CA Unpub Decisions

Defendants Clifton Wherry, Jr., (Wherry) and Dwight Campbell (Campbell) were both convicted of felony murder, which occurred during the robbery of an armored truck Wherry was driving. Wherry claims the results of his polygraph test, during which he stated police offered him a two-year deal if he confessed, were improperly excluded. Both Wherry and Campbell assert the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during argument to the jury. We conclude neither contention has merit and affirm. In a separate order, we also deny Wherry’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus in case No. A131712.

A modification decision.

The juvenile court took dependency jurisdiction over six of I.H.’s (mother) children, her 11-year-old son Carlos R., 10-year-old daughter M.R., 9-year-old son W.M., 7-year-old son R.H., 5-year-old son David H., and 3-year-old son Robert H. (collectively the children), based on allegations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (g).[1] The juvenile court left the children in mother’s custody and ordered family maintenance services. Mother appeals, contending the juvenile court erred in finding jurisdiction under subdivisions (a), (b) and (g), because those findings are not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.

Javier Pablo parked and locked his car outside his apartment one evening. His car was not there the next morning. Later that day, he saw his car go by with a “white man” wearing a “jersey” at the wheel. A few hours later, he saw Daugherity drive his car into a nearby apartment building, get out of the driver’s side, and get back into the driver’s side minutes later. He called out to her and waved his car key at her. The police arrived, searched his car, and found a “shaved” key in the ignition.[1] After the court denied Daugherity’s motion for judgment of acquittal, a jury found her guilty of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. On appeal, she challenges the court’s denial of her motion. We affirm.

An officer was dispatched to a supermarket parking lot where she met with a mother and daughter who reported an assault by three other women. The officer watched a surveillance video of a portion of the assault. The officer obtained an address for a suspect, Alicia Dominguez, and went to her home. While talking to two men who answered the door, the officer recognized Dominguez by her clothes, which were the same ones as in the surveillance video. The officer asked Dominguez several times to step outside. When she did not, the officer entered her home and arrested her without a warrant. Once outside her home, Dominguez made incriminating statements.[1] After the court denied her motion to suppress, she pled no contest to one count of assault likely to produce great bodily injury. On appeal, she challenges the court’s denial of her motion. We affirm.

Appellant/defendant Ronnie Earl Howell (defendant) was charged with several offenses after he ran through a stop sign, attempted to evade a police officer, and was determined to be intoxicated. During the course of the criminal proceedings, he repeatedly made motions pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) and asserted that he could not be represented by any court-appointed attorney because each such attorney was employed by a office that was involved in a conspiracy to take away his child in a dependency case. The court eventually suspended criminal proceedings and declared a doubt about his competency pursuant to Penal Code[1] section 1368. The court reviewed two expert reports, which concluded that defendant was incompetent to stand trial because he was unable to cooperate with his defense attorney based on his delusions about every defense counsel’s purported involvement in the alleged dependency conspiracy. The court ordered defendant committed to Atascadero State Hospital.
On appeal, defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s initial decision to suspend proceedings because it was solely based on defense counsel’s declaration that defendant was not competent. Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to the court’s finding that he was not competent.
While this appeal was pending, we asked the parties to update this court regarding defendant’s status. The parties advised this court that defendant had been restored to competency, he was in county jail, and criminal proceedings were reinstated. The People request this court to dismiss the instant appeal as moot. Defendant asserts this court should still address the issues he originally raised in his brief. We decline defendant’s invitation and will dismiss the instant appeal.

Following a jury trial, appellant Anthony Manuel Perez was convicted of two counts of attempted premeditated murder of a peace officer (counts 1 & 2), two counts of assault upon a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm (counts 3 & 4), two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a criminal street gang member (counts 7 & 11), and one count of possession of a stolen vehicle (count 8). With respect to counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8, the jury found the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1).[1] With respect to counts 1 through 4, the jury found appellant was a principal in the offenses and at least one principal personally discharged a firearm in committing the offenses within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1). However, the jury found appellant did not personally discharge a firearm in committing the offenses within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (c). Appellant received a total determinate sentence of 47 years 8 months, plus a total indeterminate sentence of 30 years to life.

Following approval of a project to expand an existing hazardous waste disposal facility located in Kings County (County), plaintiffs/petitioners and appellants Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice (Greenaction) and El Pueblo Para El Aire y Agua Limpio (Pueblo) (collectively appellants) filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint alleging violations of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)[1] and civil rights causes of action (Gov. Code, §§ 11135, 12955, 65008). The trial court sustained demurrers to the civil rights causes of action and rejected the claims of CEQA noncompliance. This appeal followed.
Appellants argue the demurrers should have been overruled and the environmental impact report (EIR) that was certified for the project did not adequately analyze the project’s health, transportation and cumulative impacts. We conclude: (1) the demurrers to the civil rights causes of action were properly sustained without leave to amend; (2) the health impacts arguments are meritless; and (3) administrative remedies were not exhausted on the transportation and cumulative impacts claims. The judgment will be affirmed.

Appellant Truxell & Valentino Landscape Development, Inc. (Truxell), removed and replaced landscaping at Clovis West High School. The job included the construction of a large paved area with cement walkways and cement seating areas. Truxell paid its employees at the prevailing wage rate for landscape workers for the entire job. Respondents and Real Party in Interest Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE), issued a wage-and-penalty assessment, finding that the workers who performed the cement work were misclassified and should have been paid the prevailing wage for cement masons. The assessment included the difference in wages plus penalties.
After a hearing, respondent Director of the Department of Industrial Relations (Director)[1] modified and affirmed the wage assessment, imposed liquidated damages, and remanded the case to the DLSE for a redetermination of the penalties. The DLSE redetermined the amount of the penalties, and Truxell did not request review by the Director. Truxell filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the superior court seeking reversal of all the relief ordered. The court denied the petition.

Ramon R. appeals the orders entered at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing held under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 360, subdivision (d), and 361, subdivision (c). Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny Ramon's request to review the record for error and to address his Anders issue. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
Citing In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, Ramon's counsel also asks this court to exercise its discretion to provide him the opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied.

George M. appeals orders entered at a jurisdiction and disposition hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300, subdivision (b), 358 and 361. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held that review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny George's requests to review the record for error and to address his Anders issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)

Liliana R. seeks writ review of a juvenile court order terminating reunification services as to her minor daughter, L.R., and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26. She contends the court erred by not continuing her reunification services to the 18-month date and by denying her request for unsupervised visits with L.R. We deny the petition and Liliana's request for a stay.

Jason Ryan Thomas entered a negotiated guilty plea to attempted burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 459)[1] and false personation (§ 529, subd. (a)(3)), and admitted a prior strike conviction allegation (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The court sentenced him to the agreed lower term of 12 months, doubled, for the attempted burglary conviction and a consecutive one-third of the midterm of eight months, doubled, for the false personation conviction resulting in a total prison term of three years four months to run concurrently with a sentence on another matter. His request for a certificate of probable cause was granted but his Marsden[2] motion was denied. Thomas appeals. We affirm the judgment.

In 2008 Gustavo Lara Perez was convicted of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187; all further statutory references are to the Penal Code) for a killing occurring in 1992. On May 29, 2009, he was sentenced to prison. Perez appealed, and this court affirmed his conviction, reversed an order denying his motion for a new trial and vacated the sentence. Respondent requests judicial notice of this court's opinion in that appeal, and we grant the request.