CA Unpub Decisions

Vicente Benites appeals from a judgment convicting him of voluntary manslaughter. He argues the judgment must be reversed due to the cumulative effect of error that occurred in closing argument by the prosecutor, the court's response to a jury question, and the court's refusal to exclude a rebuttal witness's testimony. We reject these contentions of error, and hence find no cumulative error.

Plaintiff Taxpayers for Accountable School Bond Spending (Taxpayers) appeals a judgment entered against it in its action against defendant San Diego Unified School District (District) arising out of Proposition S and District's approval of installation of new stadium field lighting and other improvements at Hoover High School (Hoover). In its operative first amended complaint against District, Taxpayers alleged four causes of action: (1) a Code of Civil Procedure section 526a cause of action for waste and misuse of Proposition S funds; (2) a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) cause of action for District's wrongful adoption of a mitigated negative declaration for the project at Hoover; (3) a cause of action for District's violation of the City of San Diego's (City) zoning and land use laws; and (4) a cause of action for District's violation of Government Code section 53094 by exempting the Hoover project and certain other high school projects from City's zoning and land use laws. On appeal, Taxpayers generally contends the trial court erred because: (1) Proposition S did not specifically list or otherwise include field lighting for Hoover or other schools for funding from bond proceeds; (2) there is substantial evidence in the administrative record that the Hoover project may have a significant effect on the environment within the meaning of CEQA; and (3) District's resolution pursuant to Government Code section 53094 exempting Hoover and other high schools from City's zoning and land use laws is invalid because inadequate notice was given, the exemption of classroom and nonclassroom facilities is overbroad, and that exemption action is a project requiring compliance with CEQA.

Conrado De Vera Bongato appeals from an order denying his Penal Code[1] section 1016.5 motion to vacate his conviction following his guilty plea to inflicting corporal injury on a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). Because Bongato did not obtain a certificate of probable cause (§ 1237.5), we dismiss the appeal.

Appellant Gustavo A. Ramos was employed by respondent Ralphs Grocery Company, Inc. (Ralphs), from 1989 to 1990 and from June 1996 until he was terminated in March 2009 for twice calling a coworker a "fucking racist bitch." Ramos sued Ralphs and two of his former supervisors, respondent John Meza and Jennifer Welker, asserting causes of action for harassment (but not wrongful termination) based on age and national origin in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code,[1] § 12900 et seq.) and for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.[2]
On appeal, Ramos contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Ralphs and Meza because (1) he raised material disputed facts in support of his age harassment claim and because the court erred in applying the law to that claim, and (2) his emotional distress claims were not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation law. As we explain, we disagree with both contentions and affirm the judgment.

Antonio Lozano was convicted by jury of five felonies arising out of shooting and kidnapping incidents involving his ex-girlfriend and her visits to her mother's home. The shooting incident on January 1, 2008 resulted in a guilty verdict of assault with a semi-automatic firearm (Pen. Code,[1] § 245, subd. (b)), and jury findings that he personally used an assault weapon within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a), and he personally inflicted great bodily injury (on the mother, Fidelia Garcia) within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). Lozano was also convicted of shooting into an inhabited structure (§ 246), with findings that he caused great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)); he intentionally and personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); and he possessed an assault weapon (§ 12280, subd. (b)).

Stanley J. Prokop appeals from a judgment that, among other things, imputed income to him and denied him spousal support. He contends the trial court erred in deciding these and other issues. We reject his contentions and affirm the judgment.

Appellant G. B., the mother of the minor S. P., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] §§ 395, 366.26.) She contends the trial court’s denial of her request for a continuance of the selection and implementation hearing was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

D. B. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders which removed the minor J. B. from his custody and granted him reunification services. ( "Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 355, 358" Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] §§ 355, 358.) Father contends no substantial evidence supported the court’s findings under "section 300, subdivision (b)" section 300, subdivision (b), that father’s drug habit put the minor at substantial risk of serious physical harm, and that removal from his custody was required. We affirm.

Lorena G. (“Mother”), the mother of now four-year-old Esther O. (“Esther”), appeals from the juvenile court’s order of June 27, 2012, summarily denying her petition filed the same day under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 388, seeking to have her reunification services reinstated, to vacate the section 366.26 hearing, and to be granted custody of Esther. We affirm.

Seo In Corporation (appellant) appeals from an order of the superior court dismissing its case against husband and wife, Kyu Bong Kim (Mr. Kim) and Hyo Sook Kim (Mrs. Kim), and two companies owned by the Kims, HQ Textile, Inc. (HQ), and Lucky Kim International (Lucky) (collectively respondents). Appellant contends that the court erred in finding that its action was based on the same facts as those in a prior federal case and thus was an improper attempt to secure a duplicate judgment. We agree, vacate the order of dismissal, and remand for the superior court to conduct a prove-up hearing. At that hearing, the court must determine whether appellant has established a prima facie case and, if so, enter judgment in its favor.

Christina C. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order asserting jurisdiction over her five children. In sustaining the dependency petition, the court amended the petition so that it included language regarding mother, despite previously accepting the parties’ mediation agreement that removed all mention of mother’s conduct or omissions from the petition. We conclude the juvenile court did not err in amending the petition’s language and that the amended language was supported by substantial evidence.

In the underlying action regarding the enforcement of a trust instrument, the trial court found that the instrument allocated the interests in a house in equal shares to two trusts. Appellants contend that the instrument requires the house to be allocated entirely to one of the trusts. We conclude that they are correct, and therefore reverse.

Gerald M. McClain was granted probation with 270 days in the county jail after a jury convicted him of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon (Pen. Code §§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)); 12316, subd. (b)(1), and possession of methamphetamine and psilocybin. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). He appeals, contending that evidence of prior drug use was erroneously admitted to show knowledge of the narcotic nature of the drugs seized. We affirm.

John Wade Fowler and Wahid Areso filed class complaints against CarMax,[1] alleging wage and hour violations. Fowler and Areso appeal from the trial court’s order granting CarMax’s motion to compel arbitration. We reverse and remand with directions.