CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Charles Berry appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of dissuading a witness with gang enhancement and use of force findings. Defendant contends that insufficient evidence supports the gang enhancement finding and the trial court committed evidentiary error in relation to the testimony of the prosecution’s gang expert. We affirm.

In this appeal, we affirm the conviction and sentence for assault with a deadly weapon, but modify the judgment by striking the conviction for assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and by striking the great bodily injury enhancement as to the mayhem conviction.

A modification decision.

Petitioner C.S., the mother of half-siblings K.W. and M.F., seeks extraordinary writ review of juvenile court orders following a contested 18-month review hearing on family reunification. The court terminated reunification services, ordered that visitation return to being supervised, and set a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] for permanency planning.[2] Mother contends the court erred in failing to return the children to her custody and in finding that unsupervised visits were detrimental to the children. We will deny the petition.

Appellant T.W. appeals from dispositions entered after the juvenile court declared her children J.L., P.B., and S.B. to be dependent children within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.[1] She contends the dispositions must be reversed because child welfare officials did not comply correctly with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We conclude the officials in question did not commit any prejudicial errors and will affirm.

Minor J.H. has a history of delinquent behavior that began at age 12. At age 16, a juvenile wardship petition was reopened upon allegations that minor assaulted another young man and inflicted great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 12077.7, subd. (a); Wel. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a).) Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations to be true and placed minor in a group home. Minor appeals, contending that the evidence is insufficient to support the great bodily injury finding. We reject the contention and shall affirm the juvenile court’s order.

This case arises out of the tragic death of a three-year-old girl after she fell from a window in her eighth-floor apartment. Dominique Evans, the girl’s mother, appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of the owners and managers of the apartment building.[1] Evans maintains there are triable issues of fact regarding whether the window was unsafe and whether the owners/managers breached their duty of care to provide “reasonably safe windows.” We affirm.

Defendant Raymond Charles Lewis pleaded no contest to carjacking and to evading the police and admitted the enhancement that he was armed with a firearm. He was sentenced to a five-year prison term.
Defendant claims that the court erred in imposing a criminal justice administration (booking) fee of $129.75 because it did not make a determination of defendant’s ability to pay the fee. He acknowledges that the statute under which the booking fee was imposed here does not include a requirement that the court determine that the defendant has the ability to pay the fee. But he contends that comparable booking fee statutes contain an ability-to-pay requirement, and therefore imposing the booking fee here without such a determination violated his equal protection rights under the federal and state Constitutions. Defendant also argues that the imposition of a $10 fine plus penalty assessment, pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.5, was error because there was no substantial evidence of his ability to pay the fine. He contends further that if the claims concerning the booking fee and fine were forfeited, we should nonetheless consider them because he received prejudicially ineffective assistance of counsel. Lastly, defendant urges that the concurrent sentence imposed on the misdemeanor conviction is not properly reflected on the abstract of judgment.

An application proposing the formation of the Bonny Doon Fire Protection District ("FPD") and detachment of the Bonny Doon area from the County Service Area 48 ("CSA 48") came before the Local Agency Formation Commission of Santa Cruz County ("LAFCO"), which disapproved it by formal resolution. Bonny Doon Volunteer Fire/Rescue, Inc., a California non-profit public benefit corporation and the proponent of the application, unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandate compelling LAFCO to (1) set aside Resolution No. 913 disapproving the proposal, (2) comply with the Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg Local Government Reorganization Act of 2000 ("the Act") (Gov. Code, § 56000 et seq.)[1] and the Fire Protection District Law of 1987 ("Fire Protection District Law") (Health & Saf. Code, § 13800 et seq.), and (3) adopt a new resolution supported by substantial evidence. It now appeals the superior court's denial of its writ petition.
Appellant argues that LAFCO's Resolution No. 913 is not supported by substantial evidence and LAFCO prejudicially abused its discretion by failing proceed in the manner required by the Act and applicable law. Our thorough review of the record does not show that appellant is entitled to writ relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendant Tremaine Jatari Sowell pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property. (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a).) The court dismissed a misdemeanor charge of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)) and obtaining an access card with the intent to defraud. (Pen. Code, § 484e, subd. (a).) Sentence was suspended and the court put defendant on three years’ formal probation and ordered he serve 365 days in jail. He was given 30 days’ actual and 30 days’ conduct credits.
After defendant appealed we appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case and the disposition. He did not argue against defendant but advised the court he had not found any arguments to present on defendant’s behalf. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) He suggested two issues to assist us in our independent review of the record.

Vickie S. appeals the juvenile court’s order issued at a postpermanency review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.3)[1] denying her request for reinstatement of reunification services as to her 12-year-old son, J.P.[2] Vickie contends the juvenile court’s order was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

John D. is the father of Ashley D., who was under a guardianship with petitioners Charles E. and Debra E. (guardians) since August 2007. Petitioners filed a petition on February 3, 2011 to declare Ashley free from John D.’s parental custody and control pursuant to Family Code sections 7823, 7824 and 7825. After a contested hearing, the court found that it would not be in Ashley’s best interests for John D.’s parental rights to be terminated and to end Ashley’s visitation with him. On appeal, petitioners contend the court committed reversible error when it failed to take into consideration detriment to Ashley when it denied their petition. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Appellant, Saul Delatorre Salazar, Jr., pled no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1))[1] and admitted a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we affirm.

Steven George Bronson, defendant, was convicted of a lewd or lascivious act on Jane Doe, a 15-year-old child, in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (c)(1). He appeals, claiming he cannot be convicted of this crime because the offense occurred after her 15th birthday. Based on the recent California Supreme Court case of People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, we affirm the judgment.