CA Unpub Decisions

T.L, individually and on behalf of her minor son, N.L., sued the Brentwood Union School District (District) for, among other things, breach of contract and retaliation in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq. (Unruh Act)). On appeal, T.L. contends the trial court erred in sustaining the District’s demurrer to her causes of action for breach of contract and Unruh Act violations. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Appellant Brooks, a former employee of respondent Bechtel Corporation, appeals in pro per from orders of the San Francisco Superior Court denying his petition to vacate several arbitration decisions of an arbitrator appointed by the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS). Those decisions dismissed with prejudice appellant’s several claims against Bechtel Corporation and several of its officers and employees (hereinafter collectively referred to as Bechtel) relating to their alleged failure to pay him overtime wages and other asserted improper actions toward him. We affirm the orders appealed from and the subsequent judgment of the superior court.

A married couple walking home after dinner was robbed at gunpoint of a large bag containing the wife’s laptop. The robber sped away in a silver Mustang. The wife memorized part of the license plate. They called the police, describing the robber and the car. The next night, the police called them at 2:00 a.m. to ask if they could come to the police station immediately to attempt an identification of a suspect. Both husband and wife identified defendant in a cold show, and defendant made admissions that led to the recovery of the laptop. A jury convicted defendant of robbery. On appeal, defendant argues the cold show procedure was unnecessary and unduly suggestive, and his statements were involuntary because they were induced by promises of leniency. We conclude the cold show was neither unnecessary nor unduly suggestive under the circumstances of this case, and that defendant’s statements were voluntary. Therefore, we will affirm.

Defendant Manuel Cesar DeJesus pleaded no contest to misdemeanor resistance of an officer in the performance of his duties. The trial court placed defendant on three years formal probation with conditions. On appeal, defendant contends that one probation condition was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it did not contain a “knowledge” requirement. The People concede this issue, and we agree that the concession is appropriate. We therefore modify and affirm the probation order.

In this marital dissolution action, appellant Michael Carrasco challenges the trial court’s December 8, 2011 order directing respondent Lily Lim to pay him monthly temporary spousal support of $2,705 and monthly child support of $1,568, based on Lim’s earnings of $22,076 per month while working an 80 percent schedule as an attorney. Carrasco contends that the trial court abused its discretion in calculating support on Lim’s actual income of $22,076 from her reduced work schedule, rather than her earnings capacity of approximately $27,595 per month when employed as a full-time attorney.
For reasons that we will explain, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in calculating Lim’s support obligations on the basis of her reduced income and we will affirm the December 8, 2011 order.

In this appeal appellant challenges as vague a probation condition that requires him to "[t]otally abstain from the use of alcoholic beverages, not purchase or possess alcoholic beverages, and stay out of places you know alcohol to be the main item of sale." Appellant urges this court to modify the first part of the condition to include a knowledge requirement.
Even though appellant did not object to the condition at issue when it was imposed, the forfeiture rule does not apply when a probation condition is challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face and the claim can be resolved on appeal as a pure question of law without reference to the sentencing record. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888–889 (Sheena K.).)
For reasons that follow we modify the challenged probation condition, which is designated probation condition "8" in the probation officer's report and the minute order from the sentencing hearing.
The facts underlying appellant's conviction are not relevant to this appeal. We note, however, that pursuant to a negotiated disposition appellant pleaded no contest to one count of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. In exchange for his no contest plea appellant was promised felony probation.

A jury convicted defendant John Anthony Zamora of attempted murder, shooting at an occupied vehicle, possession of a firearm by a felon, corporal injury to a cohabitant, kidnapping, false imprisonment, and domestic battery. It also found true firearm-use, firearm-discharge, and firearm-causing-bodily-injury allegations for purposes of sentence enhancements to the attempted murder and shooting convictions. And the trial court found true three prior-prison-term allegations for purposes of one-year sentence enhancements. The trial court sentenced defendant to 38 years to life as follows: 34 years to life for attempted murder (nine years plus 25-years-to-life for firearm-causing-bodily-injury enhancement); stayed five years for shooting; concurrent 16 months for possession; consecutive one year for corporal injury; concurrent three years for kidnapping; stayed 16 months for false imprisonment; stayed 180 days for domestic battery; and consecutive three years for prior prison terms.
On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on kidnapping, (2) he was wrongly convicted of both kidnapping and false imprisonment, (3) he was wrongly convicted of both corporal injury and domestic battery, (4) his consecutive one-year sentence for corporal injury constitutes improper multiple punishment (Pen. Code, § 654), and (5) the abstract of judgment does not reflect that the sentences for shooting (but not the enhancements) and false imprisonment were stayed. The People concede defendant’s second and fifth contentions and we agree that the concessions are appropriate. We otherwise disagree with defendant. We will therefore modify the judgment by striking the conviction for false imprisonment and affirm the judgment as modified. And we will order the abstract conformed to reflect that the base term sentence for shooting at an occupied vehicle is stayed.

This case is the latest chapter in a series of disputes[1] between family members concerning their late father’s and husband’s revocable trust. Jonathan and Jason Gill (collectively, Trustees)—who are the successor cotrustees, as well as beneficiaries, of the David Henry Gill Revocable Trust—appeal from a June 2, 2011 probate order requiring the liquidation of certain Trust assets to satisfy a prior 2010 judgment awarding costs and attorney fees in favor of Brian Gill, the former trustee who is also a beneficiary of the Trust. (Hereafter, the challenged probate order is referred to as the June 2, 2011 order.) That prior 2010 judgment was also the subject of an appeal by Trustees. This court disposed of that appeal in favor of Brian.[2] (See Estate of Gill, May 4, 2012, H036291 [nonpub. opn.] (Estate of Gill I).)[3]
Trustees claim that the court erred in granting the June 2, 2011 order, asserting that it was based upon a petition filed by Brian without affording the beneficiaries and Trustees the requisite statutory notice. Brian responds that the issue of notice was waived because no objection was asserted below. (See Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 408, 427, fn. 20.) He argues further that the June 2, 2011 order was superseded by a June 23, 2011 order that is not a subject of this appeal.
We conclude that the appeal is moot and will therefore dismiss the appeal.

Plaintiff Ischemia Research and Education Foundation (IREF) appeals from the trial court’s order granting a new trial to defendant Pfizer Inc. (Pfizer) on liability and defendant Dr. Ping Hsu (Hsu) on damages after a jury returned a $38 million verdict in IREF’s favor in IREF’s misappropriation of trade secrets action against Pfizer and Hsu. IREF contends that (1) the trial court’s order is void because the statutory period for ruling on the new trial motions had expired before the court issued its order, (2) the statutory provision permitting a trial court to grant a new trial for insufficiency of the evidence is unconstitutional, (3) the trial court’s order was an abuse of discretion, and (4) the trial court’s decision not to award exemplary damages (an issue upon which it granted IREF a new trial) was an abuse of discretion. Pfizer and Hsu have filed protective cross-appeals. We reject IREF’s contentions and affirm the trial court’s order. Therefore, we need not address the cross-appeals.

After the trial court denied defendant Jeffrey Stuart Martin’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence filed pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, he entered guilty pleas to charges of possessing a controlled substance for sale and transporting a controlled substance, admitted suffering several prior felony convictions, and was sentenced to four years in prison. Defendant filed a notice of appeal and we appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493] and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. The brief set forth the facts of the case and, although it suggested two questions related to the pretrial suppression motion, counsel advised us that she could not find any issues to argue on defendant’s behalf.

Defendant Carlos Arturo Hernandez was convicted of a number of sex offenses involving children under 14 years of age. The trial court imposed 15-year-to-life terms on two of the counts that do not qualify for such a sentence under Penal Code[1] section 667.61. We therefore remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing.

Appellant, Rubbie McKeever, originally filed a complaint for personal injuries in federal court. Following dismissal of the federal action, McKeever filed an identical complaint in the superior court. On a motion filed by defendants and respondents, Security Consultants Group, Inc. (Security Consultants) and Adalberto Arreguin (Arreguin), the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in respondents’ favor. The court found that McKeever did not file the superior court action within the applicable statute of limitations.
McKeever contends the trial court erred in not applying the equitable tolling doctrine to her case. According to McKeever, the statute of limitations should have been tolled during the pendency of the federal court action.
The effect of equitable tolling is that the limitations period stops running during the tolling event and begins to run again when the tolling event has concluded. (Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 370 (Lantzy).) The court added the time that remained in the limitations period as of the date McKeever filed her federal action to the 30-day grace period provided by 28 United States Code section 1367(d) to find that she had 50 days to file the superior court action following the dismissal of the federal action. However, McKeever filed the superior court action 91 days after the federal action was dismissed. As a result, McKeever’s superior court action is barred by the statute of limitations. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Jacob Roy Trujillo was found guilty of a total of four acts of molestation against two child victims. With sentence enhancements for a prior strike, among other things, he received a determinate sentence of 13 years plus an indeterminate sentence of 60 years to life. In this appeal, Trujillo argues that the convictions on two of the counts were not supported by sufficient evidence. He also argues that, of six witnesses who gave propensity testimony under Evidence Code section 1108, two should have been excluded. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

On August 16, 2010, appellant, Margarito Orozco, pled no contest to driving with a suspended license (count 2/Veh. Code, § 14601.1). On February 17, 2011, after a bench trial, the court found Orozco guilty of being a felon in possession of ammunition (count 1/Pen. Code, § 12316, subd. (b)(1)) and found true three prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
On March 18, 2011, the court sentenced Orozco to an aggregate five-year term, the mid-term of two years on the substantive offense and three one-year prior prison term enhancements. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we affirm.