CA Unpub Decisions

In this juvenile dependency matter, appellant A.G., the maternal grandmother of the minor, J.G., appeals from an order denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388.[1] In appellant’s section 388 petition, she requested removal of J.G. from her foster parents, who have cared for the minor her entire life and who wish to adopt her, and that a placement in appellant’s home should be made. The juvenile court denied appellant’s section 388 petition after finding that a change in placement was not in the minor’s best interests.
On appeal, appellant primarily contends that the Alameda County Social Services Agency (the Agency) and the juvenile court gave insufficient weight to appellant’s placement request under the requirements of section 361.3, affording preferential consideration to a relative’s request. Appellant claims the resulting denial of her section 388 petition should be reversed to allow her the full benefits of preferential placement consideration under section 361.3, and “the matter remanded to the trial court to start the transition of [the minor] into her grandmother’s home.”
For the reasons stated below, we determine that the court’s denial of appellant’s section 388 petition did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we will affirm the challenged order.

Brandon Duck appeals from a judgment denying his petition for writ of administrative mandamus seeking to overturn a disciplinary order by the Board of Registered Nursing, Department of Consumer Affairs, State of California (the board), placing him on probation for a three-year period upon specified terms and conditions. He contends that the board erred by imposing discipline based on his single “aberrational” misdemeanor conviction for driving under the influence. Alternatively, he argues that the penalty imposed was arbitrary and capricious. We shall affirm the judgment.

C.D., a minor, appeals from the order of the court, following a disposition hearing, that he be committed to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). At the preceding contested jurisdictional hearing, the court had sustained a count of robbery and a count of attempted robbery. C.D. seeks reversal of the court’s order sustaining the count of attempted robbery, arguing that his identity as the perpetrator was unsupported by substantial admissible evidence and that insufficient evidence supported a finding that the elements of an attempted robbery were established.
C.D. also seeks reversal of the order committing him to the custody of the DJJ. He contends that there is no evidence that he would benefit from such a commitment or that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. He also contends that this order should be vacated due to prosecutorial misconduct. Additionally, C.D. maintains that he was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to advocate for a lower maximum term of confinement.
We affirm the orders of the court.

The trial court denied a petition to compel arbitration of an action brought by respondent City of Piedmont (Piedmont) against appellant Harris & Associates (Harris), in part because of the risk that arbitration of their dispute might result in conflicting rulings affecting an action arising out of the same transaction between the city and respondent Robert Gray & Associates (Gray). Harris appeals, contending inter alia that the trial court had insufficient evidence of third party common issues to warrant denial of his petition to compel arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc.,[1] § 1281.2, subd. (c), pars. 1, 4 (section 1281.2(c)).) We affirm the trial court’s order.

Defendant was convicted of the following crimes against the following victims: (1) Shannon Doe: forcible penetration by a foreign object (Pen. Code § 289, subd.(a)(1)),[1] three counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), and two counts of forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)); (2) Barbara Doe: forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), and forcible sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)); (3) Cecilia Doe: forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)); and (4) N. Doe: assault with intent to commit a sex crime (§ 220, subd. (a)).
On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred because (1) it failed to give sua sponte a unanimity instruction on one of the counts involving Shannon Doe; (2) it did not instruct the jury sua sponte on the meaning of “consent”; (3) it failed to instruct sua sponte on simple assault as a lesser included offense of rape with regard to Cecilia Doe; (4) it failed to instruct sua sponte on simple assault as a lesser included offense of assault with intent to commit rape with regard to N. Doe; and (5) it erred in admitting testimony from the nurse who conducted Cecilia Doe’s sexual assault examination.
Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

Intervener Anthony Betchart (Tony) appeals from an order that awarded him $5,370.65 in costs after he requested the sum of $20,816.87 in costs. He contends that he was entitled to costs that the trial court disallowed. We are not persuaded by Tony’s arguments and affirm the trial court’s costs order.

On December 21, 2011, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed an amended wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a) alleging that A.L. committed attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664, victim Jane Doe., count one),[1] possessed a weapon on school grounds (§ 626.20, subd. (a), count two),[2] carried a dirk or dagger concealed on his person (§ 12020, subd. (a)(4), count three), stalked Jane (§ 646.9, subd. (a), count four), resisted, delayed or obstructed a police officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1), count five), and attempted to kidnap Jane (§§ 207, subd. (a), 644, count six). The petition contained allegations that as to the attempted murder count, the stalking count and the attempted kidnapping count A.L. was armed with a knife.
Thereafter, following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court sustained the 602 petition finding four of the allegations to be true. Specifically, the court found true the allegations of attempted murder while armed, possession of a knife on school grounds, possession of a dirk or dagger, and evading a police officer. The court found not true the stalking and attempted kidnapping allegations.
Subsequently, on January 9, 2012, the court declared A.L a ward of court, and ordered him removed from the custody of his parents. The court placed A.L. in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Division of Juvenile Facilities.[3]

M.L. was born in October 2012. Her mother, petitioner Ashley C., had taken methamphetamine the day before, so M.L. was born with methamphetamine in her system. Two days after her birth, M.L. was detained by the Orange County Social Services Agency, and by October 10 the agency had filed a petition to declare M.L. a dependent of the juvenile court.

A jury found defendant Ali Achekzai guilty of two counts of forcible rape in violation of Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(2) upon Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe No. 2 as charged in counts one and three of the information, and that as to both counts, it was true defendant committed an enumerated offense against more than one victim within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (e)(5). (Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.) He was also found guilty of two counts of sexual penetration by foreign object upon Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe No. 2 as charged in counts two and four, and the jury again returned a true finding under section 667.61, subdivision (e)(5). As to counts three and four, the jury further found it to be true defendant inflicted great bodily injury on the victims within the meaning of sections 12022.8 and 667.61, subdivision (e)(3). The jury further found defendant guilty of aggravated assault of Jane Doe No. 2 as charged in count five and that he personally inflicted great bodily harm within the meaning of section 12022.7. Lastly, the jury found defendant guilty of assault with intent to commit sexual assault upon Jane Doe No. 3 as charged in count six. The court sentenced defendant to serve a determinate sentence of 21 years and an indeterminate sentence of 40 years to life in state prison.

Shannon L. (mother) appeals from the judgment terminating her parental rights to her son William, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26,[1] and the court order denying her section 388 modification petition. She also contends that the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C., § 1901 et seq.) were not complied with. We disagree with her contentions and affirm.

A jury found Amber Boothe guilty of committing various financial crimes against her grandmother. Boothe now challenges the trial court’s denial of a motion to continue her sentencing hearing. She contends the court violated her constitutional rights by refusing to allow her additional time to search for a new attorney in hopes of preparing and filing a motion for new trial. We affirm.

Plaintiffs Darrell and Susan Wilson (collectively the Wilsons)[1] sued defendant and cross-complainant Salinas Energy Corporation (Salinas) for injuries Darrell Wilson sustained while attempting to repair a positive displacement pump on an oil lease Salinas owned. Salinas filed a cross-complaint against cross-defendant American Pipe & Tubing, Inc. (APT) for comparative equitable indemnity and declaratory relief.[2] The trial court granted APT’s summary judgment motion on the cross-complaint. APT thereafter filed a motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1038,[3] which the trial court granted. Salinas separately appealed from the judgment entered after the summary judgment motion was granted, and the amended judgment entered after the attorney fees motion was granted; at the parties’ request, we consolidated the two appeals.
On appeal, Salinas argues (1) there are triable issues of material fact that prevent the grant of summary judgment, and (2) the post judgment order awarding attorney fees must be reversed because the motion was untimely and Salinas had reasonable cause to bring and maintain the cross-complaint against APT. As we shall explain, we affirm the judgment but reverse a portion of the attorney fees order.

Appellant Mario Valenzuela was convicted after jury trial of battery on a prison guard. (Pen. Code, § 4501.5.)[1] Multiple prior strikes and prior prison term allegations were found true. After the trial court denied appellant’s new trial motion, it sentenced him as a third strike offender to 25 years to life imprisonment plus two years.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the battery conviction. He argues that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct on the defenses of accident, unconsciousness and involuntary intoxication. Appellant contends that the trial court further erred by denying his new trial motion. None of these claims is persuasive. The judgment will be affirmed.

In July of 2010, an information was filed charging appellant Manuel Joshua Knight in count 1 of battery against a custodial officer causing injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(1))[1]; in count 2 of battery against a custodial officer (§ 243.1); and in count 3 of resisting an executive officer by threats or violence (§ 69). In November of 2010, a jury was impaneled to try the case, but after the jury was unable to reach a verdict on any of the counts, a mistrial declared.
On January 27, 2011, following a second jury trial, appellant was found guilty in count 1 of the lesser offense of battery on a peace officer without injury (§ 243, subd. (b)) a misdemeanor; in count 2 of battery against a custodial officer (§ 243.1), a felony; and in count 3 of the lesser offense of resisting or obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)), a misdemeanor.