CA Unpub Decisions

Sentenced to a state prison term of life without possibility of parole plus 13 years, defendant Joseph Dean Sullivan contends only that insufficient evidence supported his conviction on one count out of six. We affirm the judgment in its entirety.
A jury convicted defendant of residential burglary (count 1; Pen. Code, § 459), residential robbery (count 4; Pen. Code, § 211), carjacking (count 5; Pen. Code, § 215), possession of methamphetamine (count 6; Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), and administering an intoxicating substance to commit a felony (count 7; Pen. Code, § 222). The jury hung on count 3 (kidnapping for robbery; Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)). The jury found true as to counts 1, 4, and 5 that defendant should have known the victim was over the age of 65 (Pen. Code, § 667.9, subd. (a)); as to counts 1 and 4, that defendant inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)); and as to count 2, that defendant caused bodily harm and confinement, exposing the victim to substantial likelihood of death (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (a)).
The trial court sentenced defendant as follows: the upper term of six years on count 1 (residential burglary), plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement and one year for the elderly victim enhancement; one year eight months on count 5 (carjacking), eight months on count 6 (possession of methamphetamine), and eight months on count 7 (administering an intoxicating substance to commit a felony), all consecutive to count 1; and life without possibility of parole on count 2 (kidnapping for robbery, plus the enhancements thereon). The court stayed sentence on count 4 (residential robbery) and the elderly victim enhancement on count 5 (Pen. Code, § 654).

Defendant and appellant Burnell Nelson appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to residential burglary with a person present (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 667.5, subd. (c)(21))[1] and his admissions that he previously had been convicted of burglary within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§ § 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and served two prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Nelson to 14 years in state prison. We affirm.

Appellant Kasha Lanay Thompson appeals from the judgment entered following her plea of no contest to a felony count of arson of an inhabited structure or property in violation of Penal Code section 451, subdivision (b). Pursuant to the plea agreement, appellant was sentenced to the low term of three years in state prison.
We appointed counsel to represent appellant on this appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an “Opening Brief” in which no arguable issues were raised. On October 11, 2012, we advised appellant that she had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues that she wished us to consider.
Appellant submitted a response on October 31, 2012, claiming that testimony given at the preliminary hearing was untruthful and that she was manipulated by the arson investigator, but without any citation to the record or any legal authority to support her assertions. Moreover, the record does not contain a certificate of probable cause executed by the trial court. Without such a certificate, no appeal can be taken from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of no contest. (Pen. Code, § 1237.5.) Although certain exceptions exist, such as when the issues on appeal arose after entry of the plea and do not affect its validity (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)), that is not the case here. Appellant’s claims directly affect the plea’s validity.

The record contains no discussion of the underlying factual circumstances of appellant Jerome Carter’s conviction. A felony complaint charged appellant with possession of a firearm by a felon. (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1).[1]) Five prior felony convictions were also alleged as prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)
Appellant waived his preliminary hearing and trial rights and pleaded no contest to the gun possession charge. He was sentenced to the mid-term of two years in state prison. The court imposed the requisite fines and fees and awarded presentence credits.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the sentence and post-plea matters. The trial court denied appellant’s request for a certificate of probable cause, and the appeal was dismissed as inoperative. This appeal lies only to the extent appellant is able to demonstrate sentencing or other post-plea errors which do not impact the validity of his plea. (§ 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(a)(1), (b)(4)(B).)
We appointed counsel to represent appellant on appeal. After examination of the record, appellant’s counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues, and asking us to independently review the record. On October 29, 2012, we advised appellant he had 30 days within which to personally submit, by brief or letter, any contentions or argument he wished us to consider. At appellant’s request, we extended that deadline to December 26, 2012.

Defendant and appellant Jaime Juan Ruiz appeals from the trial court’s post-judgment order denying his request for additional pre-sentence custody credit. We affirm the trial court’s order.

Appellant Travion Faulkner (Faulkner) appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211.[1] The trial court sentenced Faulkner to the low term of two years in state prison and then doubled the sentence to four years based on Faulkner’s admission that had a prior strike pursuant to sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) based on an adjudication under section 211 when he was a juvenile. He received 138 days of actual credit and 20 good time/work time days for a total presentence credit of 158 days.
Faulkner was accused of robbing a man of a cell phone. Before he pleaded no contest, Faulkner filed a motion to suppress the cell phone as evidence on the theory that it was taken from his pants pocket during an unlawful search. At the hearing, Los Angeles Police Officer Fernando Tenorio testified that on the night of January 26, 2012, he and a partner saw two men fitting the description of suspects given by a victim who had been robbed of a cell phone missing the back cover. Officer Tenorio and his partner approached the suspects and said they were conducting an investigation. Faulkner said, “Okay, go ahead and check me.” Officer Tenorio conducted a pat down search and found a cell phone in Faulkner’s pants pocket. The cell phone was missing the back cover. Defense counsel argued that when Faulkner said “check me,” he did not give consent to a search. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion.
Counsel was appointed to represent Faulkner in connection with this appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an “Opening Brief” in which no arguable issues were raised. On September 24, 2012, we advised Faulkner that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues for us to consider. No response has been received to date.
After reviewing the entire record, we conclude that it provides a factual basis to support the conviction. Testimony given by Officer Tenorio at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence established that Faulkner consented to being searched and his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.
We are satisfied that Faulkner’s attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
The judgment is affirmed.

Elaine M. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to Robert V. (Robert, born Aug. 2001), Jazmine V.[1] (Jazmine, born Oct. 2003), and Emily V. (Emily, born May 2008). She contends that the juvenile court erred in refusing to apply the parental benefit exception (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)).[2]
We affirm.

K.S. (Mother) appeals from a jurisdictional/dispositional order declaring her son, S.W., to be a dependent child of the court under subdivisions (b) and (j) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,[1] removing him from her custody (§ 361, subd. (b)), placing him in the custody of his presumed father, S.W., Sr. (Father), and terminating jurisdiction. We reverse.

A jury convicted defendant Jemal Suyin Reese on one count of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found defendant had suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction for voluntary manslaughter within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i), 1170.12) and had served a separate prison term for a felony (id., § 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of seven years.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in declining to dismiss his prior strike in the interest of justice. Defendant also asks that we review an in camera proceeding conducted by the trial court to determine whether it properly concluded there was no discoverable material to which he was legally entitled under Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 and Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531. We affirm.

Plaintiffs and appellants Qin Zhang (Zhang) and Booloon, Inc. (Booloon) appeal an order in favor of defendants and respondents Google, Inc. (Google) and Nick Mote (Mote). The order sustained defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ complaint without leave to amend and imposed monetary sanctions on plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in the amount of $10,982. We shall affirm the order with respect to the demurrer and monetary sanctions against Zhang but reverse the order to the extent it imposes monetary sanctions against Booloon. We shall also deny defendants’ motion for sanctions on appeal.

Petitioner Takahito Kita requests that we issue a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its February 9, 2012 order denying his motion to quash service of the summons and petition by real party in interest Kanako Kita and to enter a new order granting the motion. We grant the petition.

Pursuant to stipulation, a felony complaint dated November 10, 2011 served as an information charging Judy L. Sanders with one count of grand theft of an automobile (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(1)[1]) and specially alleging that she had a prior felony conviction for violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1), that qualified as a strike under the “Three Strikes” law. On November 14, Sanders pleaded no contest to the grand theft charge and admitted that she had a prior strike conviction. In obtaining the plea and admission, the prosecutor informed Sanders, “As a consequence of your plea you’ll be sentenced to 32 months in state prison if the strike prior against you can be proven. If it cannot, then you’ll be sentenced to 16 months in county jail.” The trial court confirmed that Sanders would receive a “maximum [sentence] of 16 months if the strike is not any good.” The court accepted Sanders’s plea and admission, finding the prior strike conviction to be true “at this time,” and continued the matter to December 8 for sentencing so that the prosecutor could “check [Sanders’s] prior.” The court noted that by December 8 the People “should have your strike and we can do the sentencing.” The Felony Advisement of Rights, Waiver and Plea Form indicates, “If the strike allegation is true, [Sanders] will receive 32 months prison; if not true [Sanders] to receive 16 months prison at 50%.”

After jury trial, appellant Frankie Monarque was convicted of the first degree murder of Omar Payan. The jury found true an allegation that the crime was committed for the benefit of a street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(4)) and an allegation that appellant personally and intentionally used a handgun and caused great bodily injury and death. (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d).) Appellant admitted having suffered the prior convictions alleged in the information, and was sentenced to a total of 80 years to life in state prison. This appeal followed. We affirm.

Kamorrie Randle (Randle) was convicted on one count of first degree murder, three counts of attempted premeditated murder, and three counts of attempted murder. On appeal, Randle contends: (1) the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional right to a jury trial and due process of law when it failed to discharge Juror No. 3 for sleeping during trial; (2) there was insufficient evidence that a victim named Davon Howard (Howard) suffered great bodily injury within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d);[1] and (3) the trial court erred when it enhanced the sentence for both counts 5 and 6 with additional and consecutive three-year terms pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A) instead of imposing a 15-year parole ineligibility periods pursuant to subdivision (b)(5).
Regarding the sentencing matter, the People agree that the trial court erred. We modify the sentence to impose a 15-year parole eligibility periods in counts 5 and 6 pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5). In addition, we strike the three-year additional and consecutive three-year terms imposed pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A).
As modified, the judgment is affirmed.