CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Rimon Hanna appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted the defendant police officers' motion for summary judgment. Hanna contends the trial court erred in concluding that he lacked standing to assert claims for breach of contract, fraud and civil conspiracy.
Defendants argue that Hanna lacked standing because (1) the oral contract alleged by Hanna was made with his corporation and not Hanna personally, (2) the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations were made to the corporation and not Hanna personally, and (3) the damages alleged in Hanna's pleading were suffered by the corporation, not Hanna.
The first step in our independent review of the motion for summary judgment is to identify the issues framed by the complaint and answer because those are the issues to which a defendant's motion must respond, not the issues the defendant wished these pleadings had raised. In this case, the defendants misinterpreted Hanna's operative complaint, which caused their separate statement of undisputed facts to be insufficient to justify a judgment in their favor. The facts in defendants' separate statements failed to establish that the corporation was the contracting party or that the alleged fraud was directed at the corporation and not Hanna. Thus, the separate statement failed to make a prima facie showing that Hanna lacked standing to assert his claims for breach of contract, fraud and civil conspiracy or that he suffered no damages from defendants' allegedly wrongful conduct.
Therefore, the judgment is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Samuel Bruno Mandock of simple kidnapping (count 1--Pen. Code § 207, subd. (a))[1] and false imprisonment (§ 236). The trial court granted defendant 36 months of probation with a requirement that he serve 365 days in jail; that he pay the costs of preparation of the probation report in an amount to be determined by the probation department, but not to exceed $1,095; that he pay probation supervision costs in an amount to be determined by the probation department, in an amount between $591.12 and $3,744; that he pay booking fees in the amount of $414.45; a conviction fee of $30 for each of his two convictions; and that he pay a security fee of $40 for each of his two convictions.
Defendant appeals contending the court erred in admitting the recording of his in-custodial statements in violation of Miranda;[2] in failing to issue a sua sponte jury instruction on the principles of aiding and abetting with respect to the charge of kidnapping; in permitting his separate conviction for false imprisonment because it is a necessarily lesser included offense of kidnapping; and in imposing the above enumerated fines and fees without making a determination of defendant's ability to pay, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the amounts, and in making some of them conditions of his probation. We direct the trial court to strike defendant's conviction on count 2 for false imprisonment. We likewise strike imposition of the booking fee and the conviction and security fees imposed as to defendant's count 2 conviction. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal by the Attorney General of the State of California from the trial court's order granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Harold Harvey Hawks (hereafter petitioner) challenging the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) decision to deny parole to petitioner. The trial court found no evidence supported the BPH's denial of parole to petitioner. Therefore, the trial court issued the writ and ordered the BPH to conduct a new parole hearing in accordance with the dictates of due process. We agree with the trial court and therefore will affirm.

G.B., a prison inmate, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court challenging the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's (CDCR) decision to remove his single cell housing status and instead place him in a double cell with another inmate. The superior court granted the petition, concluding that the CDCR's decision to alter G.B.'s housing classification "was arbitrary and capricious, and unsupported by some competent, credible evidence."
The prison warden appeals, contending: (1) G.B.'s dissatisfaction with his housing classification is not cognizable on habeas corpus, and (2) even if housing classification decisions are reviewable by habeas corpus, the court erred in finding the decision was arbitrary and capricious. We conclude the housing classification decision is reviewable through habeas corpus proceedings and reverse the trial court's order because some evidence in the record supports the CDCR's decision.

Dondrea Marie Garcia appears in propria persona to challenge orders pertaining to custody and visitation with her two minor children. Dondrea argues the trial court erred by: (1) modifying visitation without a showing of changed circumstances; (2) relying on a Family Court Services (FCS) report that was inaccurate; (3) relying on testimony and a report from a FCS mediator that did not have recent involvement in the case; (4) denying her request for a custody evaluation; (5) granting legal custody of the children to their father, Vincent Paul Garcia, because that issue was not before the court and was not mediated; (6) denying her motion for a new trial; and (7) denying her peremptory challenge to disqualify the judge.
We find Dondrea's arguments unavailing and affirm the orders.

Ponani Sukumar appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendants Med-Fit Systems, Inc. (Med-Fit), and Nautilus Group, Inc. (Nautilus, together defendants), following a jury trial. He claims that the judgment in Med-Fit's favor must be reversed because no evidence supported the jury's ultimate conclusion that Med-Fit was not liable for breach of contract. He also contends that the judgment in favor of Nautilus on his claim against it for inducing Med-Fit to breach its contract with him should be reversed because the evidence established that Nautilus intentionally prevented Med-Fit from performing its contract with him. Finally, Sukumar claims the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to compel discovery; (2) granting Nautilus's nonsuit motion to dismiss the punitive damage component of his claims; and (3) denying his motion to tax costs.
We affirm the judgment in favor of Med-Fit and Nautilus and reject Sukumar's argument that the trial court erred in awarding costs. As we discuss below, Sukumar's remaining claims are moot.

R.B. (mother) appeals after the juvenile court ordered adoption as the permanent plan for four-year-old C.A. (the child) and terminated mother's parental rights.[1]
Mother contends (1) the juvenile court did not comply with certain statutory requirements for tribal customary adoption; (2) the juvenile court should not have terminated parental rights because the Choctaw tribe identified guardianship as the child's permanent plan; and (3) the selection of adoption as the permanent plan is not supported by substantial evidence.
We conclude (1) mother forfeited her contentions regarding tribal customary adoption requirements because she did not assert them in the juvenile court, and, in any event, any error was harmless; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating parental rights; and (3) substantial evidence supports the selection of adoption as the permanent plan.
We will affirm the juvenile court order.

On appeal, he contends the minute order and order of probation should be corrected to (1) omit all fines and fees that are dependent upon a discretionary determination that he has the ability to pay (the booking and classification fees), (2) accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment (which did not include the imposition of a monthly probation supervision fee, urinalysis fee or presentence report fee) and the court's award of custody and conduct credits, and (3) clarify that the court facilities fee is not a condition of probation. We agree and shall direct the trial court to modify its written order accordingly.

Appellant In Hee Lee appeals from the judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of the demurrer of respondents Judith L. Wood and Jesse Moorman without leave to amend. Because we find that appellant's legal malpractice action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, subdivision (a),[1] we affirm the judgment.

Appellant and plaintiff Lettie Haynes appeals an order of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained the demurrer of defendant and respondent John Chiang, California State Controller (defendant or Controller), to plaintiff's complaint. We affirm.
Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to certain oil royalties and that the royalties were paid by third-party oil companies to defendant pursuant to the Unclaimed Property Law (UPL), Code of Civil Procedure section 1500 et seq.[1] She further alleges that defendant mishandled the royalties by failing to pay her the amounts due under the UPL and by wrongfully paying the royalties to her brother. Unfortunately, plaintiff did not comply with the requisite pre-lawsuit claim requirements of the UPL, and thus cannot maintain her current action against defendant.

Appellant Angel Juarez was charged in a four count information with attempted murder (Pen. Code § 664/187, subd. (a)); corporal injury to a spouse, cohabitant or fellow parent (§ 273.5, subd. (a)); felony child endangerment or abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a)); and disobeying a restraining order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4)).[1] He was found guilty of the latter three offenses and sentenced to terms of one year and four months on the second count, six years on the third count and one year on the fourth count, all to run consecutively. On appeal, he contends that substantial evidence did not support the jury's verdict on the child endangerment charge and that the trial court erred in refusing to stay the sentence on that count. We affirm.

Lloyd Wade appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction by jury of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a))[1] as a lesser included offense of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). The jury found to be true the personal use of a firearm allegation within the meaning of section 12022.5. The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate state prison term of 10 years. Appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred and violated his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process by excluding relevant evidence of the victim's violent criminal history, character for violence when using narcotics and possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia in her car, (2) the trial court erred and violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial by admitting evidence of two dissimilar uncharged incidents, and (3) his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and a fair trial were violated by the cumulative effect of the evidentiary errors.
We affirm.

Appellant Irene L. Madrid contends that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on the retaliation claim she brought against her employer, respondent the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). The trial court found appellant had failed to demonstrate an adverse employment action. We agree, and further conclude her claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant Michael Dean Stephens was charged by information with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 2), in addition to special allegations that defendant used dangerous and deadly weapons (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1); counts 1 & 2), and inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a); count 2). The jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder, and the corresponding special allegations were found true. The jury deadlocked on count 2, and the court declared a mistrial. Defendant then pleaded no contest to attempted murder and admitted the dangerous and deadly weapon allegations on count 2. The great bodily injury and premeditation allegations for this count were dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to 23 years to life, consisting of 15 years to life plus an additional consecutive year for each deadly weapon special allegation on count 1, and five years plus an additional year for the special allegation on count 2.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury that it could consider threats by the victims and their group of friends against defendant in the CALCRIM Nos. 505 and 604 self-defense instructions; (2) the standard CALCRIM No. 505 instruction improperly states the law on self-defense; and (3) the trial court improperly imposed two deadly weapon enhancements on count 1. We disagree with all but defendant's third contention and therefore affirm the judgment with modifications.