CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Angel Perdomo and Jose Domingues of three counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); all statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted). Defendants contend the trial court erred in imposing the following term and condition of probation: “Maintain a residence subject to the approval of the probation officer.” For the reasons expressed below, we modify the probation order to delete the condition.

A jury found Joseph Raymond Garcia guilty of six counts of forcible sodomy (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(2); counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7)[1] and two counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 5 and 8), and found true an allegation Garcia committed these offenses against more than one victim (§ 667.61 subds. (b) & (e)(4)). The trial court sentenced Garcia to a prison term of 45 years to life. Garcia asserts the judgment must be reversed for instructional errors and prosecutorial misconduct. We find no prejudicial errors or misconduct and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Ricardo Velasquez of attempted murder of a peace officer (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a);[1] count 1), assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (d)(2); count 2), shooting from a motor vehicle (§ 12034, subd. (c); count 8), and 10 counts of second degree robbery (§ 211; counts 3-7, 9-13). The jury found the following allegations true: (1) the attempted murder was committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation; (2) in committing counts 1 and 2, Velasquez personally discharged a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subd. (c); and (3) in committing the robbery counts, Velasquez personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced him to a total prison term of 33 years, plus 15 years to life, consecutive, comprised of: (1) count 1 – 15 years to life, plus 20 years for the gun use; (2) count 3 – three years, plus 10 years for the gun use. The court imposed concurrent or stayed terms on the remaining counts and enhancements.
On appeal, Velasquez contends the attempted murder conviction must be reversed because there is insufficient evidence of a specific intent to kill. In the alternative, he contends there is insufficient evidence to sustain the finding that the attempted murder was committed with premeditation and deliberation. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

In this bail forfeiture action, appellant, International Fidelity Insurance Company (International Fidelity), moved to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate bail on the ground that the prosecutor elected to not extradite the criminal defendant who had fled to Mexico. Under Penal Code[1] section 1305, subdivision (g), the court must vacate the forfeiture and exonerate bail when the bail agent locates and positively identifies the defendant in a foreign jurisdiction and the prosecuting agency elects not to seek extradition.
The trial court denied International Fidelity’s motion on the ground that extradition was not feasible. International Fidelity argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s ruling. We disagree. Further, International Fidelity failed to present either relevant or admissible evidence to the contrary. The trial court ruled that the evidence that International Fidelity did present was inadmissible and International Fidelity has not challenged the trial court’s evidentiary rulings on appeal. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.

Appellant Billy Moua was found to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO) and involuntarily committed to a mental health facility for one year for treatment. Moua contends his commitment as a MDO is invalid pursuant to either Penal Code section 2962 or 2970.[1] Moua further contends that substantial evidence does not support the finding that he: (1) has a severe mental disorder or (2) lacks the ability to control his dangerous behavior.
The People concede section 2962 cannot support Moua’s commitment, but assert the commitment is valid under section 2970 and that substantial evidence supports the findings.
We agree and will affirm.

Defendant Bobbi Baker appeals her sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing three consecutive enhancements for committing offenses while she was released from custody on bail. (Pen. Code, § 12022.1.)[1] Baker contends that only one on-bail enhancement was permissible, and two of the enhancements must be stricken. The People argue that two of the enhancements were proper, but concede that one enhancement must be stricken. Baker also contends that her attorney had a conflict of interest because he represented Baker and a co-defendant at the same time. We will order the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to strike one of the on-bail enhancements, but otherwise affirm.

In 2001, a masked man broke into a woman’s apartment and sexually assaulted her at gunpoint. The woman reported the sexual assault to the police, and she was taken to the hospital for a sexual assault examination. During that examination, biological evidence was recovered from her body and a DNA profile was obtained. In 2005, a “cold hit report” matched the DNA evidence recovered from the victim, with the DNA of appellant/defendant James Leshawn Boone, through a search of the CAL-DNA database. Defendant’s palm print also matched a latent print which had been found outside the woman’s apartment on the night of the crime.

Petitioner J.K. (father) is the father of nine-year-old H.M. Father challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and decision to set a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26, to determine a permanent plan for H.M.[1] The court took these actions after father allowed H.M.’s mother[2] to care for H.M. in anticipation of father being returned to custody for violating parole. The courts had previously placed H.M. in father’s sole custody with orders that H.M. only have supervised visits with her mother. Father argues the jurisdictional findings are not supported by substantial evidence. As discussed below, we affirm the juvenile court’s rulings.

Defendant and appellant Gerard James Torres was convicted of the offenses of criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, count 1),[1] corporal injury to a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a), count 2), and false imprisonment by violence (§ 236, count 3). The trial court sentenced him to three years for the corporal injury conviction (count 2), and imposed concurrent two-year terms for the criminal threats (count 1) and false imprisonment (count 3) convictions.
The sole issue defendant raises on appeal is that the trial court should have stayed the two-year concurrent terms for counts 1 and 2 under section 654. We disagree and affirm.

A jury found defendant Deandrick Opic Swauncy guilty of committing lewd acts and other sex offenses against his girlfriend’s daughter, Jane Doe. The evidence showed that the crimes were committed between February 2005 and March 2006, when Jane was seven to eight years old. Defendant was sentenced to 31 years to life in prison.
On this appeal, defendant claims the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss the charges on double jeopardy grounds after a prior trial ended in a mistrial. He also claims that insufficient evidence supports his convictions. We reject these claims and affirm the judgment.
Defendant has petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in case No. E056336, claiming his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. We ordered the writ petition considered with this appeal. By separate order, we summarily deny the writ petition.

Michael E., Sr., appeals from the juvenile court's order denying his fiancée status as a nonrelative extended family member (NREFM) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.7.[1] We affirm the order.

Robert Lawrence appeals from a judgment convicting him of mayhem and assault with a deadly weapon based on his attack on a homeless man in downtown San Diego. He argues the trial court erred in denying his day-of-trial request for a continuance to replace appointed counsel with retained counsel, and in denying his alternative request for self-representation. He also asserts the court erred by refusing his request that the jury be instructed on defense of property. We find no reversible error and affirm the judgment.

W.L. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying his petitions to change existing orders ("Welf. & Inst. Code" Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] § 388) and terminating his parental rights as to minors Blake L. (Blake) and Paige L. (Paige). ( "§ 366.26" § 366.26.) He contends that: 1) the juvenile court improperly delegated discretion to the minors as to whether visitation would occur; and 2) the court failed to advise him of his constitutional rights during the jurisdictional hearing and thus violated his right to due process.
As we will explain, because father’s arguments are unsupported by the record and his claims are not cognizable on appeal at this stage in the process, we shall affirm the orders of the juvenile court.

Plaintiff Derek Todd brings this pro se judgment roll appeal from a family court order that denied his motion to recover $37,490 in “back child support” Todd paid pursuant to a 2001 support order. Because he has failed to demonstrate error, we affirm the order.