Marriage of Patterson
Filed 4/4/13
Marriage of Patterson CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re the Marriage of STEVEN
and KELLEE R. PATTERSON.
STEVEN PATTERSON,
Respondent,
v.
KELLEE R. PATTERSON,
Appellant.
F064797
(Super.
Ct. No. S-1501-FL-595369)
THE COURT
name="_ftnref1" title="">*
APPEAL from
an order of the Superior Court of
Law Offices
of Michael G. York and Michael G. York for Appellant.
The Law
Office of Paige Etcheverry-Barnes and Paige Etcheverry-Barnes for Respondent.
-ooOoo-
In
connection with a marital dissolution
action, respondent, Steven Patterson (Husband), filed an order to show
cause requesting that he be awarded exclusive use and possession of the house
he purchased before the marriage.
Appellant, Kellee R. Patterson (Wife), responded that Husband was not
entitled to retain possession of the property because (1) he stipulated that he
would surrender possession of the house unless he prevailed at the trial of a
separate civil action; and (2) that the separate civil action had been
dismissed.
The family law court granted
Husband exclusive use and possession of the house. The court found that the stipulation was no
longer valid and that Husband should remain in possession of the house in order
to maintain the status quo.
Wife
challenges this order on the ground that Husband was bound by his stipulation
to surrender possession of the house.
According to Wife, the stipulation in the separate civil action was
binding on the court in the dissolution action and therefore the family law
court erred in not enforcing the stipulation.
The family
law court did not err as the issues are yet to be resolved by that court. The order will be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
In his
application for the order for exclusive use and possession, Husband filed a
declaration in support of his request.
Husband declared that he had lived in the house since it was purchased
in 1990. Husband and Wife were married
in 1999. Husband explained that he and
Wife agreed to the terms of a marital settlement agreement that included child
support. According to Husband, he signed
a promissory note in favor of Wife securing the
settlement agreement and it never became an order of the court. Husband declared that Wife then signed over
title to her attorney, Michael York, and that York claims he is the owner of the
house.
In
response, Wife set forth a somewhat different version of the facts supported by
York’s declaration. According to Wife
and York, in addition to the promissory
note, Husband signed a deed of trust on the house in favor of Wife. Thereafter, title to the note and deed of
trust were transferred to York. When
Husband did not make the payments on the note, York proceeded with foreclosure,
a foreclosure sale was conducted, and York acquired title to the property. York then filed an unlawful detainer action
against Husband. In response, Husband
requested a preliminary injunction against the foreclosure. Husband’s request was denied on the ground
that the court lacked sufficient evidence to make the necessary findings. Husband next filed a separate civil action
against Wife seeking an injunction against the foreclosure and claiming that
the foreclosure was improper. Husband’s
motion for a preliminary injunction in this separate civil case was denied. York declared that the parties then entered a
stipulation in the separate civil action wherein they agreed that Husband would
deliver possession of the house to York no later than April 2, 2009, “unless
prior to that date [Husband] in this action prevails at a trial of this actionâ€
and York agreed to dismiss his unlawful detainer action. York further declared that the separate civil
action proceeded to trial and Husband did not prevail. Therefore, York claimed, he was entitled to
enforce the stipulation.
The family
law court granted Husband’s request for exclusive use and possession of the
house. The court concluded that, because
the separate civil action had been dismissed and the question of the ownership
of the house was to be determined in the dissolution action, the stipulation
made in the separate civil action was no longer valid. The court also wanted to maintain the status
quo.
DISCUSSION
Wife argues
that Husband’s stipulation given in the separate civil action was binding on
the court in the dissolution action and therefore the trial court erred in
disregarding the stipulation. Wife cites
the rule that, as long as the stipulation is neither contrary to law nor
against public policy, the stipulation entered into in one proceeding is
binding in another proceeding. (
116 Cal.App.4th 934, 944.) Wife has
correctly stated the general law.
However, because the conditions of the stipulation were not satisfied,
the family law court properly refused to enforce it.
In January
2009, Husband agreed, through his attorney, that he would surrender possession
of the property not later than April 2, 2009, “unless prior to that date
[Husband] in this action prevails at a trial of this action.†This wording implies that the parties
conditioned their agreement on several events taking place. It is clear that the parties assumed
that: the court had jurisdiction to
determine the issues in Husband’s separate civil action, i.e., whether the note
and deed of trust and the foreclosure were valid; a trial would take place; and
either York or Husband would prevail.
However, in June 2009, the court dismissed Husband’s separate civil
action as follows:
“Plaintiff complaint is dismissed without prejudice to
pursue the matter in the family law case.
The family law court has exclusive continuing jurisdiction over this
matter. The claim raised in this civil
action is one of support. The
transaction which occurred would not have occurred outside of the family law
context. It is well established that
when a dissolution proceeding is pending, neither party to that proceeding may
file a civil action concerning interim support orders issued in the dissolution
proceeding. This same rule also applies
to tort actions which are based on conduct which took place during the
dissolution proceedings.…â€
Thus,
contrary to York’s declaration in response to Husband’s order to show cause,
the separate action did not proceed to trial.
Further, no one has prevailed on this matter. The issue of the validity of the note and
deed of trust has yet to be decided.
Under these circumstances, the family law court did not err in refusing
to enforce the stipulation.
DISPOSITION
The order
is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded
to respondent.
name="_ftn1" title="">* Before
Levy, Acting P.J., Kane, J. and Poochigian, J.
name="_ftn2" title="">[1] At
the time of the parties’ separation, the two minor children were living with
their grandparents in Idaho under a guardianship. Wife’s response to the dissolution petition
stated that there were no minor children.
