CA Unpub Decisions

In the late evening of January 29, 2011, Torrance Police Sergeant Eric Williams stopped his patrol car to investigate a Ford Explorer that was stopped in a left-turn pocket at the intersection of Sepulveda and Walnut because there was no traffic nearby and because the car was not moving and its brake lights were not illuminated.[1] Williams believed this meant the car was either not working or had been abandoned. After stopping behind the Ford, Williams walked to the driver’s side door and saw that the driver – Randy Jackson – appeared to be sleeping. Williams called out for Jackson to wake up, and then banged on the window. This roused Jackson, who, even though the car was in park, grabbed the car’s gear shifter and tried to put it in park.

Appellant Taisha Williams was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211[1] and one count of assault with a deadly weapon, an automobile, in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on formal probation for three years. Codefendant Latasha Rougely was convicted of one count of second degree robbery and sentenced to three years in state prison. She is not a party to this appeal.[2]
Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict and further contending that the trial court erred in failing to stay sentence for the assault conviction pursuant to section 654. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

Edward Roy Patten appeals from the trial court’s calculation of custody credits following the court’s revocation of his probation. We reverse and remand with directions.

A jury convicted defendant, Leonard Shawn Robinson, of deadly weapon assault. (Pen. Code,[1] § 245, subd. (a)(2).) The jury further found defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, Thornton Nightingale. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) The jury acquitted defendant of attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and attempted voluntary manslaughter charges. (§§ 192, subd. (a), 664.) Defendant was sentenced to 17 years in state prison.

After a jury found defendant Jimmie L. Carter guilty of robbery (§ 211),[1] with the finding that a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), a bench trial was conducted on allegations regarding a prior conviction. The trial court found that defendant had been convicted in 1998 of robbery, denied his oral Romero[2] motion, and sentenced him to a 17-year state prison term. We affirm.
The evidence at trial established that defendant and Wayne Jones committed a robbery at Camacho Auto Sales in Lancaster on May 7, 2011.[3] That day, defendant, who had recently purchased a car from the business, came to the establishment to make a payment on his car. After he left, Jones entered, and pointing a gun at the receptionist, took between $800 and $1,000. As the robbery took place, defendant circled the area in his car several times. After taking the money, Jones exited and entered the passenger side of defendant’s car which drove off. All of these events were videotaped.
Several days later, law enforcement arrested defendant and Jones in defendant’s car. The car was eventually taken to one of Camacho’s lots. Subsequently, two Camacho Auto Sales employees (a licensed recovery agent and a repossession agent) searched the car and found, hidden in the back of the passenger seat, the gun Jones had used in the robbery.

Under the authority of Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 (section 177.5),[1] the trial court sanctioned Attorney Deirdre L. O’Connor, who represents the defendant in the underlying case, the sum of $500 for having failed to appear at a hearing on a motion to quash a subpoena. O’Connor appeals[2] but we affirm because the statutory prerequisites for the award were met and substantial evidence supports the trial court’s order.
Because appellant contends principally that the trial court abused its discretion, we note at the outset that there is a two-pronged standard of review when it comes to sanction orders under section 177.5. First, the procedural prerequisites must be met, i.e., there must be notice, an opportunity to be heard and the order imposing sanctions must be in writing, stating the reasons for the sanctions; review here is de novo. Second, if the court’s factual findings are assailed, we determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. (Conservatorship of Becerra (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1474 TA l "Conservatorship of Becerra (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1474 (1485)" s "Conservatorship of Becerra (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1474" c 10 , 1481-1482.)

Plaintiff and appellant Donahue L. Wildman appeals from a judgment entered following the trial court’s order sustaining without leave to amend the demurrer filed by defendants and respondents California Coastal Commission and State Coastal Conservancy.
We affirm.

Appellant Leonard Mitchell was convicted, following a jury trial, of the first degree murders of Adriana Pizarro and Alexander Castro (Alex), in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a).[1] The jury found true the allegations that appellant personally used and intentionally discharged a handgun within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) through (d). The jury also found true the special circumstance allegation that appellant was convicted in this proceeding of more than one offense of murder within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3). The trial court sentenced appellant to life without the possibility of parole on both counts. The court imposed an additional term of 25 years to life onto each sentence pursuant to section 12022.53.
Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of first degree murder and the trial court erred in failing to instruct, sua sponte, on sudden quarrel and heat of passion. He contends that if he has forfeited the instructional claim through counsel's inaction, he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant further contends that the imposition of a section 12022.53 enhancement term in a murder conviction violates California law, and federal double jeopardy principles. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

The jury found defendant and appellant Michael Garrett McCaw not guilty of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664)[1] but guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter (§§ 192, 664). The jury also found true allegations that defendant used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and inflicted great bodily injury (§12022.7, subd. (a)). Following a bench trial, the trial court found that defendant had suffered a prior strike under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)‑(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and defendant had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to 21 years in state prison. It imposed the high term of five and one-half years, doubled to eleven years under the three strikes law. The trial court imposed an additional year for use of a deadly weapon, three years for inflicting great bodily injury, five years for the prior serious felony conviction, and one year for the prior prison term.

Federico Galavis (Galavis) appeals the denial of his motion for class certification in a multi-count action against respondent L.A. Models, Inc. (L.A. Models). We find no error and therefore affirm.
L.A. Models requests sanctions against opposing counsel. The request for sanctions is denied.

Defendant Thomas Moreno filed an insurance claim alleging that his customized motorcycle was stolen out of his driveway. Several months after the insurer paid the claim, the police impounded a motorcycle matching the description of Moreno’s stolen vehicle. Moreno attempted to retrieve the impounded vehicle and denied that he had ever filed an insurance claim. He was arrested and charged with insurance fraud (Pen. Code, § 550 subd. (a)(10)), defrauding an insurer (Pen. Code, § 548, subd. (a)) and perjury by declaration (Pen. Code, § 118, subd. (a).)
During a pretrial hearing, a police officer testified that he impounded the motorcycle because a confidential serial number indicated that it had been reported stolen. On cross-examination, the officer asserted that the location of the serial number was privileged under Evidence Code section 1040. The trial court upheld the officer’s assertion of privilege and ruled that the information was not material within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1042. The jury convicted Moreno on all counts.
On appeal, Moreno argues that his conviction should be reversed because: (1) the location of the serial number was material to his defense; and (2) the court committed instructional error. He also asks that we review the in camera proceedings conducted by the trial court pursuant to his motion for production of documents under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). We affirm the conviction.

Theresa Lynn Marks appeals the judgment following her convictions for driving under the influence causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)),[1] driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more (id. at subd. (b)), driving under the influence with prior convictions (§§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550.5, subd. (a)) driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent with priors (§§ 23152, subd. (b), 23550.5, subd. (a)), and leaving the scene of an accident (§ 20001, subd. (a)). She was sentenced to two years eight months, consisting of the two-year midterm for driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 with priors and eight months for leaving the scene of an accident. Sentence was imposed but stayed under Penal Code section 654 as to the other counts. Marks claims Miranda error,[2] and that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting her closing argument regarding the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. We affirm.

Appellant Thomas R. Cox appeals his conviction following a jury trial of one count of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), one count of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or higher (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)), and one count of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)).[1] Cox raises the following arguments on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the assault with a deadly weapon conviction; (2) the prosecution misstated an essential element of the assault charge in its closing argument; (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a defense witness’s prior misdemeanor conduct while refusing to modify the jury instructions to address the prosecution witnesses’ criminal conduct in this case; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Cox’s request for a continuance to retain private counsel; (5) the trial court may have erred in determining there was no discoverable material in the arresting officer’s personnel file; and (6) there was cumulative error. We modify the judgment to correct a sentencing error, but otherwise affirm.

Luis Fernando Ortega appeals the judgment following his conviction for first degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187/189.)[1] The jury found a special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed while lying in wait to be true. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15).) The jury also found allegations to be true that the murder was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and that a principal personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)). Ortega was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the offense, plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. Sentence for the gang enhancement was stayed.
Ortega contends the trial court erred by excluding evidence of third party culpability, and by admitting prejudicial gang evidence. He also claims ineffective assistance of counsel regarding polygraph test evidence. We affirm.