CA Unpub Decisions

In this appeal we address several procedural issues raised by defendants ZF Micro Solutions (Solutions); its principal, David Feldman; and a number of individual investors in Solutions. Appellants contend that the trial court deprived Solutions of a jury trial on every element of breach of contract in consolidated actions brought by plaintiffs TAT Capital Partners, Ltd. (TAT), Sands Brothers Venture Capital LLC, and SB New Paradigm Associates LLC. Appellants further argue that the court failed to find that TAT lacked standing to prosecute the action, essentially directed a verdict on the jury portion of the trial, and impermissibly severed Solutions' cross-complaint against TAT. As to the individual defendants, appellants contend that the court violated Civil Code section 3439.08, subdivision (b), by imposing more than $9 million in damages on them for being "fraudulent transferees" even though the amounts claimed by plaintiffs totaled only $6.7 million. Finally, appellants assert a deprivation of Feldman's due process rights arising from the court's exclusion of him from the courtroom and subsequently from the areas through which the jurors would pass. We find no error, however, and therefore must affirm the judgment.

L.R. (Mother) and S.M. (Father) are the parents of A.M. and Au.M. A.M. was taken into protective custody in September 2010, when he was eight months old, and Au.M. was taken into protective custody in June 2011, a week after she was born.
In March 2012, the juvenile court held a combined 18‑month review hearing on A.M.’s dependency case and six‑month review hearing on Au.M.’s dependency case. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court made an order terminating reunification services for Father and Mother in both cases and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (all further code references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code). The section 366.26 hea

Defendant, cross-complainant, and appellant Alma Flores appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiff, cross-defendant, and respondent EverHome Mortgage Company after a bench trial. Plaintiff filed an action to cancel an instrument defendant recorded purporting to reconvey a deed of trust she had previously signed to secure a note. The note had not been repaid in full.
Apparently misunderstanding the nature of judicial jurisdiction, defendant attacks the judgment essentially on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction. To the extent that we understand her argument, she appears to claim that she herself is a court of record and she did not cede jurisdiction to the superior court or to the judges of that court. Because defendant is not a court of record or any court at all and because the superior court can exercise its jurisdiction over her whether she cedes it or not, we affirm the judgment.

Appellant, David Scott Waggle, pled no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1))[1] and admitted a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and allegations that he had a prior conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(e)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

Appellant, Raymond Michelle Fisher, Jr., pled no contest to possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and admitted three prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b))[1] and allegations that he had a prior conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we affirm.

On November 29, 2010, appellant Thomas Earl Putney was charged in a criminal complaint with possession of a dirk and dagger. (Former Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a).)[1] The complaint further alleged three prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). At his arraignment the following day, Putney pled not guilty to the charge and denied all allegations.
On the date set for the preliminary hearing, December 17, 2010, Putney withdrew his not guilty plea and waived both his right to a preliminary hearing and his constitutional rights. He entered an unconditional no contest plea to the charge and admitted his three prior strikes. After Putney signed a change of plea form, the court accepted the plea, found it was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily and there was a factual basis for it. Defense counsel informed the court the change of plea was against his advice.
Putney was sentenced on January 21, 2011. The trial court denied defense counsel’s Romero[2] motion to strike two or all three of his prior strikes, and sentenced him to a term of 25 years to life. Putney filed a timely notice of appeal, but did not include a certificate of probable cause. This court subsequently granted his application for permission to seek a certificate of probable cause. Putney filed a request for a certificate with the trial court, which it granted.
On appeal, Putney contends (1) defense counsel was ineffective in failing to declare a doubt as to his competency, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in declining to grant his Romero motion, and (3) his sentence violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the double jeopardy clause. We disagree and affirm.

On March 26, 2006, a California Highway Patrol Officer conducted a traffic stop on defendant Elaine Sue Gallaghan for speeding. Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. During a search of defendant’s car, an officer found a baggie of methamphetamine in a coin purse in defendant’s bag.
Defendant pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to two years in state prison, suspended imposition of sentence, and placed her on five years’ Proposition 36 probation subject to various conditions, including the payment of certain fines and fees.

F. K., Sr., the father of the minor F. K., appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional orders denying reunification services. (Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] §§ 361.5, subds. (b)(12), (e)(1), 395.) Father contends the order denying reunification services was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

In this case, defendant Daniel Duane Boggess is trying to work the system. He did not say one word when present at a state court appearance where the court, the prosecutor, and his newly appointed attorney agreed to set his resentencing hearing for a date past the 30-day deadline imposed by a federal court within which to resentence defendant. The next day following the state court appearance (which was now the 31st day), defendant wrote to the federal court that the state court had not complied with the deadline.
On defendant’s appeal in this court from the state court resentencing that took place on the 38th day (which was the day the state court first learned of the federal court’s deadline), we hold defendant forfeited his argument that the state court had no jurisdiction to resentence him. He had the chance to object on the 30th day but chose not to.

In July 2011 defendant Roy Anthony Matagora pleaded guilty to transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and admitted a prior serious felony conviction (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 667, subds. (b) through (i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) in exchange for a stipulated sentence of four years in state prison and the dismissal of an enhancement for having served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). In August he was sentenced to the four-year term and the court imposed a restitution fine of $400 in accordance with section 1202.4. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

A jury found defendant Jamar Collins guilty of multiple counts of robbery, charges arising from his possession of a handgun, and receiving stolen property. The jury also found firearm enhancements in connection with the robbery counts to be true. Defendant admitted a prior strike offense and the court sentenced him to a total of 31 years in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends his conviction for possession of a handgun by a felon must be reversed because it was not supported by substantial evidence. He also contends his conviction for receiving stolen property must be reversed because it is based on some of the same property as the robbery convictions.
We agree with the People there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for possession of a handgun by a felon. We find merit in the second contention, however, and conclude defendant cannot be convicted of receiving the same property he was also convicted of stealing. Accordingly, we will reverse his conviction for receiving stolen property (on which his sentence was stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654) and will otherwise affirm the judgment.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).[1] Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we affirm the judgment.
In an information filed March 25, 2011, defendant Spencer Lamar Bornes was charged in case No. 11F181 with possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), and possession of narcotics paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364). It was also alleged that defendant had a prior drug offense conviction and had served a prior prison term. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).)

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).[1] Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
On December 20, 2009, defendant’s mother contacted law enforcement after discovering her Sam’s Club Discover card was missing from her purse. When she called the credit card company to report her card missing, she was advised a hold had been placed on the card after a $494 purchase had been attempted at Wal-Mart. A subsequent $100 purchase had also been attempted, and two additional fraudulent purchases had been made earlier that month. The total amount in fraudulent purchases was $1,502.63.

A jury found defendant David Cornelius Boult guilty of two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In a bifurcated proceeding, he admitted that he had suffered two strike convictions and had served three prior prison terms. The trial court dismissed one strike pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for 10 years 4 months, consisting of six years on one count; one year four months on another count; and three years for the prior prison terms. He was awarded 393 days’ custody credit and 196 days’ conduct credit.[1]
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the accomplice corroboration rule; and (2) his convictions are not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
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