CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant, Steven R. Camus, was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance in prison (Pen. Code, § 4573.6). Following the jury trial, Camus admitted the prior strike allegation and a prior prison term allegation. Camus was sentenced to the upper term of four years, doubled to eight years for the prior strike conviction, plus one year for the prior prison term, for a total of nine years in prison. Camus contends there was no substantial evidence showing he possessed heroin, and the trial court violated the dual use prohibition in sentencing. We will affirm.

On July 4, 2010, appellant W.R., who was then 16 years old, killed Thaddeus Tanner by hitting him in the back of the head with a small metal table. Although the killing occurred during a verbal and physical altercation between two groups of people in front of Tanner’s house, none of the numerous witnesses to the altercation saw Tanner hit anyone during the altercation. Appellant admitted to police that he hit Tanner in the back of the head with the table but claimed Tanner hit him first. Appellant stated that he was trying to protect himself and friends involved in the altercation.

In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held that review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny James's requests to review the record for error and to address the Anders issue. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
Citing In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, James's counsel requests leave for his client to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. He also asks this court to order counsel to brief any arguable issue. (Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75, 88.) The requests are denied.

N.T. appeals findings and orders limiting her telephone calls to her son at a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.

In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held that review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny Ricardo's requests to review the record for error and to address his Anders issue. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)

P.A. appeals orders denying his request for visitation with his daughter entered at a postpermanency review hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.

Dale W. (father) and Shannon S. (mother), parents of minor W.W. (minor), appeal from orders of the juvenile court terminating their parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] §§ 366.26, 395.) Both parents contend the beneficial parental relationship and relative placement exceptions to adoption applied to minor’s case to defeat termination of their parental rights. They also challenge the adequacy of notice pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) Mother further asserts that the court erred in failing to hear her Marsden motion.[2]
We agree only with the parents’ claim of error under the ICWA’s noticing requirements. Our limited agreement, however, requires us to conditionally reverse for compliance with the ICWA.

H.M., mother of the minor, C.M., appeals from orders of the juvenile court denying her petition for modification and terminating her parental rights.[1] (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 388, 395 [further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code].) Appellant argues she did not forfeit the issue of the applicability of the benefit exception by failing to raise it in the trial court and that the evidence established that termination would be detrimental to the minor because he would benefit from continued contact with her. We conclude the issue was forfeited for failure to raise it in the juvenile court and affirm.

FCC Corporation, formerly named Fru-Con Construction Corporation (Fru-Con),[1] appeals from a judgment that awards approximately $54 million to the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) for damages arising from the construction of the Cosumnes Power Plant. SMUD sought to build the power plant on a fast-track schedule after experiencing a critical shortage of electricity in 2000. SMUD retained Utility Engineering Corporation (Utility Engineering) to provide the engineering design and Fru-Con to build the power plant.
Construction difficulties plagued the project, and Fru-Con missed a sufficient number of intermediate construction milestones to trigger the maximum liquidated damages rate of $25,000 per day. SMUD terminated Fru-Con’s right to proceed with any further work after Fru-Con expressly refused to remove deficient concrete in the foundation for the power plant’s cooling tower. By terminating Fru-Con’s right to proceed, the practical effect of SMUD’s action was to terminate the construction contract with Fru-Con.

We reverse the juvenile court’s dispositional order placing mother C.P. and father’s three children in foster care because it is not supported by substantial evidence.

A jury convicted appellant Alberto H. Fonseca of first degree murder, a violation of Penal Code section 187, in connection with the stabbing death of his live-in girlfriend, Mireya Lopez Medina.[1] The jury also found true the special allegation that appellant personally used a deadly weapon, a knife, in violation of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1).
The trial court sentenced appellant to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in prison for the murder conviction, plus an additional determinate term of one year for the personal use allegation found true.
On appeal, appellant raises two, related contentions: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support a first degree murder conviction and (2) appellant’s conviction should be reduced to voluntary manslaughter or, at best, second degree murder. We reject both contentions and affirm the judgment below.

Chayya Kim appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon and force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code,[1] § 245, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to four years in state prison. Appellant contends (1) the court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on simple assault; (2) the court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his prior conviction for purposes of impeachment; and (3) the former statutory limitation on presentence custody credits for inmates convicted of serious felonies violates equal protection. We affirm.

Appellant Jorge Espinoza pled no contest, following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, to one count of transportation of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a), one count of possession for sale of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351, one count of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (a)(1), and one count of unlawful firearm activity in violation of Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (c)(1).[1] Appellant admitted that he had suffered two prior drug convictions within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a), and one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)). The trial court sentenced appellant to eight years in state prison.
Appellant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying his Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence of the narcotics found in his car. We order the abstract of judgment corrected, as set forth in more detail in the disposition. We affirm the judgment of conviction in all other respects.

Defendant and appellant Vanessa V. Morcillo was convicted by jury of one count of assault and one count of robbery. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of theft as to the robbery count. We find no instructional error and affirm.