CA Unpub Decisions

MHC Rancho Mesa, LLC and MHC Rancho Mesa, LP (collectively defendants) appeal from an order denying their motion to compel arbitration of claims brought by David and Rhonda Wick. We affirm the court's order. Substantial evidence supported the court's finding that defendants waived their right to compel arbitration.

Appellants Brandon Parks-Burns and Todd Jose Tibbs were jointly tried for the first degree murder of Charles Marshall (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a); count. 1), and the premeditated attempted murder of Sequwan Lawrence (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 2). In the first trial, the jury deadlocked on the murder count as to both appellants. Parks-Burns later pleaded guilty to premeditated attempted murder of Lawrence. The jury convicted Tibbs of that charge. In October 2010, the court sentenced Tibbs to a determinate term of 20 years plus an indeterminate term of 15 years to life.
Appellants were tried for the murder of Charles Marshall a second time. Before the close of evidence, Tibbs pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, in exchange for a six-year term to be served concurrently with his sentence from the first trial. Parks-Burns refused the prosecutor's offer that he plead guilty to a nine-year sentence for assault with a firearm instead of stand trial for murder. The second jury convicted Parks-Burns of first degree murder, and found true allegations that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and the crime was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§186.22, subd. (b)). In September 2010, the court sentenced Parks-Burns to a total of 50 years to life in state prison as follows: 25 years to life on the murder conviction, and a consecutive 25 years to life on the gun enhancement. The court ordered him to pay fines, including $7,500 for victim restitution. (§ 1202.4; Gov. Code, § 13967, subd. (c).)

A jury convicted Eric Michael Brittian of the first degree murder of Olivia Avalos and Lori Flores, attempting to murder Jack Ramirez and Joe Ramirez by personally discharging a firearm, and found true a multiple-murder special circumstance allegation. (For clarity and ease of reference, we refer to these individuals and other witnesses sharing the same last name by their first names.) The trial court sentenced Eric to prison for life without possibility of parole, to be served consecutively to an aggregate indeterminate term of 180 years to life.
Eric appeals, contending (1) his convictions must be reversed because there was no solid, credible evidence that he was the assailant who committed the crimes, and (2) the trial court erred and deprived him of his federal constitutional rights when it instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 315 regarding Olivia's purported eyewitness identification. He also asserts the trial court committed three sentencing errors, namely that the trial court erred when it (1) set the amount of the restitution fine, (2) imposed a parole revocation fine, and (3) imposed both an indeterminate life sentence and a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for the same conduct and offense.
The Attorney General conceded, and we agreed that the trial court erred in setting the amount of the restitution fine and in imposing a parole revocation fine. We otherwise rejected Eric's arguments and affirmed the judgment.

J.T., father of minor A.T., appeals from orders terminating his parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.)[1] Father contends the juvenile court did not inquire about father’s Indian heritage in violation of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). Respondent Yolo County Department of Employment and Social Services agrees. We will reverse the orders of the juvenile court to permit compliance with ICWA requirements for inquiry and notice.

On March 24, 2008, a complaint filed in Lassen County Superior Court charged defendant Michael Karl McNeil with assault with a deadly weapon on or about December 15, 2007, and violation of a restraining order on or about December 26, 2007. As to the assault charge, the complaint alleged that defendant had incurred a prior strike.
On July 31, 2008, a complaint filed in Lassen County Superior Court charged defendant of unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle, grand theft, and violation of a court order, all taking place on or about June 2, 2008. The complaint alleged that defendant committed the offenses while on release from custody.
On August 8, 2011, the trial court granted the People’s motions to dismiss both cases in the interest of justice because defendant had been sentenced to a state prison term of 19 years in Los Angeles County.
On August 29, 2011, defendant in propria persona filed a “Motion to Seal and Destroy all Arrest Records” as to both cases, citing Penal Code section 851.8, subdivision (d).[1] The record does not show that the prosecuting attorney concurred in defendant’s motion, as required by Penal Code section 851.8, subdivision (d).
On March 20, 2012, the trial court denied the motion. The court’s order did not state reasons, but the court triply underscored “subdivision (d)” on the form.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the order denying the motion.

Appointed counsel for defendant James Richard Featherstone asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

A. Teichert & Son, Inc. (Teichert), operates a gravel mine in Yuba County that produces enough aggregate to fill about 600 large trucks per day. Teichert’s gravel trucks carry the gravel to market by driving through a residential neighborhood on Hallwood Boulevard and Walnut Avenue. Responding to pleas to circumvent the Hallwood neighborhood, Teichert bought land and started building a private haul road toward the intersection of Kibbe Road and State Road 20. Although Teichert secured a grading permit from Yuba County (County), no environmental impact study was done before road construction began.
Forest and Bobbie Tull (the Tulls[1]) own property adjacent to the haul road. They filed a petition for writ of mandate on grounds that Teichert and the County failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21050 et seq.).[2] The trial court dismissed the petition as moot because the County began work on a draft environmental impact report (EIR). We reversed in Tull v. Yuba County (Jan. 31, 2006, C047900) [nonpub. opn.] (Tull I), holding that the County violated CEQA by issuing a grading permit before studying alternate routes and that the Tulls’ petition was not mooted by the work on the draft EIR.
Following remand, the Tulls sought attorney fees under the public attorney general doctrine. The trial court awarded fees to the Tulls in an amount substantially less than they sought. The Tulls appealed, and this court reversed in Tull v. Yuba County (July 7, 2008, C054917) [nonpub. opn.] (Tull II).

A jury convicted defendant Tiana Nicole Borel of second degree robbery, false imprisonment, battery and second degree commercial burglary. The trial court sentenced her to seven years four months in prison.
Defendant now contends (1) her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 359 [corpus delicti -- independent evidence of a charged crime] because it relieved the prosecution of the burden of proving the identity of the perpetrator; and (3) cumulative error resulted in prejudice.
We conclude (1) defendant has not established ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court did not err in giving CALCRIM No. 359, and the jury could not have understood the instructions as a whole to relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof; and (3) defendant’s claim of cumulative prejudice lacks merit.
We will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Gregory Marcus Merritt, a sex offender who was required to register any change in his residence address with a local law enforcement agency within five working days of making the change (Pen. Code, § 290, subd. (b)),[1] was convicted by a jury of failure to so register (§§ 290.013, subd. (a), 290.018, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to five years in state prison.[2]
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred when it (1) denied his request for a mistake of fact instruction, the mistake being that his moving from the residence for which he had last registered into an automobile in a parking lot across an alley from that residence was not a change of address; and (2) failed to instruct the jury with the definition of “residence” as provided in section 290.011, subdivision (g). We conclude that under the circumstances of this case defendant was not entitled to a mistake of fact defense, and that any error in instructing the jury on the definition of residence was harmless.

Appellant F.C. (mother) appeals from the July 5, 2012 orders denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition without a hearing and terminating her parental rights to her son, Gabriel C.[1] She contends: (1) the trial court improperly delegated to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and the caretakers the court’s authority to order visits; and (2) denial of her section 388 petition was an abuse of discretion.[2] We affirm.

V.W. (mother) and her children, P.B., N.B., and Z.W. (the children), appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating mother’s parental rights. According to mother and the children, the juvenile court erred in terminating mother’s parental rights because her evidence, including a bonding study and the testimony of the psychologist who prepared the bonding study, was sufficient to establish the beneficial parent-child relationship exception (parental bond exception) to the termination of parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1]
We hold that the juvenile court’s finding that mother failed to satisfy her burden of proof on the parental bond exception was supported by sufficient evidence. We therefore affirm the order terminating parental rights.

The mother in this dependency case contends the juvenile court erred in asserting jurisdiction over her three children. Jurisdiction was premised on allegations that there was a substantial risk of serious physical harm—future sexual abuse—to mother’s children because of mother’s impromptu marriage to a man the day after his children were detained as part of an investigation that led to separate dependency proceedings involving his four children in which he was found to be a sexual predator. We find no error and affirm the jurisdictional order.

Brian G. appeals dependency court orders concerning his biological son, Alex F. We affirm the dependency court’s orders.

Plaintiff Bruce M. Lloyd appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of defendant Metropolitan West Asset Management, LLC (Metro), in this action based on Metro’s alleged failure to pay Lloyd pursuant to his contract to solicit clients for Metro’s investment business. We affirm the judgment because the undisputed evidence shows that Lloyd violated federal disclosure regulations governing his solicitation activities. These violations would make any payment to him unlawful.