In re Jasmine V.
Filed 4/3/13 In re Jasmine V. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re JASMINE V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.
2d Juv. No. B242905
(Super. Ct.
No. J067367)
(Ventura
County)
VENTURA COUNTY PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
L.G.,
Defendant and
Appellant.
L.G. (Mother) appeals an
order terminating her parental rights
to and designating adoption as the permanent plan for her daughter, Jasmine V.
(Jasmine). (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 366.26.)
title="">[1] We affirm.
FACTS
When Jasmine was six
years old, she lived with her parents and three brothers: Antonio age ten,
Ulises, age seven and three-month-old Jose.
Antonio had been
sexually abused in Mexico
when he was six years old. His parents
failed to adequately recognize his subsequent
him and Jasmine. His parents accused
Ulises of lying. The juvenile court
removed Antonio from the home.
Shortly after Antonio
was removed from the home, Mother saw an adult male roommate with Jasmine in
his room. They both had their pants
down. Ulises said that the roommate was
trying to have intercourse with Jasmine.
Prior to the incident, the roommate's adult daughter warned Jasmine's
Mother that the roommate had molested her.
In spite of the warning, the Mother allowed Jasmine and Ulises to watch
television with the roommate in his room unsupervised. The juvenile court removed Jasmine, Ulises
and Jose from the home.
The parents had two
years of reunification services. Mother attempted to comply with her case
plan. In spite of her efforts, neither
parent progressed enough to return the children to their care. The HSA report prepared for the section
366.26 hearing concluded: "Despite
the reasonable efforts provided [by] the Agency to reunify with the child and
her siblings, the parents failed to demonstrate[] benefit from the services offered
and failed to recognize the ramifications of sexual abuse to their children. .
. . With this said, the mother continues
to express that she does not know why the Agency went to the extent of removing
the child and her siblings from her, despite her efforts to get the police
involved."
At the time of the
section 366.26 hearing, Jasmine had been in five foster placements. She suffers from anxiety, depression, sexual
trauma, and her "IQ" is in the lowest two percentile. She has been with her current foster parents
for over a year and they want to adopt her.
The foster parents would continue Jasmine's visits with Ulises.
Jasmine's
relationship with Ulises
Jasmine lived with
Ulises until she was six years old.
Ulises is very protective of his sister.
Jasmine enjoys their visits together and would ask when she was going to
visit Ulises. Jasmine's foster parents
told a social worker that Jasmine was attached to Ulises and were willing to
continue the sibling contact.
DISCUSSION
I.
Mother contends there is
substantial evidence that terminating parental rights would interfere with the
sibling relationship, and that continuing the relationship outweighs the
benefit of adoption.
Adoption where possible
is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature. (In re
Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573.)
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v) provides an exception to the
preference for adoption as the permanent plan where the court finds termination
of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because "[t]here
would be substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship, taking
into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but
not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home,
whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close
and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child's
best interest, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as compared
to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption."
Mother has a "heavy
burden" of proving the sibling exception applies to overcome the
preference for adoption. (
804, 813.)
Historically, courts
have applied the substantial evidence standard of review. (In re
Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 575-576.) Recently,
1308, 1314-1315, applied the substantial evidence standard to the trial court's
determination whether a beneficial relationship exists, and the abuse of
discretion standard to the court's determination whether the relationship is so
important that it compels a plan other than adoption. Here we affirm under either standard.
"In
viewing the evidence, we look only to the evidence supporting the prevailing
party. [Citation.] We discard evidence unfavorable to the
prevailing party as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of
fact. [Citation.] Where the trial court or jury has drawn
reasonable inferences from the evidence, we have no power to draw different
inferences, even though different inferences may also be reasonable. [Citation.]
The trier of fact is not required to believe even uncontradicted
testimony. [Citation.]" (Rodney
F. v. Karen M. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 233, 241.)
Here there is much
evidence that Jasmine and Ulises have a close bond. Undoubtedly, there will be some detriment to
Jasmine if the bond is broken. But it is
not enough simply to show a detriment to Jasmine. The detriment must be such that it overcomes
the benefit of legal permanence through adoption. (See In
re L.Y.L.(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
Mother argues there is
no substantial evidence that the benefits of adoption outweigh the importance
of maintaining the sibling relationship.
The argument misses the point. It
is Mother's burden to show the sibling exception applies. When parental rights are terminated, it is
presumed that adoption is the proper permanent plan. Substantial evidence is not necessary to
support a finding that the sibling relationship exception does not apply.
In any event there is
more than ample evidence to support the conclusion that the benefit of adoption
outweighs any detriment that may be caused by severing the sibling
relationship. Jasmine is a special needs
child. She suffers from anxiety, depression,
and has an IQ in the lowest two percentile.
She has been sexually molested multiple times by two different
people. Even after mother was warned one
of the persons is a child molester, she failed to protect Jasmine. After two years of services, Jasmine's
parents still fail to recognize the ramifications of sexual abuse to their
children. Mother continues to express
that she does not know why HSA removed Jasmine from her care.
II.
Mother contends the
trial court erred in finding that the parental relationship exception does not
apply.
The Legislature has
provided an exception to adoption as the permanent plan where the court finds
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because
"[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the
child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In order to qualify for the exception, a
parent must show that the beneficial relationship with the child "promotes
the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the
child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." (In re
Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th
at p. 575.)
Here the evidence shows
that Mother has maintained regular contact with Jasmine. But the evidence also shows that the trial
court did not err in concluding that maintaining the parental relationship with
Mother does not outweigh the benefits of adoption. For reasons previously stated, it is clear
that Jasmine is in need of a stable home where she can be protected from being
sexually molested. Mother is unable to
provide that.
The judgment is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT,
P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J.
PERREN, J.
Ellen
Gay Conroy, Judge
Superior
Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Amy Z. Tobin, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Leroy Smith, Ventura
County Counsel, Linda Stevenson, Assistant County Counsel for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1]
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
