P. v. Deanda





















Filed 4/3/13 P. v. Deanda CA4/2













NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS





California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.





IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF >CALIFORNIA>



FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT



DIVISION TWO






>

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSE ALBERTO DEANDA, Defendant and Appellant.

E053911 (Super.Ct.No. SWF024615) OPINION

APPEAL
from the Superior Court
of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Riverside
County. Dennis A.
McConaghy, Judge. Affirmed.

Janice
M. Lagerlof, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.

Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Lilia E. Garcia, Lynne
McGinnis and Felicity Ann Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

A
jury convicted defendant and appellant Jose Alberto Deanda of shooting at an
inhabited house (count 1—Pen. Code, § 246)href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">^[1] and found true an attached gang enhancement (§
186.22, subd. (b)). The trial court
sentenced defendant to the mandatory, statutory term of imprisonment of 15
years to life.

On
appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in declining to
reopen the case to permit continued cross-examination of Hemet Police Officer
Takaski Nishida, in declining to give defendant’s proffered instruction on
Officer Nishida’s testimony, and in failing to give a sua sponte jury
instruction on corroboration of an accomplice witness’s testimony. Defendant additionally contends the People
committed prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct during their closing and
rebuttal argument by vouching for Officer Nishida, defense counsel below
rendered infective assistance of counsel (IAC) in failing to object to the
prosecutor’s purported misconduct, and in failing to request a limiting
instruction on the use of the gang evidence adduced at trial. Finally, defendant maintains the cumulative
effect of the alleged errors deprived him of a fair trial and due process. We affirm the judgment.

>FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On
January 31, 2008,
defendant, whom Victoria Rodriguez knew as “Casper,”
came to her home at 7:30 to 8:00 p.m.,
with at least two persons whom she had never met before; defendant referred to
them as “Spooks” and “Happy.”href="#_ftn2"
name="_ftnref2" title="">^[2] The monikers were suggestive of gang
membership to Rodriguez. Defendant
discussed how he had gotten into a physical altercation earlier with two men
over a woman; defendant was angry and upset.
Defendant and the others were talking about getting even with the
individual with whom defendant had fought.
Rodriguez saw defendant with a black handgun.

Defendant
asked Rodriguez to give him, Spooks, and Happy a ride; she drove them in her white
Suburban to a house off of Florida Avenue. Defendant brought the gun with him. At some point, Rodriguez heard the men say
they intended to shoot a home in retribution for the earlier fight. They requested that Rodriguez turn off the
vehicle’s lights and park down the street from the home that was their intended
target.

Defendant
exited the vehicle with the gun; he was wearing a white vest under a black
hooded sweatshirt with long sleeves.
Happy exited with him. Rodriguez
sat in the vehicle with the engine running and the lights off. Defendant and Happy walked toward the house.

Less
than five minutes later, Rodriguez heard several gunshots. Defendant and Happy ran back to her
vehicle. Rodriguez heard defendant say
something to the effect of, “I got ‘em.”
She immediately drove off quickly toward Florida Avenue.

Defendant
took off the vest and threw it in the back of the vehicle. He also handed the gun to someone. Rodriguez saw several police cars pass her; a
couple of them made U-turns, followed her, and put on their lights. One of the men asked her to put the gun in
her purse; she refused.

Rodriguez
pulled over; she exited the vehicle at the command of the police officers. The officers pulled the others from the
vehicle. Rodriguez gave the officers
permission to search her vehicle.

Rodriguez
was arrested and charged with firing at an inhabited home. She entered into an agreement with the People
in which she would testify truthfully in exchange for a one-year jail term and
six years’ probation.

Mayra,
a resident of the home, testified that on January 31, 2008, she was in the
bathroom when she heard multiple gunshots fired in rapid succession. She heard one of the bullets hit the front
door. Mayra called 911.

Mayra’s
mother Carlota also resided in the home.
On January 31, 2008, she was in her bedroom when she heard five or six
gunshots; at least one of the shots hit the house. Carlota looked out her bedroom window and saw
a person dressed all in black trying to get into the open door of a moving “big
white car.” Three other residents of the
home, who were in the backyard at the time of the shooting, left the property
to follow the vehicle.

The
People played a recording of the 911 call placed by Mayra. Mayra reported someone had shot at the home
four to six times and left in a white SUV towards Florida Avenue. In less than five minutes, while Mayra was
still on the phone with the 911 dispatcher, she was told the police had already
stopped the vehicle.

Around
10:00 p.m. on the date in question, Officer Ryan Hollenweger of the Hemet
Police Department was responding to a call about the shooting; he saw a vehicle
matching the description of the suspect vehicle on Florida Avenue. The vehicle was approximately two to three
miles from the address where the shooting occurred; it was driving in the
opposite direction of that address.
Officer Hollenweger executed a U-turn and conducted a traffic stop.

Officer
Hollenweger waited for other officers to arrive before having each of the
occupants exit the vehicle separately. A
young woman exited the driver’s seat, defendant exited the front passenger
seat, and two other men came out the back.
Rodriguez gave permission to search the vehicle. It had three rows of seats; in the middle row
officers found a white bulletproof vest.
A loaded Ruger nine-millimeter handgun was found on the third row of
seats; it had one cartridge chambered and two additional rounds in the
magazine.

Hemet
Police Officer Brett Riley also responded to the scene. He found six, nine-millimeter shell casings
near the gate of the home. He also found
a bullet hole in the screen on the front door and several bullet fragments,
which had hit a car that had been parked at the residence.

Officer
Nishida took gunshot residue swabs of all the occupants of the vehicle. He testified Goldade and Ramirez were
admitted members of the 18th Street Gang.
Based on defendant’s tattoos, belt buckle, moniker, self-classification
when booked, association with other gang members, and association that night
with two other 18th Street Gang members, Officer Nishida opined defendant was a
member of the 18th Street Gang on the date of the offense. The residence where the shooting occurred was
known for drug and gang activity on behalf of La Raza Corolla, a rival of the
18th Street Gang. Based on a
hypothetical matching of the facts of the instant case, Officer Nishida opined
the offense was committed in association with and for the benefit of the 18th
Street Gang.

A
senior criminalist with the Los
Angeles County Coroner’s Officer testified the gunshot residue samples brought
to her from defendant were consistent with someone who had discharged a
firearm. Tests of the samples obtained
from the other three occupants of the vehicle found no gunshot residue.

>DISCUSSION

A. TRIAL COURT’S REFUSAL TO GIVE
DEFENDANT’S PROPOSED PINPOINT INSTRUCTION.

Officer
Nishida testified a search of defendant’s jail cell revealed a table with
graffiti etchings, indicative of the 18th Street Gang. However, on cross-examination, Officer
Nishida admitted he was mistaken about whose jail cell the etchings were found
in; they were actually found in Goldade’s jail cell. Nonetheless, defense counsel continued to
cross-examine Officer Nishida about the nature of his error. Officer Nishida then appears to have
vacillated as to whether he was sure the pictures were of defendant’s jail cell
or another individual’s jail cell.
Defense counsel eventually requested a recess so Officer Nishida could
review other materials in order that he might make a definitive determination
as to whose jail cell the graffiti was found in. The court acceded to defense counsel’s
request.

During
the recess, Officer Nishida reviewed the CD on which the photographs of the
jail cell were recorded. He then
testified the etchings were found in defendant’s jail cell. Defense counsel then requested that someone
take photographs of the respective individuals’ jail cells so a dispositive
determination could be made. The court
agreed to order a photographer to do so.

Meanwhile,
on redirect Officer Nishida testified that even assuming the etchings had been
found in another individual’s jail cell, it would neither change his opinion
that defendant was a member of the 18th Street Gang nor that the offense was
gang motivated. Later, the court
encountered a potential 10-day delay in obtaining approval for the jail cells
to be photographed. The court suggested
they have the jury visit the jail cells.
Defense counsel suggested, “[m]aybe we can arrive at a
stipulation.” Throughout the ordeal, the
court appeared extraordinarily open and accommodating as to any proposed method
of dealing with the perceived problem.

Defense
counsel eventually requested a jury instruction effectively conveying it “could
reasonably conclude that [Officer Nishida] either deliberately lied or acted in
reckless disregard to the truth.”
Defendant’s proposed instruction read, “You have heard evidence from
[Officer] Nishida, a witness concerning the nature of gangs. If you believe [Officer] Nishida deliberately
lied about some things, you may disregard all of his testimony. Also, if you believe [Officer] Nishida acted
in reckless disregard of the truth of any issue involved in forming his
opinion, or while offering his testimony, you may also disregard all of his
testimony.”

The
court responded, “As far as this jury instruction goes, I sat here and listened
to the evidence. And a person would have
to be so jaded to say that that was—assuming for a moment that the officer was
wrong—to stretch that and say reckless disregard for the truth is an absolute
fabrication in and of itself. There was
no reckless disregard for the truth, including the whole process of going and
looking at the photographs. And for that
reason I am going to reject this instruction.”

It
was eventually determined by the People that Officer Nishida had made a
mistake; the pictures of the jail cell with the 18th Street Gang etchings did
not belong to defendant; rather, they belonged to Goldade. The court suggested the new photographs of
the respective jail cells, with indications as to whom they belonged, be
admitted into evidence. The parties
agreed.

The
court indicated it would introduce a stipulation to the jury with respect to
the photographs and Officer Nishida’s testimony, but would not accept one that
included the phrase “reckless disregard for the truth.” After negotiations between the parties, the
final stipulation, as presented to the jury, read as follows: “It is stipulated by the People and the
defense that [Officer] Nishida was incorrect in his statement that the
photographed desk with gang related etchings were located in the defendant’s
jail cell. It was located in [Goldade’s]
jail cell.” “From the time the defendant
was arrested until after the cell searches were conducted, the defendant did
not have access to [Goldade’s] cell.”

“‘“[A]
defendant has a right to an instruction that pinpoints the theory of the
defense . . . .”’ [Citation.]
The court, however, ‘may properly refuse an instruction offered by the
defendant if it incorrectly states the law, is argumentative, duplicative, or
potentially confusing [citation], or if it is not supported by substantial
evidence [citation].”’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 120.)


Defendant’s
proposed instruction was unduly argumentative because it effectively told the jury the evidence indicated
or tended to prove Officer Nishida lied or acted in reckless disregard of the
truth. It is improper for an instruction
to indicate an opinion favorable to a defendant regarding the effect of the
evidence. (People v. Hartsch
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 504.) Similarly,
substantial evidence failed to support the instruction because nothing in the record
indicated Officer Nishida did anything other than make a mistake as to whom the
jail cell belonged. Indeed, if defense
counsel, during his cross-examination, had simply left matters after Officer
Nishida admitted the pictures of the jail cell did not belong to defendant, he
would have thoroughly and successfully impeached Officer Nishida on the
matter. It was defense counsel’s
tactical decision to continue to press the matter until Officer Nishida decided
he needed to take another look at the photographs in order to make a
dispositive determination. Only then did
he reverse himself again, which led to the instant issue.

Moreover,
the instruction was duplicative in that it effectively covered ground already
dealt with in instructions given by the court.
(CALCRIM Nos. 105 [jury sole judge of credibility of witnesses]; 226
[same]; 332 [credibility of expert witness to be judged by jury by factors
including its reasonability and support in the evidence].) Thus, the court acted within its discretion
in declining to give defendant’s proffered instruction.

B. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Defendant
contends the People engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by vouching for Officer
Nishida in its statements during closing
and rebuttal argument that Officer Nishida merely made a mistake in
ascribing the pictures of the 18th Street Gang graffiti to defendant’s jail
cell. Defendant acknowledges his failure
to object would normally forfeit the argument on appeal, but contends defense
counsel’s failure to object amounted to constitutionally IAC. We address the merits of the issue, to
forestall the IAC claim, and find it lacking.


During
the People’s closing argument, the prosecutor argued: “[Officer] Nishida, he was wrong. He made a mistake. He was incorrect in his testimony, that that
desk with the etchings was in that defendant’s jail cell. It was actually in . . . Goldade’s
cell.” He further claimed, “We talked
about during jury selection that officers are humans. They make mistakes. He went upstairs to review those photos. Based upon what he reviewed upstairs, he felt
certain that the writing on that desk came from the defendant’s jail cell. He was incorrect.”

Defense
counsel spent the majority of his closing argument maintaining Officer
Nishida’s incorrect testimony regarding the derivation of the photographs of
the jail cell undermined the totality of his testimony, including his
conclusions that defendant was a member of that gang and that the crime was committed
for a gang related purpose. In sum, the
defense argued: “I’m not saying he’s
deliberately lying to stick it to [defendant].
I can’t say that. I don’t know
what is in [Officer] Nishida’s mind. But
what I think is reasonable to infer, what I think is the truth, is that he’s
willing to say what he needed to say to get a conviction. And he’s willing to say things are true, and
to say that he’s certain that [they] are true, when they’re not. They’re not true.”

In
the People’s rebuttal, the prosecutor argued:
“[Defense counsel] wants you to think that because [Officer] Nishida
made one mistake in his testimony, all of a sudden you have reasonable doubt,
and that [defendant] should walk away free.”
The prosecutor noted that on cross-examination, Officer Nishida admitted
he was wrong, but defense counsel continued to press the issue. At defense counsel’s urging, Officer Nishida
took a break so that he could further review the files he had with him at
court. Only after that review did he
conclude the pictures were of defendant’s jail cell, because the CD with those
pictures was labeled with defendant’s name.
“Based on that, based on what he reviewed, in that sense he felt certain
that he was initially correct, and that was [defendant’s] cell. [¶] He
didn’t get up here and try to stretch the truth, try to lie. In fact, he was honest.”

“Improper
comments by a prosecutor require reversal of a resulting conviction when those
comments so infect a trial with unfairness that they create a denial of due
process. [Citations.] Conduct by a prosecutor that does not reach
that level nevertheless constitutes misconduct under state law, but only if it
involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the court or
jury. [Citation.] In order to preserve such claims for
appellate review, as a general matter the defendant must object below and
request an admonition, if an admonition would have cured the harm caused by the
misconduct. [Citation.]” (People
v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1031.)

“‘A
prosecutor may make “assurances regarding the apparent honesty or reliability
of” a witness “based on the ‘facts of [the] record and the inferences
reasonably drawn therefrom.’”
[Citation.] But a “prosecutor is
prohibited from vouching for the credibility of witnesses or otherwise
bolstering the veracity of their testimony by referring to evidence outside the
record.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Redd (2010) 48
Cal.4th 691, 740.)

As noted
above, defense counsel failed to object to the allegedly offending remarks;
thus, defendant forfeited the issue on appeal.
Nevertheless, addressing the merits, we hold the People committed no
misconduct. Here, the prosecutor, in
effectively stating Officer Nishida did nothing more than make an honest
mistake, simply restated the facts adduced by the evidence and inferences
reasonably drawn therefrom. Officer
Nishida initially testified the photographs were from defendant’s jail cell. When questioned on cross-examination with
regard to his report, which reflected the photographs were taken from Goldade’s
jail cell, Officer Nishida testified he had been mistaken; the photographs were
not from defendant’s jail cell.

Only after a
recess taken at defense counsel’s insistence, during which Officer Nishida
reviewed the materials he had, did he again testify the photographs were taken
of defendant’s jail cell, because they were contained on a CD marked with
defendant’s name. Thus, the prosecutor’s
passing remarks were based on the record, particularly as they were virtually
identical to the contents of the stipulation read to the jury. The prosecutor did not propose that
everything to which Officer Nishida testified was true, but merely asked the
jury not to disregard the entirely of his testimony on his one admitted
error. Therefore, the People used no
reprehensible or deceptive methods, committed no prosecutorial misconduct, and
certainly no prejudicial misconduct resulting in a deprival of defendant’s href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">right to due process.href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">^[3]

C. CALCRIM NO. 335: ACCOMPLICE INSTRUCTION

Defendant
contends the court committed prejudicial error in failing to sua sponte
instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 335, the accomplice witness
instruction. Although we hold the court
erred in failing to give the instruction, we find any error harmless because
sufficient corroborating evidence was adduced at trial.

“When
a jury receives substantial evidence that a witness who has implicated the
defendant was an accomplice,
a trial court on its own motion must instruct it on the principles
regarding accomplice
testimony. [Citations.]
This includes instructing the jury that an accomplice’s testimony implicating the defendant
must be viewed with caution and corroborated by other evidence. [Citations.]”
(People v. Houston (2012) 54
Cal.4th 1186, 1223.) “An accomplice is
someone subject to prosecution for the charged crimes by reason of aiding and
abetting or being a member of a conspiracy to commit the charged crimes. [Citations.]”
(Id. at 1224.)

“A trial
court’s error in instructing on accomplice liability . . . is harmless if the
record contains ‘sufficient corroborating evidence.’ [Citation.] Corroborating
evidence
may be slight,
entirely circumstantial, and entitled to little consideration when standing
alone. [Citations.]
It need not be sufficient to establish every element of the
charged offense or to establish the precise facts to which the accomplice
testified. [Citations.] It is ‘sufficient if it tends to connect the
defendant with the crime in such a way as to satisfy the jury that the
accomplice is telling the truth.’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 147-148, fn. omitted.)

Here,
Rodriguez was clearly an accomplice because she was arrested and charged with
the same substantive offense as defendant.
Moreover, she later entered a plea agreement with the People whereby she
would receive a one-year jail term and six years’ probation in return for her
testimony. Thus, the trial court was
under a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 335.

Nonetheless,
the People adduced sufficient corroborating evidence at trial to render the
error harmless. Carlota testified she
heard five to six shots outside the home.
Rushing to the window, she saw a large white vehicle parked
outside. She saw a person, dressed all
in black, get into the vehicle. Three of
the residence’s other denizens went to follow the vehicle. Mayra testified she heard several
gunshots. She called 911, informed the
dispatcher the shooter fired four to six times, and that he left in a white SUV
toward Florida Avenue.

Officer
Hollenweger saw a white SUV on Florida Avenue traveling in a direction away
from the house; he stopped it within five minutes of Mayra’s 911 call. Inside the car, he found a white bulletproof
vest and a loaded nine-millimeter handgun.
Officer Riley found six, nine-millimeter shell casings near the gate of
the home. A swab of defendant’s hand
revealed gunpowder residue consistent with having recently shot a gun. Defendant was wearing a belt emblematic of
the 18th Street Gang, had gang tattoos, a gang moniker, and self-classified as
an 18th Street Gang member when admitted to jail. He stated during a subsequent interview that
he “tried to leave the gang.” Defendant
was arrested with two other known 18th Street Gang members. Thus, the corroborating evidence reaffirmed
the description of the vehicle in which defendant fled; the close temporal and
geographic proximity of defendant to the scene of the shooting; the bulletproof
vest; the type of weapon used; defendant’s gang affiliation; and the motivation
for the shooting, i.e., members of a rival gang lived at the residence. Therefore, sufficient corroborating evidence
was adduced such that the court’s failure to instruct the jury with the
accomplice instruction was harmless.

D. IAC REGARDING DEFENSE COUNSEL’S
FAILURE TO REQUEST THE COURT INSTRUCT WITH CALCRIM NO. 1403

Defendant
contends defense counsel below committed constitutional IAC by failing to request
the court instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 1403, the instruction that limits
how the jury may utilize evidence of gang activity.

“‘The
law governing defendant’s claim is settled.
“A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to the assistance of counsel by both the state and federal
Constitutions. [Citations.] ‘Construed in light of its purpose, the right
entitles the defendant not to some bare assistance but rather to effective
assistance.’” [Citations.]
It is defendant’s burden to demonstrate the inadequacy of trial name="SR;27509">counsel. [Citation.]
[The Court has] summarized defendant’s burden as follows: “‘In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show name="SR;27532">counsel’s
performance was “deficient” because his “representation fell below an objective
name="citeas((Cite_as:_51_Cal.4th_830,_*875,_2">standard of reasonableness
. . . under prevailing professional norms.” [Citations.]
Second, he must also show prejudice flowing from counsel’s performance or lack name="sp_4040_876">thereof. [Citation.]
Prejudice is shown when there is a “reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”’” [Citation.]
[¶] Reviewing courts defer to name="SR;27612">counsel’s
reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a
“strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” [Citation.]
Defendant’s burden is difficult to carry on direct appeal, as we have
observed: “‘Reviewing courts will
reverse convictions [on direct appeal] on the ground of inadequate name="SR;27672">counsel only
if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical
purposename="citeas((Cite_as:_51_Cal.4th_830,_*876,_2"> for [his or her] name="SR;27692">act or
omission.’” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
If the record on appeal ‘“‘sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] unless counsel was asked for an explanation
and failed
to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation,’
the claim on appeal must be rejected,”’ and the ‘claim of ineffective assistance in such a case is more
appropriately decided in a habeas corpus
proceeding.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Vines, supra, 51
Cal.4th at pp. 875-876.)

CALCRIM
No. 1403, as presumably would have been given had defense counsel requested it
below, provides:

“You
may consider evidence of gang activity only for the limited purpose of deciding
whether: The defendant acted with the
intent, purpose, and knowledge that are required to prove the gang-related . .
. enhancement[s] . . . charged; or the defendant had a motive to commit the
crime[s] charged. . . . You may not
consider this evidence for any other purpose. You may not conclude from this
evidence that the defendant is a person of bad character or that [he] has a
disposition to commit crime.” On
request, the court must give a limiting instruction when evidence of gang
activity has been admitted. However,
there is no sua sponte duty to do so. (>People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th
1040, 1051-1052.)

Here,
there is no evidence on the record as to why defense counsel failed to request
the instruction; thus, defendant has failed to carry his burden on appeal. As the court in Hernandez itself stated with regard to this particular instruction,
“‘A reasonable attorney may have tactically concluded that the risk of a
limiting instruction . . . outweighed the questionable benefits such
instruction would provide.’
[Citations.]” (>People v. Hernandez, >supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) This is, at least in one view of the
evidence, because it would call even greater attention and focus to the
evidence of defendant’s gang affiliation.
Moreover, automatically assuming that any failure to request the
instruction in any case in which evidence of gang activity is adduced would
effectively require the court to give it sua sponte. Finally, there is simply no way the lack of
the instruction prejudiced defendant.
Here, overwhelming evidence established defendant’s guilt. As noted >ante, defendant was found in the vehicle
described, on the specific street described, with a bulletproof vest, a gun
matching the size shells found at the scene, and gunshot residue on his
hands. Thus, defense counsel below did
not commit constitutionally IAC by failing to request the court instruct the
jury with CALCRIM No. 1403.href="#_ftn4"
name="_ftnref4" title="">^[4]

>DISPOSITION

The
judgment is affirmed.

NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORT



MILLER

J.





We concur:





HOLLENHORST

Acting P. J.





CODRINGTON

J.