CA Unpub Decisions

In “All the President’s Men,” Deep Throat advises investigative reporter Bob Woodward to “follow the money.” We do so in this case to resolve a labyrinthine subprime loan scheme from the pre-2008 recession era.
U.S. Bank sued to collect a debt of $1 million after the property that was collateral for the loan was sold free and clear of a lien. Due to an error in the legal description of the property in the deed of trust, the lien had been erroneously recorded on a different property. A jury found for U.S. Bank, and the debtors, coconservators of the Estate that owned the property, appeal. They argue the undisputed evidence shows (1) the loan was made to the prior conservator, in her individual capacity, and (2) U.S. Bank was not a holder in due course. They also argue the “one form of action rule” of Code of Civil Procedure section 726 barred the action against them.
We find substantial evidence to support the jury’s findings that U.S. Bank’s predecessor in interest entered into a contract with the prior conservator, in her representative capacity, for a mortgage loan on an estate property. We also find substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that U.S. Bank was a holder in due course. Finally, we find the trial court properly denied defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the exception to Code of Civil Procedure section 726’s one form of action rule applied here. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment.

After the juvenile court denied minor J.V.’s motion to suppress evidence under Welfare and Institutions Code section 700.1, the minor admitted that he had possessed a firearm while under the influence (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (e)), possessed a loaded firearm in a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (a)), possessed controlled substance paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364.1), and possessed stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)). The juvenile court sustained the petitions alleging these offenses and continued the minor as a ward of the court. The juvenile court committed the minor to the custody of the probation officer for placement in the Enhanced Ranch Program and set the maximum term of confinement at 14 years and six months.
On appeal, the minor contends: (1) the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, and (2) the true finding that he violated Penal Code section 25850, subdivision (a) is a misdemeanor and not a felony. We affirm.

A juvenile wardship petition was filed alleging that defendant and appellant K.G.[1] committed second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459, counts 1, 5, & 7), received stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a), count 2), committed vandalism causing over $400 in damage (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1), counts 3 & 6), and committed arson (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (c), count 4). A separate juvenile wardship petition alleged that defendant and appellant W.W. committed second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459, count 1, 3, & 5), arson (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (c), count 2), and vandalism causing over $400 in damage (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1), count 4). Both K.G. and W.W. (the minors) admitted the allegations that they committed vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)), and an added count of accessory after the fact to arson (Pen. Code, § 32). A juvenile court dismissed the other counts, with the stipulation that the dismissed counts could still be considered in determining restitution. The court declared the minors to be wards and placed them on probation, under the terms recommended by the probation department. The court subsequently imposed victim restitution in the amount of $25,000, with the minors and their parents jointly and severally liable.
The People now appeal from the juvenile court’s order of victim restitution, contending that the court erroneously failed to order full restitution. The People claim that the court based its order of partial restitution on the minors’ inability to pay, which is an improper consideration under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, subdivision (h).[2] We affirm.

Berihu Hadara Fekadu appeals from a decision granting a petition to extend his commitment as a person found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) for an additional two-year period (Pen. Code,[1] § 1026.5). He contends there is not sufficient evidence to prove that because of his mental illness he remains a danger to others. We will find the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's findings and therefore we will affirm.

For three years, Melody Lee lived with her boyfriend, codefendant Timothy Gross, and Timothy's 92-year-old mother, Sally. Lee helped care for Sally. Lee pleaded guilty to elder abuse likely to cause great bodily injury or death based on her neglect of Sally, which included evidence that Sally was left alone in a home with no running water or edible food and in extremely unsanitary conditions. The trial court sentenced her to a total term of three years in prison. It also imposed various fines and fees, including a $1,500 restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Lee did not object to the imposition of the restitution fine on any grounds. She appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed the fine. We reject her contention and affirm the judgment.

Terrence Cross appeals from a judgment convicting him of selling and possessing cocaine base. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, subd. (a), 11351.5.) He contends the court erred by admitting evidence of a prior similar drug sale. We reject this contention and affirm.

Gary S. (Father) appeals from orders of the juvenile court finding Father’s children, G. and Manny B., to be dependent children of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (d), and (j) and removing them from Father’s custody.[1] We conclude that the evidence as to Father supports jurisdiction over both children under subdivision (b) and over G. under subdivision (d). The evidence does not support jurisdiction over Manny under subdivisions (d) or (j) nor does it support his removal from Father’s custody.

Appellant Martin Lamont Harris appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to bringing drugs into jail (Pen. Code, § 4573). The court sentenced appellant to prison for three years. We affirm the judgment, except we vacate appellant’s sentence and remand the matter with directions.

Appellant Derrick B. Hines (Derrick) was trustee of the Hines Family Trust (the Trust). Respondent Claire C. Hines (Claire), a remainder beneficiary of the Trust, filed a petition to remove Derrick as trustee. On April 2, 2009, the Alameda County Superior Court granted Claire’s petition and removed Derrick as trustee “due to his breach of the trust, his failure to perform his fiduciary duties under the trust, and other good cause.”
After the superior court’s order, Derrick refused to vacate one of the Trust’s properties. Claire instituted eviction proceedings in civil court, and Derrick was ordered evicted.

In this appeal, Vincent Obannon (appellant) challenges the denial of his motion to reconsider a Romero ruling,[1] argues the lower court erred in ordering him to pay direct victim restitution to Best Buy in the amount of $2,643.36, and contends, on equal protection grounds, that he is entitled to increased presentence custody credits under the current version of Penal Code section 4019. For reasons that follow, we agree that the restitution order to Best Buy cannot stand. Accordingly, we will strike the order. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Facts and Proceedings Below
We take the facts from the probation officer's report in this case. In turn, those facts were derived from Mountain View Police case number 09-005642 reports.

Alex S. appeals from an order terminating his parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26)[1] to his daughters, 11-year-old Mercedes and 10-year-old Alexandria (collectively the girls). He contends the juvenile court erred by rejecting his argument that termination would be detrimental to the girls based on their relationship with him. We affirm.

In connection with a marital dissolution action, respondent, Steven Patterson (Husband), filed an order to show cause requesting that he be awarded exclusive use and possession of the house he purchased before the marriage. Appellant, Kellee R. Patterson (Wife), responded that Husband was not entitled to retain possession of the property because (1) he stipulated that he would surrender possession of the house unless he prevailed at the trial of a separate civil action; and (2) that the separate civil action had been dismissed.
The family law court granted Husband exclusive use and possession of the house. The court found that the stipulation was no longer valid and that Husband should remain in possession of the house in order to maintain the status quo.
Wife challenges this order on the ground that Husband was bound by his stipulation to surrender possession of the house. According to Wife, the stipulation in the separate civil action was binding on the court in the dissolution action and therefore the family law court erred in not enforcing the stipulation.
The family law court did not err as the issues are yet to be resolved by that court. The order will be affirmed.

It was alleged in a juvenile wardship petition filed November 8, 2011 (first petition), that appellant, D.M., a minor, committed the following offenses: possession of a controlled substance, viz., codeine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count 1), resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69; count 2)[1], and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 3).[2] In a second wardship petition, filed December 6, 2011, it was alleged appellant committed two counts of first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a); counts 1 & 4), two counts of active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22(a); counts 5 & 6) and individual counts of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a); count 2) and grand theft of a firearm (§ 487, subd. (d); count 3). At a jurisdiction hearing covering both petitions, the juvenile court found true all allegations except for count 1 in the first petition. Following the subsequent disposition hearing, the court adjudged appellant a ward of the court and placed him on probation. The court also ordered appellant to pay direct restitution totaling $11,583.19 to the victims of the two burglaries, and a restitution fine of $500 (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6).

Edubina Victoria Carballo pled guilty to six felonies and two misdemeanors after the trial court denied her Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence found in the vehicle she was driving just prior to her arrest. Most of the charges resulted from possession of the vehicle or from items discovered after the officers decided to impound the vehicle and were conducting an inventory of its contents. As a result of the plea, Carballo received a nine-year suspended sentence conditioned on her spending one year in jail and successfully completing felony probation.
The only contested issue on appeal is whether Carballo’s motion to suppress should have been granted. We affirm the judgment, finding no merit to the motion, but remand the matter to the trial court to permit it to correct the amended information to designate correctly the counts to which Carballo pled guilty.