CA Unpub Decisions

Angelnette T. Buckner appeals from the trial court’s order denying her motion to suppress marijuana and other items seized during a warrantless search of her apartment. We reverse the court’s judgment finding her guilty of possession of marijuana for sale, direct the court to grant her motion to suppress, and remand for further proceedings.

A jury convicted defendant Jose M. Ortiz of one count of battery resulting in serious bodily injury (Pen. Code,[1] § 243, subd. (d)), and found true an allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Defendant admitted that he suffered a prior conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)), and that he suffered a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The trial court denied defendant’s motion to strike the prior conviction allegation and sentenced him to the midterm of three years in prison, doubled under the Three Strikes law, plus five years under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), for a total aggregate term of 11 years.

Jorge Antonio Castillo appeals from a judgment which sentences him to an indeterminate term of 80 years to life plus a determinate term of 20 years in state prison for the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter. On appeal, Castillo contends the court committed various instructional errors. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Teresita A. Noblejas (wife) appeals from the December 16, 2011 judgment characterizing certain property as community property and dividing the community property between wife and respondent Pacifico Noblejas (husband). Wife contends: (1) property wife transferred to an LLC of which she was a shareholder was not community property; (2) other property wife gifted to her mother and which her mother sold was not community property; (3) still other property wife acquired during the marriage was not community property; (4) the findings regarding wife’s income for purposes of calculating child support were not supported by substantial evidence; (5) the trial court erred in denying wife’s motion for new trial; and (6) the trial court erred in denying her motion to modify child support. We affirm.

Joseph Wayne Jones appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction on one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a)), four counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)), and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, § 246).[1] Appellant raises three issues on appeal, none of which we find meritorious. We therefore affirm.

Appellant Daniel Zeisler[1] received probationary sentences in two separate felony cases, each charging possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). He was subsequently found in violation of the terms of his probation, following a contested evidentiary hearing, and sentenced to a two-year term in the county jail, pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision(h)(5)(A).
Assigned counsel has submitted a Wende[2] brief, certifying that counsel has been unable to identify any issues for appellate review. Counsel also has submitted a declaration confirming that Zeisler has been advised of his right to personally file a supplemental brief raising any points which he wishes to call to the court’s attention. No supplemental brief has been submitted. As required, we have independently reviewed the record. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 109–110.)
We find no arguable issues and therefore affirm.

Gustavo Hernandez Rios appeals from an injunction issued under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6,[1] which directs him to stay away from Luis Chan. He contends the injunction must be reversed because it was based on hearsay evidence and the testimony of a biased, non-certified interpreter (a friend of Chan’s who was assisting him at the hearing). We affirm, because hearsay evidence is permitted in proceedings under section 527.6 and Rios has failed to demonstrate that the translator’s participation in the hearing was prejudicial.

Defendant Mark Brandon Arroyo pleaded guilty to two counts in connection with a high-speed police chase on a rural road through Humboldt and Mendocino Counties. He argues on appeal that a fine imposed on one of the counts should have been stayed under Penal Code section 654[1] because it amounted to multiple punishment for an indivisible course of conduct. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings on this issue because the appellate record is unclear. We do not reach the merits of Arroyo’s second argument, that the trial court impermissibly imposed a probation condition requiring him to obtain permission before leaving Humboldt County, because the issue was forfeited.

In 2002, appellant Kenneth Lee McCarty was sentenced to serve 23 years and eight months in state prison upon his guilty plea to first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459),[1] possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and defrauding an innkeeper (§ 537, subd. (a)(2)). While in prison, McCarty was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. In 2012, the Office of the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommended that the superior court recall McCarty’s sentence, pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (e)(1), providing for early release of medically incapacitated or terminally ill prisoners. The superior court held a hearing and denied the request. McCarty appealed, arguing that the trial court’s findings are not supported by the record and that the trial court misconstrued the statutory language. Subsequent to filing this appeal, McCarty passed away in prison. We therefore dismiss his appeal as moot.

Maribel Monroy executed two promissory notes with WMC Mortgage Corp. (WMC) when purchasing a home in Richmond, California in 2006 (the Richmond property). After a foreclosure on the senior deed of trust, Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC (Heritage) acquired Monroy’s second promissory note from WMC. Heritage sent Monroy a letter attached to a complaint and summons advising her that Heritage had filed a lawsuit against her alleging various fraud claims. The letter admonished that any misinformation provided by Monroy on her original loan application with WMC could result in civil liability and that Heritage would proceed with a lawsuit if it were unable to resolve the matter with Monroy. Monroy filed a cross-complaint against Heritage, alleging violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Rosenthal Act) and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA or the Act).

Raymond G. Choy and Lorraine J. Choy appeal from an order for possession of a right-of-way on land they own in Lake County. The order for possession was granted to the Lake County Sanitation District (the District) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure[1] section 1255.410, in an eminent domain proceeding that is still pending in the trial court. We dismiss the appeal as taken from a nonappealable order.

In the middle of the night, someone hot-wired a car, and then crashed it into another car parked nearby. Awakened by a banging noise, a neighbor saw a shadowy male figure, possibly wearing a backpack, running toward a nearby golf course. Police arrived moments later. One of them glimpsed someone disappearing into the woods next to the golf course. At the spot where the person was seen, police found a recently dropped backpack. The backpack contained shaved car keys, other car theft-related equipment, and a methamphetamine pipe. The police searched the adjoining woods with a dog, and found appellant there half an hour later, standing in a creek.
Two years earlier, another car theft occurred in the same neighborhood, also during the night. Later the following day, police found appellant and another man sitting in the stolen car. Inside the car, police found a backpack containing shaved car keys and appellant’s identification. Appellant also had a methamphetamine pipe in his pocket. Appellant pleaded no contest to the charges arising from this earlier incident.
At appellant’s trial in the present case, evidence of his prior car theft was admitted on the issue of common plan or scheme. Appellant argues the admission of this evidence was reversible error. We disagree, and affirm.

Nathan Lamont Hill (appellant) was convicted, following a jury trial, of possession of cocaine base for sale; possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) for sale; possession of a firearm by a felon; and possession of ammunition by a convicted person. On appeal, he contends the trial court’s denial of his Faretta[1] motion violated his federal constitutional right to self-representation. In a petition for writ of habeas corpus (habeas petition), appellant further argues that the trial court misunderstood the circumstances surrounding his motion for self-representation due to either prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel, or both.
We conclude the court erred in denying appellant’s timely Faretta motion, and shall therefore reverse the judgment. In light of this result, we need not address the related issues raised in appellant’s habeas petition, which we shall deny in a separate order.

Plaintiffs Iain Malcolm, David Potts, Anne Walsh, and Rick O’Farrell sued unnamed Doe defendants for libel, invasion of privacy, and infliction of emotional distress arising from anonymous blog entries posted on Internet sites hosted by a California company. These sites were accessible from England where the plaintiffs reside. Plaintiffs conducted third party discovery to learn if Ahmed Khan, a political rival of plaintiffs, was the author of the entries. Khan, who was not named in or served with the complaint, filed a special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.[1] [2] The trial court denied the motion, found it was frivolous, and awarded attorney fees and costs to plaintiffs. Khan appeals the ensuing order. We affirm.