CA Unpub Decisions

At the July 24, 2012, contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared N.M. to be a dependent of the court, after finding the allegations pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), to be true. Defendant and appellant D.M., father of N.M., appeals, contending there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings and the court erred in failing to consider placement with him under section 361.2. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, defendant and appellant Donta Demetrus Harris was convicted of one count of first degree murder and three counts of willful, deliberate and premeditated murder. On this appeal, he contends the sentencing court erred in staying rather than striking a three-year enhancement for personally inflicting great bodily injury on one of the surviving victims. We disagree and affirm the conviction.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Jose Alberto Deanda of shooting at an inhabited house (count 1—Pen. Code, § 246)[1] and found true an attached gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to the mandatory, statutory term of imprisonment of 15 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in declining to reopen the case to permit continued cross-examination of Hemet Police Officer Takaski Nishida, in declining to give defendant’s proffered instruction on Officer Nishida’s testimony, and in failing to give a sua sponte jury instruction on corroboration of an accomplice witness’s testimony. Defendant additionally contends the People committed prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct during their closing and rebuttal argument by vouching for Officer Nishida, defense counsel below rendered infective assistance of counsel (IAC) in failing to object to the prosecutor’s purported misconduct, and in failing to request a limiting instruction on the use of the gang evidence adduced at trial. Finally, defendant maintains the cumulative effect of the alleged errors deprived him of a fair trial and due process. We affirm the judgment.

Trevon H. entered a negotiated admission to having committed two residential burglaries (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460; counts 1 and 3). The court declared him a ward and committed him to the Breaking Cycles Short Term Offender Program for a period not to exceed 90 days. Trevon appeals. We affirm.

Representing himself, plaintiff Alexander Ziburtovicz filed a petition for writ of mandate under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) challenging approval of an affordable senior housing project by defendant City of Oroville (the city). Ziburtovicz’s petition failed to name the project applicant as a real party in interest. The trial court sustained the city’s demurrer without leave to amend because Ziburtovicz failed to join a necessary and indispensible party (the project applicant) and the statute of limitations had run for him to do so. On Ziburtovicz’s appeal (in which he also represents himself) from the resulting judgment of dismissal, we affirm because the trial court got it right.

q In this action for damages for breach of a lease, plaintiffs and cross-defendants Scott Molinari and Luz Molinari doing business as Minerva’s (collectively Molinari) appeal from a judgment entered after a nonjury trial awarding defendant and cross-complainant Stephen Tebo doing business as Tebo Development Co. (Tebo) certain amounts of rent as damages on the cross-complaint and denying Molinari all relief upon his complaint. We affirm the judgment. w

The juvenile court declared two-year-old Raymond A. a dependent of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)[1] and ordered reunification services for the child’s mother. Over the next 18 months, mother repeatedly used methamphetamine, was arrested on multiple occasions and failed to comply with the court’s case treatment plan. The juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a hearing on the termination of parental rights pursuant to section 366.26.
On the morning of the section 366.26 hearing, mother filed a section 388 petition arguing that the juvenile court should reinstate reunification because she had completed a drug treatment program and obtained housing. The juvenile court summarily denied the petition, terminated parental rights and selected adoption by maternal grandparents as the child’s permanent plan.
Mother appeals the juvenile court’s orders, arguing that: (1) she was entitled to a hearing on her section 388 petition; and (2) the juvenile court erred by not applying the beneficial parental relationship exception to parental termination. We affirm.

L.G. (Mother) appeals an order terminating her parental rights to and designating adoption as the permanent plan for her daughter, Jasmine V. (Jasmine). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)[1] We affirm.

Father R.C. appeals from a juvenile court order asserting dependency jurisdiction over his and mother M.J.’s children. Father contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court order. We reverse the juvenile court’s order asserting jurisdiction over the children.

Plaintiffs Teresa Tostado and Robert Tostado obtained a loan from Rehabbers Financial, Inc., dba Aztec Financial (Aztec) to construct a home on a vacant lot for Teresa Tostado’s mother. Plaintiffs claim that Aztec failed to disclose to them several material terms of the loan and filed this action asserting claims for violations of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.) (TILA) and other California statutory and common law provisions. The trial court sustained Aztec’s demurrer on statute of limitations and substantive grounds. We reverse on plaintiffs’ claims for violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Civ. Code, § 1788 et seq.) (Rosenthal Act) and Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) (UCL), breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and declaratory relief, and affirm on the remaining claims.

Property owners petitioned for a writ of mandate and administrative mandate to compel a community services district to act on their applications for a service review and for sewer service. They also included a cause of action alleging a taking of their properties.
The trial court sustained the district's demurrer without leave to amend. The court concluded the district had no duty to conduct a piecemeal service review or to hold a hearing on a petition for sewer service without water service. It also concluded the takings claim is not ripe for adjudication. We affirm.

The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment of defendants and respondents F. Bari Nejadpour and Nejadpour & Associates (Nejadpour defendants) and then entered judgment in their favor and against plaintiff and appellant Gerald Cravea. We affirm.
This action arises from the alleged legal malpractice and fraud of Benjamin Donel and the Law Offices of Benjamin Donel (Donel defendants), who represented plaintiff in a number of matters. Plaintiff contends that the Nejadpour defendants were “partners” of the Donel defendants and, as such, were vicariously liable for the Donel defendants’ alleged negligent and fraudulent conduct. The main issue on appeal is whether there was a triable issue of material fact concerning the alleged actual or ostensible partnership between Donel and Nejadpour, or their two respective law firms. We shall conclude that the trial court correctly found that, as a matter of law, there was no partnership.

Jorge Vasquez (Vasquez) challenges the trial court's calculation of presentence conduct credits and the sufficiency of the evidence underlying one of his three convictions. We modify the judgment to include additional conduct credits, but otherwise affirm.

A jury found Trinidad Cruz Burquez, Jr., guilty of corporal injury to a cohabitant. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a).) Burquez admitted he suffered a previous conviction for violating section 245, subdivision (a) within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (c)(1) and (e)(1); and 1170.12, subdivisions (a)(1) and (c)(1), the three strikes law.[1] We affirm.