CA Unpub Decisions

Amber G. and Juan G. (together, the parents) appeal judgments declaring their son, J.G., and Amber's son Isaiah (together, the minors), dependents of the juvenile court and removing them from parental custody. The parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders. Juan also contends the court erred by requiring his visits with J.G. to be supervised. We affirm the judgments.

Devon Dunlap entered a negotiated guilty plea to assault with intent to commit rape (Pen. Code, § 220, subd. (a)(1)).[1] The court sentenced him to prison for the six-year upper term and issued a three-year criminal protective order (§ 136.2) barring Dunlap from contacting the victim. Dunlap appeals, contending the criminal protective order must be stricken because it was unauthorized and violates his federal constitutional right to due process. The People concede the point.
The authority of section 136.2 exists only during the pendency of the criminal case. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382.) There is no other applicable statutory authority for the protective order, and there was no showing a protective order was appropriate under the court's inherent authority. (Id. at pp. 382-385.)

A modification decision.

Kevin Lamarr Andres appeals the judgment sentencing him to prison for 10 years after a jury found him guilty of possession of cocaine base for sale and he admitted allegations concerning prior convictions. Andres contends the trial court prejudicially erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures; (2) admitting at trial hearsay statements of anonymous informants that he was selling drugs on the night he was arrested for the current offense; and (3) refusing to dismiss the allegations of a prior serious felony conviction. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

In November 2005 Susan M. Schindelar and Edward W. Sznyter III (collectively Schindelar-Sznyter), individually and as trustees of their family trust, sued Richard Neefe and Sherri Nolan (collectively Neefe-Nolan), claiming Neefe-Nolan's remodeling of their home resulted in various encroachments on their property. In March 2007 the parties executed a settlement agreement, which resolved the disputes. The settlement agreement required the parties to mutually exchange easements. From March 2007 through June 2009 counsel for Neefe-Nolan attempted to finalize the exchange of the easements required under the settlement agreement, but no agreement could be reached.

Appointed counsel for defendant Leonard Duarte Martinez, Jr., has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
During the summer of 2010, defendant began molesting nine-year-old M., his biological granddaughter and adopted daughter.[1] Between summer 2010 and November 28, 2010, defendant performed oral copulation on M. “a little more than five times,” had her perform oral copulation on him “about four times,” attempted vaginal intercourse with her “three times or so,” and attempted anal intercourse with her “about three times.” M. reported pain and bleeding from the sexual acts. A criminalist analyzed samples that had been taken from M.’s vaginal area during a medical examination. The samples contained DNA that matched a sample obtained from defendant.

Appointed counsel for defendant Anthony Demone Stuart asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Following her plea of guilty to bringing an illegal substance or alcohol into a jail facility (Pen. Code, § 4573.5), defendant Pamela Austin was ordered to pay a $63.50 criminal justice administration fee (Gov. Code, § 29550.2). On appeal she contends the order must be reversed, as there was no determination she had the ability to pay the fee and no evidence supporting that finding. We affirm.

Pursuant to a resolution reached at a contested jurisdictional hearing, the minor, Andre C., admitted one count of child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)),[1] and three other such counts were dismissed along with a count of corporal injury on a cohabitant (§ 273.5).
The juvenile court declared the admitted count to be a felony, adjudged Andre C. to be a ward of the court, set a maximum confinement term at six years, ordered Andre C. to be placed in a suitable licensed placement while on probation, and then placed Andre C. in the Rite of Passage program (ROP) in Nevada.
On appeal, Andre C. contends the juvenile court (1) violated his legal right to special education that conforms to his Individual Education Plan (IEP), (2) erred in requiring him to obtain his high school diploma or GED as a probation condition, as there was no evidence of his ability to comply, and (3) failed to determine his ability to pay a $100 restitution fine. We shall order the correction of a clerical error on the disposition order, brought to our attention, but otherwise affirm the juvenile court’s adjudication and orders.

Defendant Cody Agasihorn pleaded guilty to felony leaving the scene of an accident (Veh. Code, § 20001, subds. (a), (b)(1)) with a stipulated term of 16 months in county jail to be served concurrently with a three-year county jail term previously imposed in Calaveras County Case No. F4550.
The trial court later indicated that a felony violation of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) was not subject to the provisions of Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h), but was instead punishable by confinement in state prison. After briefing and argument on the matter, the trial court ruled that defendant could not be sentenced to county jail and was subject to state prison. Defendant declined the trial court’s invitation to withdraw his plea, and the trial court sentenced him to a 16-month state prison term concurrent to the three-year county prison term in Calaveras County Case No. F4550.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court was without authority to impose a state prison rather than a county jail term. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant Enrique Sanchez was convicted of one count of unlawful taking a vehicle with a prior for a related offense. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), appellant’s counsel filed an opening brief requesting that this court review the record and determine whether any arguable issues exist on appeal. We have reviewed the entire record and find no arguable issue. We affirm the judgment.

Carlos Armando Encinas appeals a $9,985.98 victim restitution order following his negotiated plea agreement and his no contest plea to assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).)[1] More than two years after his sentencing hearing, the People filed an application for a victim restitution order. The trial court granted it.
We conclude, among other things, that: 1) Encinas's negotiated plea agreement did not preclude the trial court from modifying the sentence to include a victim restitution order, and 2) the court was not required to obtain a Harvey waiver before making that restitution order. We affirm.

Gerald Beckwith was convicted of first degree residential burglary and petty theft, and received a sentence of 37 years to life. Beckwith appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss one or both of his prior strikes. We modify the abstract of judgment and otherwise affirm the judgment.

A petition charged 14-year-old Thomas S. with vandalism over $400 to a 2010 Honda Civic, license plate number 6LMY945, in violation of Penal Code[1] section 594, subdivision (a) (count 1). At the adjudication hearing, Javier G. testified that on May 31, 2011 at 1:35 p.m., he was leaving Granada Middle School with Thomas S. and Adrian J. Thomas S. kicked the side of a red Civic as they walked by the car. The next day, Thomas S. sat on the hood of the Civic, banging the hood with his fist so that the alarm went off. Javier G. had told the principal that Thomas S. fell on the right front fender of the Civic, and told a detective that Adrian J. pushed Thomas S. into the car after Thomas S. told him to. Asked, “Going back to what you remember from what happened May 31, did you see any damage to the vehicle after that day?” Javier G. responded that he saw “[l]ike a dent in the side, like, the rear, like, the car door passenger side.” Asked whether he saw “any damage on the vehicle on the day that [he] said Thomas sat on the car,” Javier G. responded, “Yes. [¶] . . . [¶] On the hood.” Asked, “From him just sitting on the vehicle?,” Javier G. responded: “And banging his fist.”
A deputy sheriff testified that when he went to the middle school on May 31, 2011, he saw damage to the Civic’s driver side door, the right front quarter panel, and the hood, including some damage to the right front fender.