CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
In March 2012, L. B. (L.), the three-year old daughter of appellant Blake B. (Father) was removed from his home by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) due to the child’s report that she had been repeatedly hit by the paternal grandmother. At the time, Father and the child’s mother, Rae H. (Mother), were separated and engaged in a dispute over custody of L. in family court. DCFS’s investigation revealed a lengthy history of domestic violence in which both Father and Mother initiated physical violence, including an incident in December 2011, when L. incurred scratches while the parents were physically fighting over her.
At the detention hearing, L. was placed with Mother, who at that time was living in the home of the maternal grandmother with two other children, L.’s half-siblings. Mother subsequently submitted to jurisdiction. Father contested, but at the April 2012 jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the court found true that the couple had a history of engaging in domestic violence, including the incident in December 2011 when L. was injured, and that the parents failed to protect the child from the paternal grandmother, who had hit the girl with a broom. |
Priscilla F. (mother) appeals from the Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26[1] order terminating her parental rights to her children. She argues that the order must be reversed because the court abused its discretion by denying her a contested evidentiary hearing. Mother had also argued that the Santa Barbara County Department of Social Services/Child Welfare Services (CWS) did not comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) We granted respondent's motion to augment the record with documents relevant to that issue. Mother now concedes the ICWA issue. We affirm.
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The juvenile court sustained a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging two counts of second degree robbery against minor and appellant O.R. Although he was ordered home on probation, the court set a maximum term of confinement. Because that term of confinement has no legal effect, we modify the judgment by striking the term of confinement, and we affirm the judgment as modified.
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M.B. (mother) appeals jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders made with respect to her children, 11-year-old D.B. and infant Da.B. The juvenile court sustained a non-detained petition alleging mother’s marijuana use placed her children at risk of harm within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).[1] Mother contends the evidence was insufficient to show the children were at substantial risk of harm. Thus, the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders must be set aside. We reject mother’s claims and affirm the orders under review.
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David Llamas Llamas appeals the judgment following his convictions for aggravated sexual assault (rape) of a child under the age of 14 (J. G.) (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(1)),[1] continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 (J. G.) (§ 288.5, subd. (a)), lewd act upon a child of 14 (J. G.) (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)), continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 (Y. G.) (§ 288.5, subd. (a)), and lewd acts upon a child of 14 and 15 (Y. G.) (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)). Llamas was sentenced to three consecutive terms of 15 years to life in prison for the aggravated sexual assault and the two counts of continuous sexual abuse. He was also sentenced to three years for the lewd act against a child of fourteen and eight months for lewd acts upon a child of fourteen and fifteen. Llamas contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to consecutive 15 years to life terms for the two counts of continuous sexual abuse (§ 288.4) by failing to understand it had discretion to impose concurrent sentences. Llamas also contends the trial court erred in awarding restitution to a victim of an uncharged crime, issuing a no-contact order (§ 1202.05), and miscalculating presentence custody credit. We will modify the judgment regarding the restitution, no-contact order and custody credits. The judgment, as modified, is affirmed. |
A Sheriff's deputy saw the respondent, Ernest Lira, carrying a "bright colored" women's purse. Lira also had a knapsack on his back. The trial court opined that "a man with a purse is not unusual in Los Angeles." Perhaps. But, when the contents of the purse are poured into the knapsack and the purse discarded, the interest of an observant Sheriff's deputy is properly and lawfully aroused. As we shall explain, the initial contact between the deputy and Lira was a "consensual encounter," not a detention, and the facts presented here "permit -- even demand -- an investigation: the public rightfully expects a police officer to inquire into such circumstances 'in the proper discharge of the officer's duties.' [Citation.]" (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 894, superseded by statute on another issue.)
Lira was charged with receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)),[1] with an alleged prior "strike" conviction (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667), and prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court granted Lira's motion to suppress evidence (§ 1538.5) and dismissed the case (§ 1385, subd. (a)). The People appeal. (§ 1238, subd. (a)(7).) We reverse. |
Defendant and appellant Marvin Haynie (defendant) was convicted of first degree burglary with a person present (Pen. Code, § 459[1]). On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike his prior conviction pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero motion). We affirm.
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Defendant and appellant Abraham Saucedo Sanchez pleaded guilty to one count of corporal injury to a spouse or cohabitant, and the remaining three counts for the same charge were dismissed. The trial court ordered Sanchez to pay restitution related to the dismissed charges. The prosecutor, however, did not obtain a waiver under People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, 758 (a “Harvey waiverâ€), which held that when charges are dismissed against a defendant, there should not be any punishment for them. Because the defendant did not agree to waive his rights under Harvey, the trial court erred by ordering him to make restitution on the dismissed charges. We therefore modify the judgment to strike those restitution amounts improperly imposed and affirm the judgment as modified.
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Following trial, a jury found defendant and appellant Tedroy Davis (defendant) guilty of second degree murder and of being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, defendant contends that during a rebuttal examination of one of the investigating detectives, the prosecutor committed Doyle[1] error when, on four separate occasions, she asked the detective improper questions about statements defendant made or failed to make after he invoked his right to counsel.
We hold that defendant forfeited each of the claims of Doyle error by failing to object to the questions in issue and request curative instructions. We do not reach defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as such a claim is more appropriately raised by way of a writ of habeas corpus. We therefore affirm the judgment of conviction. |
Defendants and respondents (defendants) Josef and Carmella Blankstein (the Blanksteins), Marc and Laura Garbell (the Garbells), and Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company (Coldwell Banker) each filed motions for summary judgment that the trial court granted. Plaintiff and appellant Alex Pladott (Pladott) appeals from the judgments entered in favor of defendants and also appeals from certain orders entered by the trial court prior to the entry of the judgments.
Defendants each submitted facts in support of their summary judgment motions showing that Pladott could not establish one or more elements of his causes of action or that they had a complete defense to one or more of his causes of action, thereby shifting the burden to Pladott to show the existence of a triable issue of fact. Therefore, because Pladott failed to submit sufficient admissible facts to show the existence of a triable issue of fact as to each of his claims, the trial court properly granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it entered the orders denying the motions from which Pladott appeals. |
Jaime Luis Lopez ("Lopez") was charged with assaulting a teenage boy and, two weeks later, with attempting to murder two other men. For the first incident, he was convicted of assault with a gang allegation (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). For the second incident, he was convicted of first degree burglary (§ 459) and two counts of attempted murder (§§ 187/664). For both incidents, he was convicted of street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd.(a)).[1] Lopez was sentenced to a determinate term of 18 years, followed by an indeterminate term of 14 years to life in state prison. Among other things, Lopez now challenges the trial court's findings that he was competent to stand trial and that he was properly housed in a "safety cell" during trial. These arguments lack merit, and we affirm. |
Former spouses Leslie Osinoff (Husband) and Karen Huter (Wife) appeal the characterization and value of three marital assets. Husband argues that the couple's Thousand Oaks residence and a $100,000 loan to finance its renovation are assets and liabilities of the community. Wife contends that Husband's general contractor business should be valued as of the date of their separation (rather than the date of trial). We agree with each. We modify the judgment accordingly, reverse and remand for further proceedings to value the business, and affirm the judgment in all other respects.
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