CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Kamlesh Banga (Banga), who has represented herself for the duration of these proceedings, appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendant The Restoration Cleanup Company, Inc. (Restoration) following a bench trial. She argues that the court committed reversible error in failing to issue a statement of decision and in granting Restoration’s motion for a “nonsuit” based on her failure to present sufficient evidence to support her causes of action. We affirm. First, the court did sign a statement of decision prepared by defense counsel, and procedural irregularities in the filing of that document do not require reversal of the judgment. Second, the “nonsuit,” which we treat as the granting of a motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8,[1] was proper because plaintiff failed to present evidence in her case-in-chief sufficient to support a judgment in her favor.

Textainer Equipment Management Limited (Textainer) sued Pacific Interlink SDN BDH (Pacific) for unpaid rent on shipping containers Pacific lost while it had them on lease from Textainer. Pacific asserts it does not owe rent because Textainer did not fulfill its contractual obligation to invoice Pacific for the lost containers’ replacement value—payment of which would have stopped rent from accruing. Textainer asserts it had no obligation to invoice Pacific, which could have paid the pre-set replacement value at any time to stop accrual of rent. After inspecting the parties’ lease agreement, the trial court ruled in favor of Textainer and awarded it rent and other damages. We affirm.

Husband and wife, a wealthy couple, were married for nearly 20 years when the husband developed dementia. The husband’s adult sons became involved handling his financial affairs, and began to eliminate or reduce some of the payments husband had made to or for the wife. Although the marriage remained intact, the wife filed a petition against her husband (later joining the sons, the trustees of his trust), seeking greater payouts to allow her to maintain the standard of living she had been afforded before her husband’s illness. The parties settled their differences as to the underlying issues of support, but they disagreed about whether the trust may be ordered to pay her attorney fees. The trial court ruled that it could be required to do so.
Husband, the trust, and the trustees (when referred to collectively, appellants) appeal, an appeal that involves only the dispute about attorney fees. To resolve that appeal, however, we are asked to examine fundamental issues of privacy within a marriage, to determine what is required to assert a claim for spousal support under Family Code sections 4300 and 4303,[1] and to answer what appellants claim is a question of first impression: whether the courts may be used at all to compel payment of support for an ongoing standard of living in an intact marriage. We answer that question, as well as all other questions, in favor of the wife. We therefore affirm the order awarding her attorney fees.

After a jury trial, defendant Todd Sheldon Morgan was found guilty of committing assault with a deadly weapon by a life prisoner with malice aforethought (Pen. Code, § 4500)[1] on a victim 70 years of age or older (§ 12022.7, subd. (c)). He admitted the allegations that he had six prior violent or serious felony convictions that also qualified as strikes within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)). The trial court imposed a sentence of 27 years to life plus a consecutive three-year term.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and we appointed counsel to represent him in this court. Appointed counsel has filed an opening brief that states the case and facts but raises no issue. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf within 30 days. The 30-day period has elapsed and we have received no response from defendant.
Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have reviewed the entire record. Following the California Supreme Court’s direction in People v. Kelly, supra, at page 110, we provide “a brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case, the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and the punishment imposed.”

On the evening of September 24, 2011, Guadalupe Medina was selling tacos outside the S & S Market on Tenth Street at Williams Street in San Jose. Between 7:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m., she saw defendant John Victor Ramirez and several other men go into the market. Defendant and one of his companions were Norteno gang members. Alejandro Ortega, a Sureno gang member, entered the market at about the same time. Inside the market, two of defendant’s companions made derogatory comments to Ortega, taunted him, and made Norteno gang challenges. These activities were captured by the market’s video camera and audio recorder. Defendant could not be seen on the video.

Bruce Lee Blackburn is an inmate and patient at Coalinga State Hospital, and asserts on appeal that the court erred in ordering that he be involuntarily medicated with antipsychotic drugs, because the order is vague and overbroad.

Defendant Francisco Javier Orozco appeals after pleading no contest to unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), admitting that the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1))[1] and admitting that he had a prior strike within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). He was sentenced to a nine-year prison term.
On appeal, defendant’s appointed counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 that states the case and facts, but raises no issue. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf within 30 days. The 30–day period has elapsed and we have received no response from defendant.
Pursuant to People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have reviewed the entire record. Following the California Supreme Court’s direction in People v. Kelly, supra, at page 110, we provide a brief description of the facts and the procedural history of the case.[2]

Lawrence Frank, Jr. appeals a judgment of conviction that resulted from a no contest plea to carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215).[1] On appeal, defendant asserts the court erred in calculating the penalty assessment on his fine. The Attorney General concedes that the court erred in calculating the assessment, but argues that because the amount is deminimus, this court should dismiss the appeal.[2]

We appointed counsel to represent Octavio Oropeza on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against his client but advised the court no issues were found to argue on his behalf. Oropeza was given
30 days to file written argument on his own behalf. That period has passed, and we have received no communication from him.
Counsel did not provide this court with any specific information to assist us with our independent review pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. We have reviewed the information provided by counsel and have independently examined the record. We found no arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Jesus Guzman was found guilty of assault with intent to commit sexual offense; rape, as charged in count one of the information. The court conducted a trial on the prior allegation, and found the prior to be true. The court sentenced defendant to seven years in state prison.
In his appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing an expert witness to testify about the results of DNA testing performed by nontestifying analysts. Alternatively he argues that, in the event this court concludes defense counsel failed to preserve his confrontation issue, then he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He further contends the trial court erred in imposing a one-year enhancement due to his failure to remain free from custody for five years prior to committing this crime. We are not persuaded by any of defendant’s arguments and affirm.

Petitioner challenges the denial of his discovery requests regarding the informant S. G., other confidential informants who may have provided information on this case, and whatever additional evidence pertinent to this case is in the possession of the Multiple Gang Enforcement Consortium (MAGEC).
The People concede that “the police and the district attorney must make reasonable efforts in good faith to locate the [material] informer so that either party or the court may, if desired, subpoena her as a witness….
An informant is a material witness ‘if there appears, from the evidence presented, a reasonable possibility that he or she could give evidence on the issue of guilt that might exonerate the defendant.’”
The transcript of the interview with S. G. establishes that she was a percipient witness to discussions regarding a plan to rob the victims Gary and Sondra DeBartolo at their residence. S. G. indicated that the participants in those discussions were members of the Asian Boys Club, two Hispanic men, two Asian females, and another female who was called “Thumper.” It appears that at one point during the interview, S. G. identified a photo as the person called “Thumper.” Petitioner asserts without contradiction that one of those females was the codefendant Dawn Singh. S. G. also stated that at least one other male was involved but who was not present during the discussions.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant, Caroline Barboza, pled no contest to individual counts of welfare fraud (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 10980, subd. (c)(2)) and perjury (Pen. Code, § 118, subd. (a)). In keeping with the plea agreement, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on five years’ probation, one of the terms of which was that she serve one day in county jail and 89 days in the adult offender work program.
The court denied appellant’s request for a certificate of probable cause (Pen. Code, § 1237.5).
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing.

Appellant/defendant Anthony Endsley (defendant) and codefendant Shamir Hill were charged with count I, assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code,[1] § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and count II, battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)); and with the special allegations that the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). They were also charged with count III, the substantive offense of active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)).
The charges were based on a brutal beating inflicted on Dennis Steward, on or about October 12, 2010. Steward was the boyfriend of Shadonna Hill, sister of both defendant and Shamir Hill. Rodney Woods and a man only known as “RJ” were also present during the beating, but they were not charged or tried in this case.
After a joint jury trial, defendant and Shamir were found not guilty of counts I and II, the assault and battery on Steward, and the gang enhancements were found not true. Shamir was also found not guilty of count III, active participation in a criminal street gang. However, defendant was convicted of active participation and sentenced to the second strike term of 14 years in prison (including enhancements for two prior serious felony convictions).
On appeal, defendant contends that his conviction in count III must be reversed because the court misdirected the jury as to the evidence and requisite elements to prove a violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a), active participation in a criminal street gang, and the court’s misdirection was prejudicial because it allowed the jury to convict him solely based on his trial admission that he was a member of a gang, without finding that he willfully promoted, furthered, or assisted “in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang” on or about October 12, 2010. (§ 186.22, subd. (a)(1).)
As we will explain, the court initially gave the jury the appropriate pattern instructions to define the elements of count III, but it misstated those elements when it responded to the jury’s questions about count III. Based on the evidence and nature of the verdicts, we will find that count III must be reversed.

Defendant Jesus Jose Sanchez was charged with felony evading arrest (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 1), and misdemeanor driving on a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a); count 2). A jury convicted Sanchez on count 2, but the jury could not reach a verdict on count 1 and the trial court declared a mistrial on that count. Sanchez was immediately sentenced on count 2; the court placed him on 36 months summary probation.
The People thereafter filed a motion to amend the information to add one count of misdemeanor reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 23103, subd. (a)) as new count 2. The trial court granted the motion after defense counsel submitted on it without objection. A second jury trial on the amended information ended in a mistrial after the jury was unable to reach a verdict on both counts. A third jury convicted Sanchez on both counts. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and admitted Sanchez to 36 months’ probation upon specified terms and conditions, including a jail sentence of 180 days with 12 days’ custody and conduct credits, and payment of various fines and fees.