CA Unpub Decisions

Behnam Khani and his trial counsel, Payam Shahian and Strategic Legal Practices, appeal from an attorney disqualification order. We reverse.

This is the second time this matter is before us. The case stems from claims filed by Jack and Teresa Horak (collectively “Horaks”) against South Shores Development Corporation doing business as Lanikai Lane Mobile Home Park and Jed Robinson (Robinson) (collectively “South Shores”), after South Shores served the Horaks with a “Sixty (60) Day Notice to Terminate Possession” of their tenancy (60-day notice) in the Lanikai Lane Mobilehome Park (the park).[1] The Horaks requested that the 60-day notice be withdrawn “on the grounds of discrimination and breach of contract.” They moved out of their mobilehome, yet continued to market the property for sale. The Horaks sued South Shores after they came to believe that South Shores was blocking their ability to sell their mobilehome.
In their second amended complaint (SAC), filed July 24, 2008, the Horaks alleged six causes of action against South Shores for: (1) declaratory relief, seeking a declaration that the purported termination of their lease was a nullity and that the lease was still in full force and effect; (2) slander of title, based on South Shores’s representations to third parties that the Horaks no longer had rights to the property; (3) breach of contract, based on South Shores’s issuance of a false 60-day termination letter and refusal to authorize sale of the property; (4) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; and (6) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.

Plaintiff and appellant Rehan Nazir appeals from the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend of defendants and respondents County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, and Lawrence E. Mason to the original complaint. We conclude the demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend and a judgment of dismissal properly entered in defendants’ favor. We therefore affirm.

Leroy and Terrie Brown appeal the trial court’s judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Mid-Century Insurance Company on the Browns’ claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court concluded that the Browns’ claim for water damage caused by a broken pipe in their house was not covered under their Mid-Century policy and that Mid-Century was entitled to summary judgment. We affirm.

Plaintiff Ki Hyun Lim made renovations to a “four-plex” he and his sister owned, but did not comply with building codes or obtain a permit. When he received notices of violation from the housing authorities, he paid a Los Angeles city employee, defendant Eun Chavis, $11,000 to “resolve the subject property’s code violations in a safe and legal way.” He continued to receive citations and then hired a contractor recommended by Chavis, but the contractor did not do the work. Plaintiff filed a claim for damages under the Government Claims Act, the claim was denied, and plaintiff then sued the City of Los Angeles (hereafter the city), Chavis and others.
The city demurred to plaintiff’s second amended complaint. The trial court sustained the city’s demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the complaint, observing among other things that plaintiff’s government claim was not timely filed. We affirm the judgment of dismissal.

A jury convicted defendant Michelle Cato of one count of second degree murder in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a)[1] (count 1) and one count of attempted murder in violation of sections 664 and 187, subdivision (a) (count 2). The jury found that in the commission of count 1, defendant personally used a firearm, personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and (d). In count 2, the jury found the firearm allegation pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (b) true, but found the allegations pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (c) and (d) not true.
The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 57 years to life in state prison. In count 1, the court imposed a 15-years-to-life term, plus 25 years to life pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d). In count 2, the court imposed a consecutive seven-year term, plus 10 years pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (b).
Defendant appeals on the grounds that: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred by improperly restricting her proffered psychiatric expert testimony in support of her claim of imperfect self-defense; and (2) the trial court prejudicially erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter based on sudden quarrel.

Lisa Maria Flowers appeals the judgment entered following her plea of no contest to one count of grand theft. (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a).)[1] Flowers contends the order directing her to pay victim restitution to family members of the named victim must be stricken as unauthorized by her plea bargain or sections 1192.3 and 1202.4. However, Flowers agreed to pay actual restitution to any victim, if appropriate, and the family members of the named victim themselves qualify as victims for the purpose of restitution. (§ 1202.4, subd. (k)(3)(A) & (k)(3)(B).) We therefore find no violation of Flowers’s plea bargain or the cited statutes and affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

On October 4, 2011, the trial court found defendant Kenneth Moore in violation of probation. On October 5, 2011, the trial court ordered executed an eight-year prison sentence that had previously been imposed and suspended.
Defendant appeals on the grounds that: (1) the trial court erred in not sentencing him under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h);[1] and (2) the restitution fine and parole revocation fine imposed on October 5, 2011, must be stricken because the court had previously imposed these fines. Also, because defendant is not subject to parole under section 3451, both parole revocation fines must be stricken.

Plaintiffs are the former owners of a fire and security services company. Plaintiffs sold their company to the defendants pursuant to a purchase agreement requiring the arbitration of disputes arising out of the agreement.
Plaintiffs filed an action for breach of contract claims against defendants alleging defendants failed to provide reasonable access to accounting information related to the defendants’ claim of a post-closing purchase price adjustment. Defendants moved to compel arbitration. The motion was granted. Defendants then brought several accounting related breach of warranty claims against the plaintiffs.
The arbitrator found in defendants’ favor and awarded them damages. Plaintiffs petitioned the trial court to vacate or correct the award. The trial court denied the petition, confirmed the award and entered judgment. The plaintiffs filed this appeal.

Appellant Paul Ajiduah has not seen his child for six years; he seeks custody. Ajiduah asks that California maintain jurisdiction over the case; both the child and the custodial parent, respondent Karyn Hutchinson, live in Texas. The trial court has ordered Ajiduah to pay child support; his arrearages exceed $80,000. Ajiduah owes Hutchinson's counsel over $17,000 in court-ordered fees; he has paid nothing.[1] Notwithstanding his obdurate behavior, Ajiduah sought and received a reduction in his monthly child support payment -- a seemingly inconsequential matter since he does not comply with support orders irrespective of the amount.
Ajiduah appeals from the trial court's order relinquishing jurisdiction to Texas on child custody issues and requiring him to pay Hutchinson's attorney's fees. We affirm.

Appellant David Wayne Wolf appeals from the judgment of conviction following a jury trial in which he was convicted of one felony count of grand theft auto (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(1))[1] (count 1) and two felony counts of attempted carjacking (§§ 664/215, subd. (a)) (counts 2 and 3). He was sentenced to the middle term of two years six months on count 2, with the same sentence on count 3 and the middle term of two years on count 1, both to run concurrently. On the date of his sentencing on November 19, 2008, he received 713 days of custody and work credit.[2]
Appellant contends the trial court violated his due process rights by not conducting a competency hearing postverdict and prior to sentencing. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant and appellant, Samuel Vanek, appeals his conviction, after a bench trial, for felony child abuse with an enhancement for infliction of great bodily injury on a child under the age of five (Pen. Code, §§ 273a, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (d)).[1] Vanek was sentenced to state prison for 10 years.
The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with directions.

After the court denied his Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence, Kevin Lu (appellant) entered no contest pleas to one felony count of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a), count one) and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, count two).
On January 13, 2012, the court suspended imposition of sentence and admitted appellant to probation pursuant to Proposition 36 (Pen. Code, § 1210 et seq.). The court imposed various fines and fees. Relevant to this appeal, the court did not calculate or award appellant any presentence custody credits.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, appellant challenges the denial of his suppression motion and contends that the court erred in failing to calculate his presentence custody credits. For reasons that follow we reverse the judgment.