CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted appellant Jennie Marie Campanella of attempted second-degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664, count 1).[1] Appellant admitted that she suffered a prior robbery conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The trial court sentenced appellant to seven years and eight months in state prison, consisting of the low term of 16 months doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law, plus a five-year serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). Appellant was awarded 263 days of presentence credit consisting of 229 days of actual custody credit and 34 days of conduct credit.
Appellant contends the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on a claim-of-right defense; the trial court failed to advised her properly of her constitutional rights before accepting her admission on the prior conviction allegation that served as the basis for the section 667, subdivision (a)(1) sentence enhancement; and the judgment must be modified to reflect 343 days of presentence custody credit.
We order the abstract of judgment modified to reflect 343 days of presentence custody credit. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Antonio Meza appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of first degree murder and assault with a firearm, with personal firearm-use findings. Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing to instruct upon provocation and intoxication and denying his motion contesting the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges against two prospective jurors. We affirm.

The jury found defendant and appellant Luis Caceres guilty in count 1 of assault by a state prisoner with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 4501)[1] and in count 2 of assault by a state prisoner by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 4501). In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted suffering a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).[2]
The trial court sentenced defendant to five years in state prison. It imposed the middle term of four years on count 1, plus an additional year for the prior prison term. The court stayed the sentence in count 2 pursuant to section 654.
Defendant argues the trial court: (1) erred by refusing to dismiss count 2; (2) erred when it failed to give the requested self-defense instruction; and (3) abused its discretion when it restricted defendant’s ability to cross-examine correctional officers.
We affirm the judgment.

Tenet 1500 San Pablo, Inc. (the Hospital)[1] sued Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union Welfare Fund (the Fund)[2] for payment for services provided to a patient. Summary judgment was awarded in favor of the Fund and the Hospital appeals. We find no disputed issue of material fact and affirm.

Appellant Peter K. appeals from the judgment declaring him a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The juvenile court sustained a petition alleging that appellant committed the crime of obstructing a peace officer in the performance of his duties. (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1).) The court declared the offense to be a misdemeanor, and ordered appellant home on probation for six months.
Appellant contends (1) the juvenile court erred by denying in part his pretrial motion for discovery of police personnel records under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess motion); (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that he violated Penal Code section 148; and (3) the court erred by setting a maximum term of confinement. We strike the maximum term of confinement and affirm.

Defendants and appellants Felicitas Rodriguez, Roberto Rodriguez, Jr., and Lupe Casas appeal from the judgment following a court trial quieting title in the two-unit residential property located at 210 and 212 S. Sunol Drive, Los Angeles (the Sunol property), in favor of plaintiffs and respondents Maria Hernandez, Oscar Hernandez, and the estate of Filimon Hernandez. Appellants argue the trial court’s statement of decision was inadequate with respect to their contention that the statute of limitations barred respondents’ action and that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination that the deed transferring an ownership interest in the 210 unit of the Sunol property to Roberto and Lupe was invalid.
We remand to the trial court for the limited purpose of issuing a proper statement of decision with respect to whether the statute of limitations bars respondents’ complaint. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Alan Gil of seven counts of committing a lewd act upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)[1])—four counts with respect to victim L.R. and three counts with respect to victim C.R.—and one count of possessing matter depicting a minor engaging in sexual conduct (§ 311.11, subd. (a)). With respect to the committing a lewd act upon a child offenses, the jury found true the allegations that there were multiple victims. (§ 667.61, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced defendant to 33 years to life in state prison. The trial court imposed a three year term with respect to the possession of matter depicting a minor engaging in sexual conduct offense. As to each of the remaining offenses, the trial court sentenced defendant to terms of 15 years to life—imposing consecutive terms on two of the offenses and concurrent terms on the remaining offenses. Among other fines, the trial court imposed on defendant a $300 sexual offender fine. (§ 290.3.)
On appeal, defendant contends that his consecutive terms of 15 years to life are cruel and/or unusual punishment and that the abstract of judgment must be modified to reflect that he was sentenced to a term of 15 years to life on count eight (one of the committing a lewd act upon a child offenses) and not on count six (the possession of matter depicting a minor engaging in sexual conduct offense). We asked the parties to submit supplemental letter briefs addressing whether the trial court erred in failing to impose on the section 290.3 fine a mandatory penalty assessment pursuant to section 1464, subdivision (a)(1); a mandatory state surcharge pursuant to section 1465.7, subdivision (a); a mandatory state court construction penalty pursuant to Government Code section 70372, subdivision (a); and a mandatory penalty assessment pursuant to Government Code section 76000, subdivision (a)(1), and the proper amount of any such penalty, surcharge, or assessment. We affirm defendant’s sentence and order the abstract of judgment modified to reflect that defendant received a term of 15 years to life on count eight and not on count six and that defendant is to pay a $300 mandatory section 1464, subdivision (a)(1) penalty assessment; a $60 mandatory state surcharge pursuant to section 1465.7, subdivision (a); a $90 mandatory state court construction penalty pursuant to Government Code section 70372, subdivision (a)(1); and a $210 mandatory penalty assessment pursuant to Government Code section 76000, subdivision (a)(1).

In two related appeals, appellant Bradley L. (“Father”) challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders declaring his three children dependents of the court and removing them from the custody of Father (Welf. & Inst. Code[1] § 300, subd. (b)), and its subsequent orders terminating jurisdiction and granting sole physical and legal custody of the children to their mother, Stacy L. (“Mother”) (§§ 364, subd. (c), 362.4). Father argues that the juvenile court violated his statutory and constitutional rights by failing to ensure that Father was transported from prison to court for the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Father also asserts that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his attorney’s requests for a continuance of two status review hearings to allow Father a meaningful opportunity to participate in such hearings. We conclude that Father has failed to demonstrate any prejudicial error in the juvenile court’s rulings, and accordingly, affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Sean Thomas Turner of infliction of corporal injury on a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a), count 1)[1] and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 2). Appellant admitted that he suffered a prior conviction for spousal abuse within the meaning of section 243, subdivision (e)(1). The trial court imposed concurrent mid-term sentences of three years in state prison on counts 1 and 2. The trial court suspended execution of sentence and placed appellant on formal probation for four years on terms and conditions of probation, including that he serve 222 days in county jail. Appellant was awarded 222 days of presentence credit consisting of 148 days of actual custody credit and 74 days of conduct credit.
Appellant contends the trial court erred (1) by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on misdemeanor spousal battery (§ 243, subd. (e)) as a lesser included offense in count 1; (2) by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on misdemeanor assault (§ 240) as a lesser included offense in count 2; (3) by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 852, which allowed the jury to consider evidence of uncharged acts of domestic violence; and (4) in calculating appellant’s presentence credit.
We order the abstract of judgment modified to reflect 296 days of presentence custody credit. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Mi Ryong (Mimi) Song[1] appeals from an adverse judgment in her action against Suk K. Lee for breach of a confidential settlement agreement. She contends the trial court erred in excluding a second version of the settlement agreement found by her attorneys after the discovery cutoff date and shortly before trial. Her claim is that interlineations on this version would establish that respondent Suk K. Lee breached the confidentiality agreement by providing a copy of his version of the agreement to George Oh for use in a will contest.
We agree that the trial court erred because there was no violation of a discovery order and the trial court did not find that the late production of the second version was willful or that appellant had engaged in repeated and egregious discovery abuses. We also conclude exclusion of the document was not appropriate as an exercise of the court’s inherent authority to ensure a fair trial or to avoid delay. Because the error is material, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

In this construction defects action, plaintiffs and appellants James W. Ciaciuch, and Friendswood Builders, Inc., appeal from a judgment following the granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent David Lee Chapman, individually and doing business as Chapman Design and Development (collectively Chapman Design). Appellants contend triable issues of fact exist that preclude the grant of summary judgment. We affirm the judgment.

This case concerns a string of robberies and commercial burglaries which occurred over the span of 10 days in close proximity. Defendant Gevork S. Guyundzhyan appeals from his conviction for five counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211, counts 1-5) and three counts of second degree commercial burglary (§ 459, counts 6-8).[1] Defendant was charged in two separate cases, which were consolidated on the People’s motion (Super. Ct. L.A. County, case Nos. BA304764, BA305744). An amended information, setting forth all of his crimes, was later filed. On appeal, defendant contends that the court improperly denied his Faretta[2] motion; that the two criminal cases should not have been tried together because the BA305744 case was weaker than the BA304764 case, and therefore his conviction on the weaker counts must be reversed; irrelevant testimony concerning fingerprint evidence was wrongfully admitted; and cumulative error. Finding no merit in any of defendant’s contentions, we affirm.

Charles Robert Willard threatened two men on a bus with a knife, one of whom he stabbed. A jury convicted Willard on two counts of assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).)[1] In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found Willard had suffered two prior serious felony convictions and one prior juvenile adjudication for robbery, making him eligible for sentencing under the “Three Strikes” law, and he had served separate prison terms for felonies. (§§ 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d); 667.5, subd. (b).) Willard was sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of 30 years to life. On appeal, he contends insufficient evidence supports the true finding on his prior 1978 juvenile robbery adjudication. We affirm the judgment of conviction and remand for resentencing.

At the conclusion of a joint trial involving a bicycle ride-by shooting, a jury convicted Andres Frias of first degree murder, with findings the murder was committed to benefit a criminal street gang, that Frias personally discharged a firearm causing death, and that a principal personally discharged a firearm causing death. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a); 186.22, subd. (b); 12022.53, subd. (d); 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1).)[1] The jury also convicted Frias of possession of a firearm by a felon, with a finding the offense was committed to benefit a criminal street gang. (§§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A).) The jury convicted David Quintana of second degree murder, with findings the murder was committed to benefit a criminal street gang, and that a principal discharged a firearm causing death. (§§ 187, subd. (a); 186.22, subd. (b)(5); 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1).)
The trial court sentenced Frias to a total state prison term of 55 years to life, and Quintana to a total state prison term of 40 years to life.
Frias and Quintana appeal. We affirm both judgments.