P. v. Lopez
Filed 1/10/13 P. v. Lopez
CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
SIX
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JAIME LUIS LOPEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
2d
Crim. No. B235904
(Super.
Ct. No. 1191961)
(Santa
Barbara County)
Jaime
Luis Lopez ("Lopez") was charged with assaulting a teenage boy and,
two weeks later, with attempting to murder two other men. For the first incident, he was convicted of
assault with a gang allegation (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)). For the second incident, he was
convicted of first degree burglary (§ 459) and two counts of
subd.(a)).
18 years, followed by an indeterminate term of 14 years to life in
Among
other things, Lopez now challenges the trial court's findings that he was
competent to stand trial and that he
was properly housed in a "safety cell" during trial. These arguments lack merit, and we affirm.
I. Competency Issues
reinstatement of criminal proceedings
In
April 2009, the trial court found Lopez incompetent to stand trial and
suspended criminal proceedings. The court reinstated proceedings in May
2011. Lopez argues that the
reinstatement was improper for three reasons.
First, the court should have postponed the reinstatement hearing so
mental health experts could be appointed to evaluate his competence. Second, the court should not have found him
competent. Third, the court should have
made findings before ordering the involuntary administration of medication.
The
trial court was not required to continue the reinstatement hearing. To begin with, Lopez forfeited this argument
because he never asked for a continuance.
(People v. Riccardi (2012) 54
Cal.4th 758, 810.)
Even if
we were to consider the issue, we would reject Lopez's argument. Lopez contends that People v. Rells (2000) 22 Cal.4th 860 (Rells) stands for the proposition that any and all procedures
applicable in initial competency hearings under section 1369 also apply in
reinstatement hearings under section 1372.
Because the court would have been required to appoint mental health
experts to assess his competency under section 1369, Lopez asserts that the
court was also required to do so for his reinstatement hearing. Lopez reads too much into
Rells borrowed from section
1369 to conclude that a defendant bears the burden of proving his incompetence
at a reinstatement hearing. (
867-868.) Rells did not mandate or otherwise suggest the wholesale
importation of all of section 1369's
procedures into the section 1372 context.
Nor does such importation make sense, as this case illustrates. An absolute prerequisite to a reinstatement
hearing is an evaluation and certification by mental health experts that a
defendant is competent. There is
accordingly no reason to require a second, duplicative round of expert
evaluations in every reinstatement hearing.
The
trial court also did not err in finding that Lopez did not prove his
incompetence. State
certified that Lopez was once again competent.
Moreover, the professional who evaluated Lopez reaffirmed her
certification at the reinstatement hearing.
To be sure, Lopez's most recent evaluation was six months before the
hearing, and the evaluating professional opined that Lopez's competency might
deteriorate if he was not properly medicated.
But no one, including Lopez's own counsel, disputed that Lopez was still
competent at that time of the hearing because deterioration had yet to occur.
Lastly,
the court did not err in ordering involuntary administration of medication
should Lopez display signs of deterioration.
The trial court's cursory treatment of the issue was not erroneous
because the court had already issued several prior orders mandating involuntary
medication—in January 2008, July 2009, and February 2010. Those orders had complied with the Penal Code
and the due process requirements for inmates posing a risk of inflicting
substantial physical harm to themselves or others. (See § 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(ii) &
(7); Sell v. United States (2003) 539
U.S. 166, 179; Riggins v. Nevada
(1992) 504 U.S. 127, 134-135.) Lopez
cannot demonstrate prejudice in any event because he was never forced to accept
medication after the reinstatement hearing.
B. The
refusal to convene a mid-trial competency hearing
Lopez
next contends that the trial court erred when it declined to convene a
mid-trial competency hearing after defense
counsel declared a doubt about Lopez's competency. The trial court committed no error.
When
confronted with defense counsel's declaration, the court asked the right
question: Since the most recent hearing
declaring Lopez competent, had there been a substantial change in circumstances
or new evidence that gives rise to a serious doubt about the validity of the
recent competency finding? (
33.) Defense counsel's declaration of a
doubt regarding Lopez's competency, while relevant, was not dispositive. (People
v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 739, fn. 7.) The trial court was required to assess for
itself whether substantial evidence dictated a "yes" answer to the
above question. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1216.)
The
trial court did not err in its assessment that Lopez had not presented
substantial evidence of his incompetence.
The court had information that Lopez had attacked one deputy and thrown
water at another the weekend before his counsel declared a doubt about his
competency. The trial court
appropriately examined this information in light of the entire record,
including from the recent reinstatement hearing and from a further hearing on
Lopez's competence held a few weeks earlier.
From
these hearings, the court learned the following. State mental health professionals had
declared Lopez competent as of May 2011, but had opined that his mental
condition might deteriorate if he did not take medication. Lopez suffers from an antisocial personality
disorder and, consistent with this disorder, had previously engaged in
malingering behavior. In fact, the court
had previously found that Lopez "knows exactly how to exaggerate symptoms"
of his mental illnesses. Lopez had been off
his medication since November 2010, but had remained competent and stable. Indeed, he was competent enough to enter a
plea in a felony assault case during that period. Lopez had started engaging in bizarre
behavior in early June 2011, just after learning that his case was set for
trial. Lopez had been responsive to the
court's questions regarding dressing in jail garb and his seating arrangements
during the five days of trial leading up to the day his counsel declared a
doubt about his competency. Viewed
together, the trial court found that these circumstances did not "rise to
the level of having another competency hearing." This ruling was not an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Rogers (2005) 39 Cal.4th 826, 847.)
We
reject Lopez's arguments to the contrary.
He asserts that People v. Murdoch
(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 230 controls. To
be sure, the mental health diagnosis in Murdoch
suggested that the defendant's competence might deteriorate if he stopped
taking his medication. Lopez's diagnosis
was similar. However, Murdoch's
competence did deteriorate, as he
sought to proceed pro se so he could argue that his victims were not
"human." Lopez's did not. To the contrary, Lopez was off his mediation
for 10 months without any noteworthy deterioration. Lopez's "bizarre" behavior started
only after the matter was set for trial, timing entirely consistent with his
history of malingering.
Lopez
also contends that the trial court's conclusion was faulty because the court
was not allowed to rely on its own observations and because the court could not
physically see Lopez while he was in the safety cell. We reject these contentions. Trial courts may consider their own
observations in assessing whether to order a subsequent
v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1133.)
Lopez was not in the safety cell during any of the exchanges on which
the trial court relied.
II. Use of
the Safety Cell
Lopez
next asserts that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by
confining him a safety cell. The cell
was a separate room within the courtroom with see-through walls from waist
level up. Normally, a jury could see a
defendant but not any restraints. Lopez,
however, chose to draw the blinds to block the jury's view of him
completely. Lopez could still
communicate with his attorney using a microphone system and earpiece. Lopez forfeited any challenge to this procedure
by not objecting to it. (
72, 95.) There was no abuse of
discretion in any event. (
926, 987.)
Lopez
first argues that the court did make the requisite finding of a "manifest
need" for this special restraint. (
773.) However, the record reveals that
the trial court made precisely that finding.
Lopez
next contends that placing him in a safety cell was too severe because he could
have remained in the courtroom wearing shackles. The court's finding of "manifest need"
was based on 10 different violent attacks by Lopez against other
and custody officials. These attacks
included incidents of spitting, throwing water and abrasive powder, making
threats, and even punching a mental health patient hard enough to rupture his
eyeball and blind him. Most of these
attacks involved "either throwing objects or spitting." Given this conduct, the trial court had ample
basis to impose the most severe and most obvious restraints. The court opted instead for the safety cell,
which would have concealed any shackles.
We reject Lopez's further suggestion that his counsel was
constitutionally ineffective, as counsel made the tactical decision to concur
in the court's well-reasoned order.
Lopez
lastly argues that the jury disregarded the court's repeated admonition to
ignore his placement in the safety cell.
Lopez points to a note from the jury asking, among other things, whether
he would be present when the verdicts were read. We presume jurors follow a court's
instructions. (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 669.) That presumption has not been rebutted
here. Nothing in the jury's note
suggests that Lopez's placement in the safety cell factored into its
deliberations on the verdicts. At most,
the note suggests the jury's curiosity as to who was in the safety cell which
had, at Lopez's counsel's request and with Lopez's consent, been blocked from view
by window shades during the entire trial because Lopez refused to wear street
clothes.
III. Attempted
Murder Convictions
A. Sufficiency
of the evidence regarding premeditation
Lopez
contends that the jury's findings that his two attempted murder convictions
were not supported by substantial evidence.
More specifically, Lopez argues that the State did not adduce sufficient
evidence that his stabbings of Ramon Cabrera and Jesus Hernandez Flores were
premeditated and deliberate.
Viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence indicated that Lopez,
a gang member, walked up to a house in rival gang territory at 1:30 a.m.,
knocked on the door, and waited for someone to answer. When Hernandez Flores answered the door,
Lopez immediately stabbed him and then Cabrera repeatedly, and then fled. This was not the first time Lopez had engaged
in this type of attack. Just weeks
before, Lopez had punched and stomped on another stranger who had been walking
through rival gang territory. Moreover,
as a juvenile, Lopez had knocked on a door and stabbed the person who answered
with a shard of glass. A gang expert
testified that attacking people located in a rival gang's territory enhances a
gang member's reputation.
Taken
together, this is circumstantial evidence that Lopez's attacks in this case
were part of a longstanding pattern of planned behavior aimed at enhancing his
gang reputation. This evidence is
"'reasonable, credible, and of solid value.'" (People
v. Garcia (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1508.) It refutes Lopez's argument that his attacks
were a "hastily executed, . . . unconsidered or rash impulse . . .
.'" (People v. Thomas (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 900.) Lopez suggests that we may not consider the
gang motivation for the attack because he was not charged with gang enhancements
for the attempted murders. The State's
decision not to charge an enhancement does not preclude us, or the jury, from
considering how this possible motivation bears on the issue of premeditation.
B. Erroneous
defense instruction
Lopez
finally argues that the trial court gave an incomplete jury instruction on his
mental illness defense. The court's
instruction informed the jury it could consider whether Lopez's mental illness
negated the intent element of attempted murder, and defined that element as the
intent to kill. Lopez argues that the
instruction should have also referred to the additional element of intent to
act with premeditation and deliberation.
We reject this argument because the crime of attempted murder has only
one intent requirement—the intent to kill.
(People v. Lee (2003) 31
Cal.4th 613, 627.) When it comes to
attempted murder, the elements of premeditation and deliberation pertain to the
circumstances of the crime, and not
the defendant's intent. (
The cases Lopez cites are irrelevant because they deal with the crime of
murder, for which State must also prove the defendant's intent to act with premeditation and deliberation. (People
v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1248.)
CONCLUSION
The
judgment is affirmed.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED.
HOFFSTADT,
J.
We concur:
GILBERT,
P. J.
YEGAN,
J.
>
Kay S. Kuns, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Richard
E. Holly, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson,
Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
name="_ftn2" title=""> * Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
