CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
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An amended information charged Michael Williams with one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211).[1] The information alleged in the commission of the robbery Williams, “with the intent to do so, took, damaged and destroyed property of a value exceeding $65,000,†within the meaning of section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(1).
Evidence presented at trial showed that robbery victim Cesar Ramirez worked for a recycling company and sometimes paid out large sums of money in cash for recyclable materials. On multiple occasions, defendant Williams had brought car parts to Ramirez’s employer to be sold. On March 23, 2011, at about 7:30 a.m., Ramirez arrived for work carrying a backpack full of bundles of cash totaling approximately $120,000. Ramirez had withdrawn the money from the bank the evening before because he needed to pay a customer for a large volume of recyclable materials. As Ramirez was unlocking the gate at the recycling company, two men approached. A man later identified as Juan Carlos Garcia demanded Ramirez’s backpack, told Ramirez he had a gun and would shoot, and moved his hand inside his jacket pocket indicating he had a gun. Garcia grabbed the backpack and Ramirez let him because Ramirez was afraid Garcia would hurt him. The two men ran off. Ramirez flagged down a stranger who was driving by and asked for his help. The stranger allowed Ramirez to get into his vehicle and they drove off after Garcia and the other man. Ramirez saw Garcia and the other man run to and climb inside a white sport utility vehicle with paper license plates. Ramirez dialed 911 and provided the location and description of the white vehicle. Eventually, Ramirez lost sight of the white vehicle and went back to the recycling company to wait for the police to respond. |
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Named plaintiff and class representative Michael Merchant (plaintiff) and his counsel Kirk Hanson appeal from the superior court’s order disqualifying Hanson as class counsel and from the dismissal without prejudice of plaintiff’s putative class action against his former employer OfficeTeam, a temporary employment agency. The parties reached an early class settlement, in which Hanson agreed to seek an attorney fee award of no more than one-third of the $1.5 million settlement fund, and plaintiff agreed to request no more than $7,500 as an award for his service as class representative. After the preliminary approval hearing, the trial court ordered an award of attorney fees to class counsel in the amount of $75,000 and a $1,000 incentive award for plaintiff, and ordered the parties to revise the settlement agreement to reflect this order. When Hanson refused to comply with the order and revise the settlement agreement, the trial court disqualified Hanson as class counsel on the grounds that he had a conflict of interest with the class and had violated his fiduciary duty to them, and then dismissed the action without prejudice when plaintiff refused to find another lawyer to represent him and the putative class.
Although we are mindful of the trial court’s concern over the terms of the settlement agreement, we conclude that the court erred by prematurely deciding the attorney fee and incentive payment amounts at the preliminary hearing, and that it exceeded its authority when it ordered the parties to amend their settlement agreement to include the amount of attorney fees and service award ordered by the court. Further, we conclude that the court erred in disqualifying class counsel for refusing to amend the agreement and dismissing the case without prejudice. Therefore, we reverse and remand to the trial court to proceed with the settlement approval process. |
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Matthew W. Carpenter appeals from the judgment entered after his conviction by a jury of two counts of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (counts 1 & 6 - Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a));[1] driving in willful disregard for the safety of others while attempting to elude a pursuing peace officer (count 2 - § 2800.2, subd. (a)); driving on the wrong side of the road while eluding a pursuing peace officer (count 3 - § 2800.4); and reckless driving (count 8 - § 23103, subd. (a)). In a separate court trial, appellant was found guilty of driving while his license was suspended for a conviction of driving under the influence (count 9 - § 14601.2). He was sentenced to prison for four years, four months.
Appellant contends that the trial court (1) erroneously instructed the jury, (2) violated Penal Code section 654 by imposing a concurrent sentence on count 3, and (3) erroneously ordered him to pay restitution to Ventura County for damage that its vehicles had incurred during the pursuit of appellant. We modify the judgment to stay execution of the sentence imposed on count 3. We affirm the judgment as modified. |
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Christian Guzman and Agustine Edgar Cuevas appeal from the judgments entered after a jury convicted them of assault with a firearm and other crimes committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. We remand to correct a sentencing error conceded by the Attorney General, but otherwise affirm.[1]
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Plaintiff and appellant Richard Feder appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Blue Cross of California, doing business as Anthem Blue Cross (Blue Cross). For approximately two years, plaintiff was a subscriber to an individual health insurance plan with Blue Cross. Plaintiff contends Blue Cross violated Health and Safety Code sections 1399.805, 1399.811 and 1399.815 by charging him premiums that exceeded the statutory rate limitations for his type of individual policy. Plaintiff filed suit, on behalf of himself and a putative class, stating claims for unlawful business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., and fraud by omission. The trial court granted Blue Cross’s motion for summary judgment, essentially concluding there was no showing Blue Cross engaged in unlawful conduct. We conclude summary judgment was properly entered in favor of Blue Cross, and therefore affirm.
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Defendant Richard Khoury, a qualified medical marijuana patient, operated three medical marijuana shops in the cities of Northridge, Van Nuys and Encino. In 2010 and 2011, the Los Angeles Police Department executed search warrants at the shops and Khoury’s home, seizing marijuana, cash, scales, computers, receipts and business records. Khoury was charged with cultivating marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale. (Health & Safety Code, §§ 11358, 11359.) He pleaded not guilty.[1]
Prior to trial, Khoury filed a notice that he would rely on an affirmative defense provided by the Medical Marijuana Program Act, Health and Safety Code[2] section 11362.7 et seq. Section 11362.775 provides: “Qualified patients, persons with valid identification cards, and the designated primary caregivers of qualified patients and persons with identification cards, who associate within the State of California in order collectively or cooperatively to cultivate marijuana for medical purposes, shall not solely on the basis of that fact be subject to state criminal sanctions under Section 11357 ([possession of marijuana]), 11358 ([cultivation of marijuana]), 11359 [(possession of marijuana for sale)], 11360 [(transporting, importing, selling, furnishing, or giving away marijuana)], 11366 [(maintaining a place for the sale, giving away, or use of marijuana)], 11366.5 [(making real property available for the manufacture, storage, or distribution of controlled substances)], or 11570 [(abatement of nuisance created by premises used for manufacture, storage, or distribution of controlled substance)].†|
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Plaintiff Eden Ruiz Ari sued her divorce lawyers, defendants Oyler and Woldman, Donald Woldman and Connolly Oyler, claiming that, due to their deficient handling of her dissolution action, she entered into a settlement which awarded her ex-husband virtually all of her interest in the couple's community property. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, which plaintiff challenges on appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.
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California Surety Investigations (CSI), its employee Peter Holdsworth and CSI’s parent company, Two Jinn, Inc., doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds (collectively CSI parties), appeal from the order denying their motion to compel arbitration of claims brought against each of them by Valerie Serpa for sexual harassment, employment discrimination, wrongful termination in violation of public policy and related causes of action. The CSI parties contend the trial court erred in concluding the arbitration agreement Serpa signed was unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable. We reverse. |
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Plaintiff and appellant Jane Porter appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants and respondents Joanne Adger and Shadow Hills Mobile Home Park in this action arising out of Porter’s eviction from the park. Porter contends that triable issues of fact exist as to her causes of action for elder abuse and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by denying her requests for a continuance and to amend her complaint. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
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Anthony C. Romero (Romero) appeals from the judgment following his convictions of carrying a loaded firearm, in violation of former Penal Code section 12031, subdivision (a)(2)(F), and street terrorism, in violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a).[1] He challenges the legality of the search that revealed the firearm, and the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the street terrorism conviction. We reject his challenge to the search and affirm the firearm conviction.
We need not address Romero's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to the street terrorism conviction because our Supreme Court's recent decision in People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125 (Rodriguez), requires us to reverse that conviction. We accordingly vacate the judgment on the street terrorism conviction and remand for the trial court to consider whether resentencing is necessary. |
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In this action for damages for employment discrimination based on a disability of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), plaintiff Carmen Hunt appeals from the judgment on a jury verdict in favor of defendant El Camino Community College. Hunt assigns as error the trial court’s ruling in limine precluding evidence that Hunt was raped by a professor at El Camino College in 1982 (Evid. Code, § 352). She contends that this ruling was an abuse of discretion because the rape was critical evidence of the nexus between her PTSD and her requests for accommodation to teach off campus. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm the judgment.
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Sharon Meeks appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted her of simple possession of a controlled substance (cocaine base). (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350.) After Meeks waived her right to jury trial on prior conviction allegations, the trial court found true that Meeks had suffered eight prior prison term convictions within the meaning of Penal Code[1] section 667.5, subdivision (b), and had suffered one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes Law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(1) & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The court sentenced Meeks to eight years and eight months in prison: the low term of 16 months for the offense, doubled under the Three Strikes Law, plus six years for six prior prison term convictions.[2] The court awarded Meeks custody credit of 247 days and conduct credit of 122 days.
Meeks contends she is entitled to additional presentence conduct credits under the October 2011 amendment to section 4019, arguing the amendment should be applied retroactively to her sentence under principles of equal protection of the law. Applying Supreme Court precedent, People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 330, we reject Meeks’s contention. Meeks also asks this court to review the record of the in camera hearing on her Pitchess motion. (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.) We conditionally reverse the judgment and remand the matter because the record demonstrates Meeks was entitled to disclosure of additional discoverable information.[3] |
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