CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Save Cuyama Valley ("Save Cuyama") appeals from the judgment denying its petition for a writ of mandate. The County of Santa Barbara and its Board of Supervisors (collectively, "the County") granted Real Party in Interest Troesh Materials, Inc. ("Troesh") permission to begin sand and gravel mining in the bed of the Cuyama River. Save Cuyama asks us to overturn that decision. Save Cuyama contends that the Final Revised Environmental Impact Report ("Report") that formed the basis for the County's approval violates the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA") in a variety of ways. We reject Save Cuyama's arguments and affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant and appellant Ali David Naredo guilty of, among other things, involuntary manslaughter of his seven-month-old son. At trial, the People introduced, over Naredo’s objection, his statement to the police that he punched the baby’s head. On appeal, he contends that his statement was involuntary because it was coerced by a promise of a benefit or leniency. He also contends that the trial court improperly denied challenges for cause, admitted cumulative autopsy photographs, and failed to instruct the jury properly. We hold that no prejudicial error occurred and affirm the judgment.

G.F. (Mother) seeks extraordinary relief from orders of the Alameda County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, entered September 18, 2012, terminating Mother’s reunification services after the six-month status review hearing, and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] to select a permanent plan for her twin daughters, K.F.-1 and K.F.-2 (born November 2011). Mother contends essentially that the juvenile court erred in finding that the Alameda County Department of Social Services (Department) offered or provided her with reasonable reunification services, and in finding Mother had failed to make substantial progress in her court-ordered treatment plan during the period under review. We conclude substantial evidence supports the challenged findings, and deny on the merits Mother’s petitions for extraordinary writ.[2]

Appellants Lotchk Corporation (Lotchk) and Great Sunset Ventures, Inc. (GSV) attempt to appeal from an interlocutory probate order denying their motion to dismiss the petition brought by respondent William Parisi on behalf of conservatee Lucia Fiorani. Because the order is not appealable and there are no unusual circumstances present that would spur us to treat the appeal as a writ of mandate, we dismiss the intended appeal. As well, we grant Parisi’s motion to impose sanctions on appeal.

A jury found defendant guilty of (1) willfully causing or permitting a child to suffer under conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, inflicting unjustifiable pain or mental suffering upon a child, or willfully causing or permitting a child to be placed in a situation where her person or health is endangered (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a));[1] and (2) willfully inflicting upon a child cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or an injury resulting in a traumatic condition (§ 273d, subd. (a)). As to both counts, the jury found true the allegations defendant inflicted great bodily injury on a child under the age of five years old. (§§ 12022.7, subd. (d), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) The trial court suspended a prison sentence of four years, and granted defendant probation with the condition she be committed to the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department for 360 days. The trial court struck the punishments for the great bodily injury enhancements. (§ 1385.) Defendant contends the trial court erred by incorrectly instructing the jury on the great bodily injury enhancements. (CALCRIM No. 3162.) We affirm the judgment.

Defendant was placed on probation after his conviction of multiple crimes. He urges this court to strike an award of attorney fees ordered pursuant to Penal Code section 987.8,[1] because it was imposed without the requisite showing that he was able to pay. We conclude that although the trial court did not err in imposing the fee, its written order should be modified to clarify its contingent nature. We otherwise affirm.

Defendants Scott Alan Desmarais and Wendi * appeal the trial courts denial of their motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. <br />
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Defendants Scott Alan Desmarais and Wendi * appeal the trial courts denial of their motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5.

Respondent Rick Hill, Warden at Folsom State Prison, appeals from the superior court's December 9, 2011 order granting inmate James L. Stevenson's petition for writ of habeas corpus and compelling the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) to provide petitioner a new parole consideration hearing.[1] Petitioner James L. Stevenson is currently serving an indeterminate life term for a 1998 conviction of kidnapping to commit robbery (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)).[2]
We reverse the court's order granting habeas relief.

This appeal concerns a long and contentious dispute between Lyle Wilson and his former employer, the Orange County District Attorney’s Office (the County). Wilson was discharged from his employment in 2002. After six years of litigation and legal maneuvering, a trial court entered judgment in Wilson’s favor and issued a peremptory writ ordering the County to vacate his discharge from employment. The trial court determined one of the charges supporting Wilson’s discharge was barred by the statute of limitations. The County did not appeal this judgment. Instead, the County amended Wilson’s employment file to show he was terminated in 2002 for two non-time barred reasons.
The trial court, and a different panel of this court, concluded backdating a second discharge violated the peremptory writ. (Wilson v. Superior Court (Apr. 7, 2010, G040875) [nonpub. opn.] (hereafter Wilson I).) The backdating effectively deprived Wilson of any administrative remedies to challenge the discharge and eliminated his ability to seek backpay. We upheld the trial court’s order finding the County’s attempt to backdate a second discharge was null and void. (Ibid.)
Thereafter, the County vacated the 2002 discharge, reinstated Wilson with pay, but placed him on paid administrative leave. The trial court ordered the County to determine within 90 days how much Wilson was due in backpay and benefits. It also ruled any dispute as to the amount of backpay would have to be resolved in a new action.
On October 26, 2010, the County paid Wilson $97,304 for backpay and benefits. Wilson filed the underlying petition for a writ of mandate, seeking an order requiring the County to pay him an additional $1,108,782, as well as a retirement credit of 7.9 years. A few weeks later, the County discharged Wilson from his employment based on two non-time barred charges.
The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer on the basis Wilson failed to allege compliance with the Government Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq., hereafter referred to as Claims Act).[1] The court dismissed Wilson’s writ petition. On appeal, Wilson asserts the Claims Act does not apply. We agree and reverse the judgment.

Pacific Westline, Inc. (Pacific), has appealed an order compelling arbitration after a judgment confirming the arbitration award. Pacific was a subcontractor of general contractor C.W. Driver, Inc. (Driver), for remodeling work on a hotel at Disneyland. Pacific alleged that Driver ordered additional work on the hotel for which it refused to pay. Driver successfully petitioned to compel arbitration of the dispute. Pacific appeals from the order granting Driver’s petition.
We affirm. The language of the subcontract supports arbitration of disputes such as the one between Driver and Pacific. The court correctly granted the petition to compel arbitration.

Plaintiff and cross-defendant JR Enterprises, L.P. (tenant) appeals from the denial of its special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16; all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated) the breach of contract claim in the cross-complaint filed by defendants and cross-complainants Michael Lawrence and Victoria Lawrence (landords). Tenant contends the court erred in sustaining landlords’ evidentiary objections and finding tenant had not met its burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute to demonstrate the breach of contract cause of action was based on protected activity. Finding no error, we affirm.

Lisa Rene Brown’s vehicle collided with Lynn Phillip’s vehicle in the middle of an intersection. They had both taken drugs before the crash, and they were both injured by the impact. Brown was charged with one count of driving under the influence of drugs causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23151, count 1) and having suffered three prior convictions for driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)). The trial on the priors was bifurcated. The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of count 1, as well as the lesser included offense of driving under the influence. The jury found Brown not guilty of count 1, but guilty of the lesser included offense. The court sentenced Brown to the upper prison term of three years and ordered she pay $47,531 restitution to Phillips. On appeal, Brown asserts the court should not have ordered her to pay restitution for the crime for which she was acquitted. We agree and reverse the restitution order. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

At a jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found true allegations set forth in a juvenile wardship petition that appellant, J.C., a minor, committed assault with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and that in committing that offense he personally inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)). At the subsequent disposition hearing, the court adjudged appellant a ward of the court, placed him on probation with various terms and conditions and ordered that he serve 90 to 180 days in the Tulare County Youth Treatment Center.
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d. 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing. We affirm.