively, a mitigated negative declaration; (2) defendants violated zoning laws by failing to require a noise study, exceeding the maximum density, and approving improper lot lines; and (3) the case is not moot. Plaintiff’s first two arguments have no merit, eliminating any need to rule on the mootness claim. We affirm.
After the opening brief was filed and simultaneously with the filing of the respondent’s brief, real parties filed a motion seeking to introduce additional evidence to support its claim the appeal was moot. They later filed a supplemental motion to introduce additional evidence. We decide the case on the merits, and, having no need for additional evidence, deny the motions.

We appointed counsel to represent defendant Vanessa Suarez Torres on appeal. Counsel filed a brief which set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against the client, but advised the court no issues were found to argue on defendant’s behalf. Defendant was given 30 days to file written argument in defendant’s own behalf. That period has passed, and we have received no written argument from defendant. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.)

Eric and Lizbeth Reichert attempted a remodel of their newly-purchased Huntington Beach house. Before construction was finished, city building inspectors discovered the project did not conform to Huntington Beach floodplain regulations, and ordered the property demolished. The Reicherts then sued their architect and their contractor, and also made a claim on their homeowners’ insurance policy. Their insurance company denied the claim, asserting the demolition was not an accidental loss, and in any event the loss was excluded by a provision in their policy saying there is no coverage for loss caused by the enforcement of any law or ordinance. The Reicherts sued their insurer, and the case now comes to us after the insurer’s successful motion for summary judgment. We affirm. This seems, unfortunately for the Reicherts, a rather clear example of the “law or ordinance exclusion.”

Glenn and Peggy Rosen appeal from an order dismissing their third amended complaint against Bank of America (BofA), based on the foreclosure of their Laguna Niguel Home.[1] The court sustained without leave to amend BofA’s demurrer to the Rosens’ fourth attempt to state a cause of action, having despaired of obtaining a comprehensible pleading. Glenn Rosen, it should be mentioned, is a member of the California State Bar and is representing himself and his wife in this appeal.
We allude to Glenn Rosen’s status as an attorney because of the state of the appellants’ opening brief. The statement of facts section in the opening brief is devoid of a single citation to the record. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) Numerous references to facts in the argument portion also lack citations to the record. The brief contains no headings summarizing each separate point. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)[2] The statement of relief sought (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(A)) is the dismissal of the order sustaining the demurrer to the third amended complaint without leave to amend. There is no discussion of, or even reference to, the standard of review of an appeal following the sustaining of a demurrer.[3]