CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Edward Leonard Watkins and acquaintance Jaquann Garrett were pimps. One underage girl who Garrett pimped was Faith. Faith would prostitute herself in Oakland and Stockton, and it was Garrett who encouraged her, dropped her off at the streets where she prostituted herself, and took half her earnings. Sometimes defendant and two other prostitutes named Kream and Cherry were with Garrett and Faith in the car. Kream and Cherry also prostituted themselves on the streets of Oakland, and they gave their earnings to defendant. On one occasion (resulting in the charged acts), they all took defendant’s car to Sacramento where Faith, Kream, and Cherry were going to prostitute themselves on Watt Avenue and defendant and Garrett and would “get [the] money.” Later that day, Faith, Kream, and Cherry used a motel room defendant had rented for prostitution. Defendant and Garrett were arrested in the parking lot of the motel.
Defendant was charged with both pimping and pandering.[1] A jury found defendant guilty of pimping Faith (on a theory he aided and abetted Garrett), pandering Kream, and attempting to pimp Kream.
Defendant appeals from the resulting conviction, raising contentions relating to the instructions and his presentence credits. Finding no merit in these contentions, we affirm.

Pursuant to a plea agreement involving three separate cases, defendant Andre Lashin entered no contest pleas to corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a))[1] with an enhancement for personally inflicting great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)), second degree burglary (§ 459), receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), and being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)). In exchange for his pleas, numerous charges were dismissed and it was agreed he would receive five years’ formal probation with the suspended execution of a term of 10 years four months in state prison. Defendant was sentenced in accordance with this agreement.
Defendant appeals, contending the trial court’s written probation order does not accurately reflect the fines and fees it assessed when pronouncing sentence. He also claims the court was not permitted to impose a fine in addition to ordering him to make payments to a battered women’s shelter. Defendant’s final contention is that the court did not assess his ability to pay before ordering payment of the costs of preparing the presentence report and probation supervision. We conclude the matter must be remanded to the trial court for clarification of its order.

Arriana G. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to Crystal B., born in October 2009, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Mother contends that the trial court erred in denying her a contested hearing on the applicability of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), which provides an exception to termination of parental rights where the parents “have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” We affirm the judgment.

Edward R. Kamen appeals from the trial court’s order directing him to reimburse his former wife, respondent Elizabeth J. Ernst, for his half of their children’s health care expenses. We affirm.

Appellant Misael E. (minor) appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that he committed a forcible lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s finding. Minor also challenges as overbroad three conditions of his probation, one restricting family contact and two restricting associations. We conclude that the juvenile court adequately narrowed the condition regarding family contact but omitted the provision from the minute order; we thus order the court to insert the missing provision into the minutes. We modify the remaining two conditions by inserting a knowledge provision. With such modifications, we otherwise affirm the judgment.

Appellant Marguerite M. (mother) is the mother of Chloe (born August 1993), Bryanna (born May 1999), Annie (born February 2003), and Christopher (born November 2006). Appellant Sonny S. (Sonny)[1] is the father of Annie and Christopher. Mother appeals the denial of her petition, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388,[2] seeking return of all the children to her custody, or in the alternative, an additional six months of family reunification services. Sonny appeals the denial of his section 388 petition seeking return of Annie and Christopher to his custody, or alternatively, for an additional six months of family reunification services. Both parents contend the juvenile court erred by denying their respective petitions without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.
We hold that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying mother and Sonny’s respective section 388 petitions without an evidentiary hearing. We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Defendant Rodney Cyril Carr appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of first degree murder and mayhem, with a finding he personally used a deadly weapon. The jury also found that defendant was sane at the time he committed the offenses. Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports the jury’s sanity verdict and the trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte on involuntary manslaughter and by admitting the testimony of a particular witness. He also notes an error on the abstract of judgment. We direct the trial court to correct two errors on the abstract of judgment, but otherwise affirm.

Thomas Dewayne Kirkwood challenges the sentence he received following his conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Appellant shot his unarmed stepson three times, at close range. Despite the deliberate nature of the killing, appellant is unhappy that he received the upper term of 11 years, plus a 10-year firearm use enhancement. We affirm. Appellant has not shown that the sentence is arbitrary or irrational.

Defendants appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion for relief from a default judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and respondent Relational, LLC (Relational). We affirm the order denying the motion and dismiss the appeal to the extent that it addresses the default judgment and other, earlier matters.
Defendants also appeal from a separate judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and respondent US Capital Equipment Leasing, Inc. (US Capital). Finding no error, we affirm.

Richard Gomez appeals from his judgment of conviction for murder and attempted murder, with firearm special allegations. He raises several claims of evidentiary error: the exclusion of a letter purportedly written by his brother; admission of a hearsay statement as an adoptive admission; and admission of evidence of prior uncharged acts to prove a common plan, scheme and intent. He also argues the trial court should have granted a mistrial after a prosecution witness disclosed to the jury that she was a probation officer although the trial court had previously ruled that such evidence was inadmissible.
We conclude the trial court erred in admitting evidence of one prior uncharged act, but that this error was harmless. No other error occurred. We shall affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Patricia Tarle appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants and respondents Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (collectively, Kaiser), Dilip Sedani and Wayne Rupnik in this employment discrimination action. Tarle contends the trial court erred in sustaining defendants’ evidentiary objections to much of the evidence she submitted in opposition to the summary judgment motion (and that such evidence raises a triable issue of material fact). However, Tarle never provided to the trial court any oral or written opposition to the bulk of defendants’ objections. This case, therefore, raises the issue of whether, in the context of a summary judgment motion, a party must provide the trial court with such opposition to an opponent’s objections or be barred from challenging on appeal the trial court’s order sustaining the objections. We conclude that existing law, in the factual context of this case, compels the result that a failure to provide such opposition to the trial court on summary judgment bars a party from challenging on appeal the trial court’s order sustaining the unopposed evidentiary objections. We also determine, however, that as both parties are responsible for substantial flaws in the summary judgment briefing in this case, the proper procedure is to remand with directions for a properly-briefed summary judgment motion.

On June 6, 1996, a jury convicted petitioner Michael Adamar of second degree murder and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. The jury also found that Adamar personally used a knife in the commission of the murder. The trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 18 years to life. At Adamar’s initial parole hearing, conducted on January 16, 2009, the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) denied parole. Adamar filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus contending that the Board’s decision violated due process because it was not supported by evidence demonstrating that he would currently be a danger to the public if released on parole.

K & K Capital Investments (K & K), doing business as "Ventura Gasoline," appeals a judgment for damages against Southwest Trails (Southwest) and an order granting a new trial in favor of IPC (USA), Inc. (IPC). We affirm. IPC cross-appeals an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). We affirm.

Defendant Malinka T. Moye (appellant) appeals, in propria persona, the sentence imposed following his plea of no contest. Since appellant failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the sentencing order, his appeal is dismissed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(b).)[1]