CA Unpub Decisions

Cassius Kim Collins appeals from a judgment involuntarily committing him for an indeterminate term to the custody of the California Department of Mental Health after a jury found him to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predators Act (the Act). (Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] § 6600 et seq.)
Collins raises two issues. First, he argues his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to certain terms used by the prosecutor and inadmissible hearsay evidence relied on by the prosecution's expert witnesses. Second, Collins attacks the Act on state and federal constitutional grounds, including under the equal protection clause. We reverse the judgment solely as to Collins's equal protection claim and remand the case to the superior court for reconsideration of Collins's equal protection argument in light of People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 (McKee). We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Appellant Anthony Mouradian appeals from a 2010 order renewing a 2006 domestic violence restraining order, that prevents him from contacting his former wife, respondent Judy Kononchuk and their son, J. (Fam. Code,[1] § 6345.) Mouradian also contends the family court abused its discretion in denying his motion to resume contact with his son and implement a parenting plan.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm the judgment.

Appellant, the mother of the minor, appeals from the juvenile court's order at the jurisdictional hearing denying placement with the minor's cousin. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395; further statutory references are to this code.) She contends the court applied an incorrect standard when ruling on the placement and that, under the correct standard, the evidence was insufficient to support the court's order. We shall affirm.

Defendant and appellant Keith Brown appeals from the order denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis following his 1987 conviction by plea of second degree murder. This court appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal from the order. On March 21, 2012, appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issues, asking this court to independently review the record for arguable appellate contentions under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.

Appellant Montel H. appeals from an order of wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) entered after the juvenile court found he had committed robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and personally used a firearm to commit the offense (id., § 12022.53, subd. (b)).[1] The court directed appellant into a short-term camp community placement program and calculated the maximum term of confinement as 15 years. Appellant now contends the evidence is insufficient to support the finding. We affirm.

R.C. (father) appeals from the judgment of August 18, 2011, declaring his daughter, L.C., a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 360, subdivision (d) and ordering daughter removed from his custody. Father contends substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional finding and removal order. We affirm.[2]

C. was born in 2001 to mother and A.H.[2] B. was born in 2009, and A. was born in 2011, to mother and Angel, who did not live together. C. exhibited emotional and behavioral problems. Mother disciplined C. by whipping her â€

Appellant Gar A. Richman appeals from the judgment of dismissal entered upon the trial court's order sustaining the respondent California School Employees Association's (CSEA) demurrer without leave to amend to appellant's complaint. Before this court, appellant asserts that the lower court erred in dismissing his claims based on the view that the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) had exclusive jurisdiction over appellant's claims against CSEA. Appellant's causes of action all center on the claim that CSEA failed to perform in its duty to represent him in various respects including that CSEA failed to file a grievance of his layoff from the Arcadia Unified School District (the â€

A jury convicted defendant, Ruben Avila, of two counts of lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (counts 9 and 10). (Pen. Code,[1] § 288, subd. (a).) Following a mistrial on several counts, defendant pleaded no contest to two additional counts of lewd act upon a second child victim under the age of 14 (counts 1 and 3). Defendant was sentenced to 14 years in state prison. We affirm the judgment. We direct the clerk of the superior court to correct the abstract of judgment.

Ava T. (mother) and Barry H. (father) appeal from a juvenile court order asserting dependency jurisdiction over their daughter, Amanda H. Mother and father contend there was insufficient evidence to support the court's jurisdictional findings. We reverse the trial court order.

Plaintiffs and appellants Mary and Donald Gaskin filed an action for attorney malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty against defendant and respondent Debra Wegman. The trial court granted summary judgment for Wegman on September 17, 2010, and judgment was entered on October 13, 2010.[1] Wegman moved, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420,[2] for an award of costs and attorney fees incurred in proving issues denied by the Gaskins in response to requests for admission (RFA). The court granted Wegman's motion and ordered the Gaskins to pay costs of $9,841 and attorney fees of $121,000. The Gaskins appeal from the order, challenging the award of attorney fees.
We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Wegman was entitled to an award of attorney fees under section 2033.420. However, the court erred in awarding reasonable fees rather than limiting the award to the amount of fees incurred by Wegman. We therefore remand the cause to the trial court for a hearing to determine the amount of attorney fees Wegman incurred in proving the matters denied in the RFA's.

Appellant Jennifer Morgan appeals from a portion of a protective order in favor of respondent Sara Van Horn in this elder abuse action. Morgan contends the portion of the order that restrains her from interfering with Van Horn's mail was an abuse of discretion because: 1) the trial court adjudicated the contractual rights of a third party; 2) there was no substantial evidence that Van Horn experienced mental suffering as a result of Morgan's interference with her mail; and 3) the trial court was not authorized to order Morgan to take affirmative action. We find that Morgan does not have standing to appeal the rights of a third party, there was substantial evidence of mental suffering to support the protective order, and the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering Morgan to stop interfering with the delivery of Van Horn's mail. Therefore, we affirm.

A jury convicted defendant, Jose Enrique Rodriguez, of first degree murder by lying in wait. (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(15).) He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole plus a consecutive one year for personal use of a knife. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) On appeal, defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support the lying–in-wait special circumstance finding. We disagree. We modify the judgment to impose a $40 court security fee (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) and affirm the judgment as modified.