CA Unpub Decisions

Irving Ruben Urbina appeals from a judgment imposed upon his guilty plea to home invasion robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)) and possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)). His counsel raises no issues and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant filed a supplemental brief and contends that his counsel was ineffective in representing him during sentencing and that the court committed sentencing errors. We affirm.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of F.J. (Mother) and James B. (Father) with respect to their daughter, T. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)[1] Father appeals, arguing that: (1) the juvenile court improperly precluded him from presenting evidence regarding a relative placement; (2) substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's determination that the sibling bond exception is inapplicable; (3) the juvenile court failed to consider T.'s wishes; and (4) the juvenile court erred by terminating his rights without proper notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We find that only the last contention has merit, and remand the matter to the juvenile court for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with the notice and inquiry provisions of ICWA. We otherwise affirm.

In this action challenging a non-judicial foreclosure sale of certain real property, plaintiff Orit Younessian appeals from a judgment in favor of respondents John F. Lundy and Nancy A.M. Lundy, Trustees of the 2001 Lundy Family Trust dated May 3, 2001, and Standard Trust Deed Service Company, after the court granted their motion for summary judgment. Appellant contends she is entitled to reversal and a new trial on the sole ground that respondents' motion for summary judgment was untimely served in violation of Code of Civil Procedure, section 437c, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 437c(a))[1]. We disagree, and accordingly, affirm the judgment.[2]

The plaintiffs in these consolidated actions appeal from judgments on the pleadings in favor of defendant Hennessy Industries, Inc. (Hennessy), the manufacturer of a brake arcing machine. Each of the plaintiffs alleged Hennessy's machine was designed and used exclusively for the purpose of shaping, by grinding action, brake linings that were manufactured by others, but contained asbestos fibers that were dangerously released into the air by the normal action of Hennessy's machine. The trial court ruled that, because Hennessey's machine itself was not made with asbestos and Hennessy did not itself manufacture or distribute any product made with asbestos, plaintiffs had not, and could not, plead a viable cause of action against Hennessy for negligence or strict products liability.

Appellant Paul Curtis Dixon appeals from an order committing him for an indeterminate term to the custody of the Department of Mental Health (DMH) after a jury found him to be a â€

Dameion Brown was convicted in January 1993 after jury trial of torturing his daughter D. (Pen. Code, § 206),[1] and endangering the health of his daughter Y. and his son Da. (§ 273a, subd. (a)(1)). He was sentenced in February 1993 to prison for life with the possibility of parole. Following a subsequent parole hearing on October 14, 2010, the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) found Brown not suitable for parole. On July 25, 2011, the superior court granted Brown's petition for writ of habeas corpus and directed the Board to conduct a new parole hearing within 95 days. The warden where Brown is incarcerated (the Warden) filed an appeal and a petition for writ of supersedeas requesting a stay of the superior court's order. On October 7, 2011, we granted the Warden's petition for writ of supersedeas. For the reasons stated below, we will reverse the superior court's July 25, 2011 order and remand the matter to the superior court with directions to deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

A modification decision.

In Stephens v. Gaustad (March 13, 2012, G045073) (nonpub. opn.) (Stephens I) this court affirmed a trial court order requiring trustee Mary Gaustad (Mary) to pay reasonable attorney fees to two beneficiaries of a trust (her siblings, Michael and William) established by their now deceased mother, Barbara Stephens. We affirmed the order under Probate Code section 17211, subdivision (b). (All further undesignated statutory references will be to that code.) We said the trial court could reasonably find, on the evidence presented, that Mary had opposed Michael and William's accounting contest â€

In this wrongful foreclosure case, Daniel Marshall sued Countrywide Bank, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., and CTC Real Estate Services (collectively referred to as Defendants unless individual names are required for clarity). The case was dismissed after the court sustained the Defendants' demurrer to the second amended complaint (SAC) without leave to amend. On appeal, Marshall asserts the court abused its discretion. We affirm the judgment.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), appellant James Kenney pleaded guilty to drug charges and was placed on formal probation. He contends the charges stemmed from an unlawful search and seizure, but we disagree and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Moises Arnaldo Flores of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); all further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted) and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The jury found the murder was committed in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and a principal in the murder discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)).
Flores contends his trial lawyer acted ineffectively by failing to seek suppression of his confession. He complains counsel made no effort to probe for â€

A jury convicted defendant Moises Arnaldo Flores of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); all further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted) and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The jury found the murder was committed in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and a principal in the murder discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)).
Flores contends his trial lawyer acted ineffectively by failing to seek suppression of his confession. He complains counsel made no effort to probe for â€

On April 4, 2011, an information was filed against appellant, Jamal Maurice Carter, alleging that he committed the following offenses: assault likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1), counts one & seven)[1] with an enhancement in count one for causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d), count two), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a), count three) with gun use enhancements (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1) & 12022.53, subd. (b)), false imprisonment by use of force (§ 236, count four), making criminal threats (§ 422, counts five & six) with a gun use enhancement on count six (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), first degree burglary (§ 459, count eight), and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2), count nine).

This appeal challenges the adequacy of respondents' compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)[1] with respect to 6 two-year interim renewal contracts concerning Central Valley Project (CVP) water that expired on February 29, 2012. As we will explain, the appeal is moot and the appropriate disposition is to reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the superior court with directions to dismiss the action as moot.[