CA Unpub Decisions

M.M. (Mother) appeals after the termination of her parental rights to T.M. at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing.[2] Mother claims on appeal as follows: (1) the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the parental benefit exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), and (2) termination of her parental rights on the basis of poverty and homelessness was erroneous.

Defendant Ted Julius Rick raped his 11-year old stepdaughter, M., and was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of 14 years. Defendant essentially claims on appeal that his rights to confrontation and a fair trial under the federal Constitution were violated by the trial court refusing to allow him to cross-examine M. regarding previously being molested by her biological father.

On July 14, 2011, the trial court granted defendant Southern California Edison Company’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that defendant “met its prima facie burden of showing that it was immune from liability to Plaintiff because it showed that Plaintiff was injured during recreational activities on property in which [defendant] owned an easement.”
Judgment was entered on July 22, 2011. Plaintiff Irby McDonald appeals, contending that the recreational use immunity statute (Civil Code section 846)[1] is inapplicable and, if it is applicable, an exception for willful or malicious activity applies.

Two teenage boys affiliated with the Delmann Heights gang were walking down a street in San Bernardino when a man pulled up next to them in a car and fired two shots. One of the boys was struck and killed. The other boy hopped a wall and escaped; he gave a series of three statements to the police, in which he claimed that he could not identify the shooter, then gave a fourth statement, identifying defendant as the shooter. Defendant was a member of the rival 18th Street Maze gang.
Almost a year later, in Louisiana, defendant and his girlfriend, LaToya Thompson, were arrested for selling marijuana. Thompson told the Louisiana police that defendant had told her about a shooting he had committed in San Bernardino. At the preliminary hearing, she claimed that she lied to the police, because they threatened to arrest her and to take her children away. She did not testify at trial; the trial court found that she was unavailable. Thus, her preliminary hearing testimony was read into the record, and her statement to the police was then admitted as a prior inconsistent statement.

Michelle C. appeals juvenile court orders summarily denying her petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] and terminating her parental rights to her minor sons, Jason C., Brandon C. and Christopher C. (collectively, the minors) under section 366.26. Michelle contends she was entitled to a hearing on her section 388 petition because she made a prima facie showing her circumstances had changed and the proposed modification—an order for additional reunification services—was in the minors' best interests. She also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. We affirm the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2011, Michelle was arrested as she attempted to enter the United States from Mexico with a substantial amount of methamphetamine and heroin in her car. The drugs were hidden under the backseat where six-year-old Jason and three-year-old Brandon were sitting. Michelle, who was eight months pregnant with Christopher, admitted she knew the drugs were in her car. She said Julio C.,[2] who was her husband and the minors' father, had made arrangements for her to smuggle the drugs from Mexico to a location in Downey, California. Michelle admitted she used Jason and Brandon to distract border patrol agents in order to avoid getting stopped.

Dr. John Young on behalf of four of its employees. (Code Civ. Proc.,[1] § 527.8.) After an evidentiary hearing, the court issued orders enjoining Dr. Young from further contact with the four employees and prohibiting Dr. Young from entering Tri-City's hospital (except for emergency purposes). The court additionally provided a procedure whereby Dr. Young could participate in hospital board meetings without being physically present at the hospital.
On appeal, Dr. Young raises numerous contentions, including: (1) insufficient evidence supported the need for the section 527.8 protective orders; (2) the court failed to apply proper legal standards and proof burdens; (3) Tri-City sought the orders for an improper purpose; and (4) the protective orders violated his First Amendment rights to attend governmental board meetings. The contentions are without merit and we affirm the orders.

Following a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury, a jury convicted Jody Lewis of assault with a deadly weapon and with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 245, subd. (a)(1); 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). The jury also found Lewis personally: (1) used a deadly weapon (a knife) (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)) and (2) inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
The court sentenced Lewis to prison for six years.
Lewis appeals, contending the court erred in denying his multiple Marsden[2] motions, failing to adequately explore Lewis's request to represent himself, and failing to provide an instruction that the jury was to view with caution Lewis's out-of-court statements. We affirm.

A jury convicted John Michael Sedej of committing gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, causing the death of Nancy Ramirez (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a); count 1); driving under the influence of alcohol causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 2); and, driving while having a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b); count 3). It found the following allegations to be true: While Sedej was driving, he proximately caused bodily injury or death to more than one victim, to wit, Patricia Ramirez and Maria Elena Ramirez,[1] in the commission of counts 1, 2 and 3 (Veh. Code, § 23558); he personally inflicted great bodily injury on Nancy in the commission of counts 2 and 3 (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)); and he drove with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15 percent or more in the commission of counts 2 and 3 (Veh. Code, § 23578). As to count 1, the jury found not true that Sedej personally inflicted great bodily injury on Patricia. (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a).) The court sentenced Sedej to an aggregate term of six years, staying the sentence on counts 2 and 3 under Penal Code section 654.[2]
Sedej contends: (1) the convictions for counts 2 and 3 should be reversed because both are necessarily included offenses of the conviction in count 1; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction in count 1; (3) his state and federal constitutional due process and confrontation rights were violated by the court's exclusion of evidence; 4) the court erroneously declined his request to instruct the jury regarding unanimity; (5) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during closing arguments; and (6) the court erroneously denied him probation. We reverse the true findings on the Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancements as to Nancy in counts 2 and 3. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

Ponani Sukumar entered into a contract with Health Tech Resources, Inc. dba Impact Fitness Systems (Health Tech) whereby Sukumar purchased certain exercise equipment. The equipment was manufactured in Italy by Air Machine Com SRL, an Italian company (SRL). Because he believed the exercise equipment was defective, Sukumar, along with his physical rehabilitation clinic Southern California Stroke Rehabilitation Associates (SCSRA) brought suit against multiple defendants,[1] including Health Tech, Thomas Eggers (Health Tech's president and owner), and SRL. SRL moved to quash service of summons because of a lack of personal jurisdiction, and the court granted the motion.
Sukumar and SCSRA appeal, arguing the court erred in finding that SRL was not subject to personal jurisdiction in California. Specifically, they argue SRL purposefully availed itself of the benefits of doing business in California, their suit relates to SRL's contacts with California, and SRL did not show the superior court's exercise of jurisdiction in this matter would be unreasonable. In the alternative, Sukumar and SCSRA contend SRL waived its jurisdictional objection by engaging in discovery unrelated to jurisdictional issues. We affirm.

In February 2012, appellant Martha (mother), who had a history of psychiatric hospitalizations, gave birth to Baby Boy R. That same day, mother was involuntarily hospitalized for psychiatric evaluation and treatment. Two days later, respondent Department of Children and Family Services placed Baby Boy R., whose father was unknown, with a couple who eventually became his prospective adoptive parents.
On February 10, 2012, respondent filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The petition alleged mother suffered from mental and emotional problems, including schizophrenia with psychotic episodes and auditory hallucinations, and suicidal and homicidal ideation, that prevented her from providing regular care to Baby Boy R. The petition also alleged that mother had two other children who were dependents of the court because, among other reasons, mother’s mental and emotional problems prevented her from taking care of them.
The court sustained respondent’s petition and set a hearing for termination of mother’s parental rights. The hearing was held on September 7, 2012. The court’s minute order states the court received into evidence a copy of Baby Boy R.’s birth certificate and respondent’s report recommending termination. The minute order further states that the court “read and considered” respondent’s report. At the end of the hearing, the court terminated mother’s parental rights. (The men whom mother had identified as possible fathers of Baby Boy R. had already disavowed any interest in the boy’s custody or their parental rights.) Mother’s appeal followed.[1]

Respondent Preston Sharp lived in a house owned by appellant Deborah Paul. He lived rent free with the understanding he would oversee substantial repairs to the residence. When Paul no longer wanted Sharp’s services, she asked him to move out of the residence.
As a result of conduct not relevant to the current appeal, Paul successfully sought a restraining order against Sharp. Sharp simultaneously successfully sought a restraining order against Paul. On appeal, Paul challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the restraining order entered against her. Because we conclude the restraining order is not supported by substantial evidence, we reverse and dissolve it.

Defendant Nou Chong Her pleaded no contest to felony evading a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), receipt of a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)),[1] and felony resisting an executive officer (§ 69). The trial court imposed a stipulated term of 16 months in state prison and awarded 527 days of presentence custody credits.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court should have awarded him 526 days of presentence conduct credits. We dismiss the appeal for failing to raise a cognizable issue.

Defendant Miguel White and an accomplice robbed three pizza delivery men at gunpoint. During the third robbery, defendant shot the delivery man in the leg. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of three counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)[1] and one count of attempted carjacking (§§ 664/215, subd. (a)). Additionally, the jury found true three enhancements for personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and an enhancement for personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (d)). The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for 18 years four months plus 25 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) there is insufficient evidence to support the personal and intentional discharge of a firearm enhancement, (2) instructional error on that enhancement, and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction on accident. We affirm.

Stacy K. (father) has filed a petition for extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) challenging an order of the juvenile court terminating reunification services with his four children and setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Father contends the juvenile court erred when it found that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) had provided him with reasonable reunification services because the court failed to provide services tailored to the family’s special needs. We find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order. Accordingly, we deny the petition.