CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant appeals from his conviction for two counts of murder with special circumstances, three counts of attempted murder, kidnapping, felon in possession of a firearm, as well as the corresponding gang and firearm allegations.[1] His conviction arose out of shootings in 2007 and 2009. In 2009, while defendant was in custody on an unrelated offense, he confessed to the 2007 and 2009 crimes to undercover deputies posing as inmates. On appeal, defendant complains that his jailhouse confession should have been excluded on various grounds. He also argues that the 2007 and 2009 crimes should not have been tried together. Finally, he claims error in the imposition and calculation of custody and various fines. We disagree with all but his contention concerning the fines. We also conclude that defendant received more custody credits than he was entitled. We affirm the judgment with modifications.

Appellant Andres Lamar Williams, individually and as Trustee of the Andres Williams Trust dated June 25, 2004 (collectively, Williams), appeals from summary judgment entered in favor of respondent North American Title Insurance Company (North American). Williams filed suit against North American for bad faith and related insurance claims after Williams was sued by his neighbor Christopher Murphree (Murphree) for interference with Murphree’s sewer line, which ran across Williams’s property. Williams and North American had earlier settled a claim when it was learned that the Murphree sewer line was not disclosed at the time Williams purchased his property.
The pivotal issue on appeal is whether a previous release executed by these parties in conjunction with the settlement of Williams’s earlier claim bars Williams’s current lawsuit against North American. Among other arguments, Williams contends North American’s representative misrepresented the terms of the release and, as a result, he never understood that his earlier settlement with North American included a release of the “duty to defend [Williams] in a civil action concerning the encroachments.” Williams claims that since the potential for coverage exists, summary judgment was erroneously granted. We conclude, as did the trial court, that the release bars the current lawsuit, and we shall therefore affirm the summary judgment.

Defendants Scott A. Ruch and Ruch Logic LLC appeal the trial court’s order denying their anti-SLAPP motion.[1] Plaintiff ReMetrix LLC cross-appeals from the court’s order denying its request for attorney fees. We affirm both orders.

Appellant O.S. is the father of two daughters, P.S. and P.S.2, who have special needs because of various disabilities. The juvenile court found in essence that he was unable to care for them following their mother’s abandonment of them, subsequent incarceration and entry into deportation proceedings. We will affirm the order.

In this dissolution proceeding involving a lengthy marriage between Fritz and Jeanne Akerlund, a trial ensued and judgment was thereafter entered.[1] Fritz appeals from the judgment, asserting three claims. First, he argues that the judgment must be reversed because the court failed to file a statement of decision after Fritz made a timely request for one. Fritz contends further that the court erred in denying his request that Jeanne reimburse the community for the value of her exclusive use of the family home for a period of several years, otherwise known as Watts (Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366 (Watts)) credits. Third, he asserts that the court erred in awarding attorney fees to Jeanne without giving consideration to Fritz’s ability to pay those fees.
We conclude that the court committed reversible error by failing to file a statement of decision in response to Fritz’s timely request. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment with instructions that the trial judge who heard the matter prepare and file a statement of decision.

Defendant Erick R. Torregroza, Jr., was charged by two separate complaints with one felony (vandalism) and four misdemeanors. Based upon the opinion of a psychologist, the court determined that defendant was incompetent to stand trial and ordered him committed to a state hospital for a term of no more than three years.
Defendant challenges the commitment order on the ground that the court failed to appoint a second expert to evaluate his competence. Subsequent to the commitment order and the filing of the notice of appeal, defendant was restored to competency, the court reinstated criminal proceedings, defendant entered no contest pleas, and the court granted three-years’ probation. The Attorney General contends that the appeal is moot. We agree and will dismiss the appeal.

The judgment dissolving the marriage of Susan Marie Hawley and Lee Garth Hawley found their residence to be community property, and ordered that Susan receive half the proceeds of the sale of the residence, less costs of sale and an existing encumbrance.[1] Although the judgment directed Susan and Lee to cooperate in listing and selling the residence “forthwith,” Lee continued to live in the residence for 21 more years. When he finally sold the residence, he did not provide any portion of the proceeds of the sale to Susan. The trial court denied Susan’s request for a writ of execution, because the judgment was not a “money judgment” as defined by Code of Civil Procedure section 680.270.[2]
We reverse the trial court’s order with directions. Although the judgment of dissolution of Susan and Lee’s marriage did not specify an amount of money owed by Lee to Susan, such an amount can be ascertained. As explained post, we direct the trial court on remand to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine on what date Susan’s share of the community property should be calculated, to consider all legal and equitable arguments by both parties, to calculate Susan’s community property interest, and to issue the writ, if appropriate. For the reasons we explain, these issues should be considered by the trial court in the first instance.

Christina D. appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order denying her reunification services pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)[1] as to her two-year-old son Joshua. Asserting that the court misapplied section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), Christina contends that she made reasonable efforts during the relevant timeframe to treat the problems that led to the removal of Joshua’s brother, Triston. Finding substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s decision, we affirm.

It was alleged in a juvenile wardship petition filed September 1, 2010, that appellant, Andrew C., a minor, committed two counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212, subd. (c); counts 2, 5) and individual counts of the following offenses: kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking (Pen. Code, § 209.5, subd. (a); count 1), carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a); count 3), attempted carjacking (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 215.5, subd. (a); count 4), unlawfully dissuading a witness by force or threat (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (c)(1); count 6), and attempted unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 664; Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 7). At the jurisdiction hearing, on December 14, 2010, the court found true all allegations except for count 7, which it dismissed as not proved true beyond a reasonable doubt.
On April 19, 2011, at the subsequent disposition hearing, the court adjudged appellant a ward of the court, ordered him committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice and set his maximum term of physical confinement at seven years to life plus nine years two months, based on the instant offenses and offenses adjudicated in a prior wardship proceeding.
On appeal, appellant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his adjudication of the count 4 attempted carjacking, and (2) the juvenile court erroneously considered evidence of other misconduct by appellant, thereby impermissibly lessening the prosecution’s burden of proof as to count 4, in violation of his due process rights. We affirm.

Cindy J. (Mother) has three sons, Brandon M., I.B., and N.B., having different biological fathers (only Brandon’s case is relevant to this appeal). J.M., who lives in Texas, is the biological father of 10-year-old Brandon. M.B., who is Mother’s boyfriend, is the biological father of I.B. and N.B. This appeal concerns M.B.’s desire to have standing as a party in Brandon’s dependency proceedings. M.B. asserts the juvenile court erroneously denied his oral request for standing at a hearing held for the court to consider Mother’s Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition (hereafter 388 petition) regarding Brandon. M.B. also maintains the court should have, sua sponte, bestowed upon him party status as a de facto parent. We find M.B.’s contentions lack merit and we affirm the court’s order.

L.C. seeks review of a juvenile court order setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] L.C. contends the court erred when it found that reasonable services were offered or provided to her. We deny the petition.

In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held that review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny appellant's requests to review the record for error and to address the Anders issue. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
John's counsel asks this court to order counsel to brief any arguable issues. (Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75, 88.) Citing In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, his counsel also asks this court to exercise its discretion to provide her client the opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The requests are denied.

A father challenges jurisdictional orders entered by the juvenile dependency court on the ground that the orders are not supported by substantial evidence. He also contends a restraining order issued by the juvenile court in favor of the mother lacked an adequate basis. We reject his contentions and affirm the orders.

Phillip Cardwell Garcia and Keiron Marquitt Elias appeal judgments sentencing them to prison after a jury found them guilty of the first degree murder of Anthonie Wendler. Garcia contends the trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury to view with caution evidence of incriminating statements he made to Elias before trial. Elias contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion for new trial, which was based on Garcia's confession at his sentencing hearing that he murdered Wendler and framed Elias. We reject these contentions and affirm both judgments.