CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant, S.K. (Mother), appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying her petition to reinstate her reunification services for her three daughters, M1, M2, and M3, terminating her parental rights to the girls, and placing them for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 388.)[1] We affirm the challenged orders.

Jasmine D. appeals the judgment terminating her parental rights to her sons, Marco M. and Jesus C. (together the boys). Jasmine contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her modification petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388)[1] and erred by declining to apply the beneficial relationship and sibling relationship exceptions (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i) & (v)) to termination of parental rights.[2] We affirm.

Minor Camille P. and her mother, Paula C., appeal an o rder denying services to Paula to aid her in trying to reunify with Camille. They contend the court erred because providing reunification services to Paula is in Camille's best interests. We affirm the order.

Carl Green Morgan entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count of possessing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) and admitted having one prior serious/violent felony or strike conviction (Pen. Code,[1] § 667, subds. (b)-(i)). As part of the plea bargain, the prosecution agreed to dismiss 10 other felony counts, four misdemeanor counts and two allegations of serving a prior prison term (§ 667.5,
subd. (b). Morgan, who represented himself below, and the prosecution also agreed to a stipulated sentence of 32 months in prison. The trial court sentenced Morgan in accordance with the plea bargain─the middle term of 16 months doubled under the "Three Strikes" law. The trial court awarded Morgan 186 days of custody credit.[2]

Kathryn Aimee Erb (now known as K. Aimee Fuller) (Mother) appeals postjudgment orders issued after the dissolution of her marriage to Mathew White (Father), which modified the coparenting plan for their child, Bella (Child), by increasing the time Child spends with Father. On appeal, Mother contends: (1) the trial court erred by not requiring Father to present substantial evidence showing there were changed circumstances since the final judicial custody order; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the court's finding the new coparenting plan is in Child's best interests; (3) Child's appointed counsel committed certain errors; and (4) the trial court erred by not considering Mother's oral motion for an award of attorney fees.

A jury convicted Raul Arellano of seven counts of committing a lewd act on a child under 14 years old involving substantial sexual conduct (Pen. Code, §§ 288, subd. (a), 1203.066, subd. (a)(8); counts 3-9)[1] and one count of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor more than three years younger than him (§ 261.5, subd. (c); count 10).[2] The trial court sentenced him to 18 years 8 months in prison.
Arellano appeals, contending we must reverse his convictions for counts 3 through 9 because the victim's generic, contradictory accounts provided insufficient evidence to support these convictions and these convictions violated his right to a unanimous jury. In addition, he contends we must reverse his conviction for count 10 because his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move under section 995 to dismiss this charge for lack of jurisdiction. He further contends he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court did not sufficiently investigate his motion for replacement counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) or, alternatively, erroneously denied his motion. We conclude each of these contentions lacks merit and affirm the judgment.

Plaza de Santa Fe Limited, LLC (Plaza) appeals an award of attorney fees and costs to Stump's Market, Inc. (Stump's Market) as a prevailing party in an action brought under a lease. We affirm.

Defendant Ashley Aimee Hall pleaded no contest to felony child abandonment. (Pen. Code, § 271a.)[1] After substituting retained counsel for her appointed counsel, defendant filed a motion to withdraw her plea, which was denied. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court placed defendant on five years’ probation with 90 days in county jail and suspended the jail term on the condition that she speak to five community organizations about her experience. Within one to two years, the trial court would consider reducing the offense to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b).
On appeal, defendant contends it was an abuse of discretion to deny her motion to withdraw the plea, and she received ineffective assistance of counsel in the entry of her plea. We affirm.

The trial court sustained a demurrer to the previous pleading of plaintiff Thomas Medeiros with leave to amend. It also granted a motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages without leave to amend. Medeiros then filed the present pleading, which again seeks damages for the alleged negligent or intentional misrepresentation of defendant George Hills Company, Inc. (GHC)—the claims adjuster for the City of Palo Alto (the City)—in its processing of his tort claim against the City for malicious prosecution, asserting GHC falsely informed him that his claim was untimely. The trial court again sustained the demurrer of GHC, finding GHC’s assertion that the claim was not timely was true in light of the facts contained in the claim form, which had omitted the timely accrual date of Medeiros’s cause of action. It denied leave to amend. Medeiros filed a timely notice of appeal from the ensuing judgment of dismissal.
Medeiros contends we must reverse the trial court’s ruling, because it implicitly reflects a factual determination of the scienter of GHC in making the representation (which Medeiros had alleged was either intentionally false or not made with a reasonable belief in its truth because GHC’s expertise in processing claims for public entities should have led it to the fact making the claim timely). With respect to the reasonability of GHC’s belief that his claim was untimely, Medeiros also argues that GHC had an independent obligation to learn of the timely accrual date of his cause of action against the City for malicious prosecution, even though he failed to include this fact in his claim. Finally, Medeiros asserts that it was error to strike his prayer for punitive damages.[1] We shall reverse the judgment of dismissal in part.

On April 21, 1995, defendant and appellant Hateem Abdul Shareef was sentenced for his convictions of 19 counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),[1] during a number of which he used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), three counts of attempted robbery (§§ 664, 211), during which he used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and one count of assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)).[2] After sentencing him, the trial court awarded him presentence custody credit for 576 days actually served and 288 days of good time/work time.

Robert Dean Laverdure appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm (former Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1))[1] and his admission that he previously had been convicted of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)[2] within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), § 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced Laverdure to two years eight months in prison. We affirm.

Appellant Nicole R. (Mother) challenges the juvenile dependency court’s finding that her child J.F. Jr. was not an Indian child within the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). She specifically contends that the Department of Children and Family Services (the “Department”) failed to satisfy ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements of the Act, and therefore the court’s determination that ICWA did not apply is infirm. As we shall explain, the Department’s inquiry into the Indian heritage of the child was sufficient, however, the ICWA notice did contain several errors. Nonetheless, under the circumstances the errors are harmless as they pertained to individuals who, by parents’ admission, were not enrolled or registered in any tribe. Accordingly, we affirm.

Plaintiff, Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles, and defendant, City of Los Angeles, appeal from a January 30, 2012 judgment. The judgment at issue was entered after we reversed a judgment in a prior appeal. (Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (May 19, 2011, B222424) [nonpub. opn.].) Plaintiff argues: the trial court erroneously awarded a declaratory rather than a money judgment; it should have been granted leave to amend the declaratory relief complaint to add a contract breach claim; and it was entitled to pre-and post-judgment interest. On cross-appeal, defendant challenges the award of attorney fees to plaintiff. Defendant argues plaintiff is judicially estopped from recovering attorney fees. We reject all of these contentions and affirm the January 30, 2012 judgment.

Appellant Wendell Rowe was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of making criminal threats in violation of Penal Code section 422,[1] one count of corporal injury to a cohabitant in violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a) and one count of kidnapping in violation of section 207, subdivision (a). The trial court found true the allegations that appellant had suffered two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a) and the "Three Strikes" law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) & 1170.12), and had served prison terms for those convictions within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced appellant to 25 years to life on the kidnapping conviction, pursuant to the Three Strikes law, plus two consecutive 5-year enhancement terms pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a) plus a 1-year term pursuant to section 667.5, for a total term of 36 years to life in state prison. We affirm the judgment of conviction.