CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found Trinidad Cruz Burquez, Jr., guilty of corporal injury to a cohabitant. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a).) Burquez admitted he suffered a previous conviction for violating section 245, subdivision (a) within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (c)(1) and (e)(1); and 1170.12, subdivisions (a)(1) and (c)(1), the three strikes law.[1] We affirm.

A jury convicted Abel N. Neyra of two counts of committing lewd acts on a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and one count of continuous sexual abuse (§ 288.5, subd. (a)). He received a prison sentence of 16 years. We affirm.

A jury convicted Steven Hector Alcaraz (defendant) of second degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)) (count 1) and shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246) (count 5). The jury acquitted defendant of three counts of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) (counts 2, 3, 4). The jury found as to counts 1 and 5: a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm proximately causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)); and the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd (b)(1)(C)). Defendant was sentenced to 65 years to life in state prison. This was the third time defendant was tried for these crimes. We remand for resentencing as to count 5 and certain other modifications, and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Blaine Perry appeals from an order denying his post-judgment motion under Health and Safety Code section 11362.795[1] to modify his probation conditions to allow his use of medical marijuana under the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA) (§ 11362.5) and Medical Marijuana Program (MMP) (§ 11362.7 et seq.). We affirm the order.

A modification decision.

On November 29, 2011, Larry Allen Stancliff was sentenced under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h)[1] (hereafter section 1170(h)) to a four-year term in local custody for auto burglary (§ 459) and receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). Both offenses were committed in November 2010. Stancliff argues that equal protection principles entitle him to day for day presentence custody conduct credits pursuant to a 2011 amendment to section 4019, and that he was improperly denied such credit. We do not need to reach Stancliff’s equal protection argument because we conclude that calculating his presentence custody conduct credits under the version of section 4019 in effect when Stancliff was sentenced, “at the rate required by prior law” (§4019, subd. (h)), results in award of the credits he seeks. We therefore order the judgment modified to reflect 185 days of additional credits.

After a court trial, defendant Manuel Garcia[1] was found to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO) and was ordered committed for continued involuntary treatment for one year. (See Pen. Code, §§ 2970, 2972.)[2] Defendant was not present at the pretrial hearing when his counsel waived a jury trial. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to obtain a waiver from him personally, and by failing to advise him of his right to a jury trial. Defendant argues that the errors violated his statutory and constitutional rights and that reversal is required.
For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Timothy Murphy appeals from a default judgment in the sum of approximately $905,000 in favor of plaintiff Donald L. Henry, claiming the complaint did not provide sufficient notice of the amount of damages plaintiff was seeking. We disagree and affirm.

Plaintiff Tammy Demetry, a clerk for the County of Orange, was taking a walk during her break when she was struck by a car driven by another County employee, Rebecca Leeds, as Leeds was exiting a driveway. Demetry filed a workers’ compensation action, which was adjudicated. Demetry and her husband subsequently filed the instant lawsuit against Leeds, alleging negligence and loss of consortium.
Leeds filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 437c,[1] arguing that Demetry’s cause of action for negligence was barred by the doctrine of workers’ compensation exclusivity because both parties had been acting in the course and scope of their employment when the accident occurred. The trial court denied Demetry’s request for a continuance and granted Leeds’s motion. The court concluded the “required vehicle exception” to the going and coming rule applied, and therefore the claims by Demetry and her husband were barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine.
On appeal, Demetry argues that Leeds failed to meet her burden of production in a manner warranting summary judgment. We disagree, finding that Leeds met her burden with relevant, admissible and undisputed evidence, while Demetry offered none on her own behalf. We therefore affirm.

Plaintiffs Lisa Williams, as guardian ad litem for A.W., and Jennifer Eslinger, as guardian ad litem for A.E., sued defendant State of California for damages, alleging the minors were injured at Huntington State Beach (beach) because of a dangerous condition. After the court granted defendant’s motion in limine excluding evidence plaintiffs claimed showed defendant had notice of the dangerous condition, the parties ultimately stipulated to a nonsuit because, without that evidence, plaintiffs were unable to prove one of the elements of their case. Plaintiffs appeal, claiming the court erred in excluding that evidence and in preventing their expert from relying on it in his testimony. We conclude the court relied on an incorrect standard in excluding the evidence and erred when it ruled the expert could not testify that he had relied on that evidence in forming his opinions. We reverse the judgment and remand for the court to reconsider the motion in limine in light of the proper standard.

Richard A. England (appellant), trustee of the Robert L. McCaslin Separate Property Trust (the trust), appeals from the trial court’s order granting the “safe harbor” petition (former Prob. Code, § 21320) of Mark McCaslin and Brett Miller (respondents).[1] We affirm.

Appellant/defendant Imelda Chavez was charged and convicted of count I, felony possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)); and count II, misdemeanor possession of narcotics paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)). She was placed on probation.
On appeal, defendant contends the court erroneously admitted evidence of her admission that she previously used methamphetamine, and defense counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to request a limiting instruction as to the jury’s consideration of her admission. Defendant further argues the court had a sua sponte duty to give the unanimity instruction. We will affirm.

Petitioner M.V. (mother) challenges the decision of the juvenile court to terminate reunification services and set a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] to consider a permanent plan for her minor son. Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it found that the reunification services offered to her were reasonable and, also, that return of the minor would create a substantial risk of detriment to him. For the reasons explained post, we disagree with these contentions and, therefore, deny the petition.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Houston Edward Stalling pleaded guilty to three counts of residential burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.)[1] He admitted that the victims were present at the time of the burglaries (§ 667.5) and that each victim was older than 65 years within the meaning of section 667.9. In addition, he admitted that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22.)
Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw the plea. We disagree and so affirm the judgment.