CA Unpub Decisions

A modification decision.

Plaintiff Camden Technologies, Inc. (Camden) appeals the judgment entered following defendant Oracle USA, Inc.'s successful demurrer to its complaint. Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendant Alan Merida appeals from the judgment entered following revocation of his probation. The appeal raises only sentencing issues. Primarily, defendant contends that he is entitled to an additional 60 days in presentence good time/work time custody credits. He relies upon an amendment to section 2933[1] that took effect two years after his actual custody but that was in effect when he was sentenced. We are not persuaded by defendant's arguments. Secondarily, the parties concede that some of the fee orders imposed as part of defendant's sentence need to be modified. We modify the judgment to reflect those concessions but in all other respects, affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

A modification decision.

This appeal follows appellant Andrew Joseph Acosta's plea of no contest to attempted murder and his admission of a gang enhancement. He argues that the trial court should have dismissed two counts of conspiracy to commit murder pursuant to his plea agreement. Appellant also argues that he is entitled to three additional days of custody credits. We agree with appellant's arguments, modify the judgment, and affirm the judgment as modified.

A modification decision.

Steven O. Sparks sued his lawyer (Robert Woods) and law firm (Isaacman, Kaufman & Painter, P.C.) in November 2005 for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, defamation, and several other causes of action. Plaintiff was required to arbitrate the malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract claims. The arbitration was resolved in defendants' favor and the parties returned to court. In the end, the parties went to trial before a jury on several of plaintiff's claims, including interference with prospective economic advantage and defamation, and on defendants' cross-complaint for unpaid attorney fees. At the close of plaintiff's evidence, the trial court granted defendants' motion for nonsuit, and the jury then awarded defendants $11,179.32 on their quantum meruit claim for attorney fees.
Plaintiff appeals, arguing the trial court's nonsuit ruling was erroneous. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Cecilio Gonzalez (defendant) pleaded no contest to five counts involving the transportation, possession, and sale of methamphetamine, and the trial court imposed a four-year prison term. On appeal, defendant asserts various claims, primarily about fees imposed by the court. We reverse and remand with directions that the court reconsider the amount of the criminal laboratory analysis fees, stay imposition of the fee on one count, and make a finding regarding defendant's ability to pay the booking fee.

Defendant Lavell Jordan pleaded no contest to one count of voluntary manslaughter and admitted the allegations that he personally used a firearm and that the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Defendant was sentenced to a 20-year prison term.
Defendant claims that the court erred in imposing a criminal justice administration (booking) fee of $129.75 as part of the sentence because the court did not make a determination of defendant's ability to pay the fee. He contends that because under the general statutory scheme, comparable booking fees may only be imposed if the court makes a determination that the defendant has the ability to pay them, imposing the booking fee here without such a determination violated his equal protection rights under the federal and state Constitutions. Defendant also claims that the clerk's minutes and abstract of judgment do not conform with the court's oral pronouncement of sentence with respect to the amounts fixed for the restitution fine and parole revocation restitution fine.
We conclude that defendant forfeited the constitutional challenge concerning the imposition of the booking fee, but that he has correctly noted an inconsistency between the oral pronouncement of sentence, on the one hand, and the clerk's minutes and abstract of judgment, on the other hand. Accordingly, we will order the minutes and abstract of judgment modified and will affirm the judgment as modified.

Defendant Joe Ramos Vasquez, who is required to register as a sex offender because of a prior conviction, was convicted by plea of failing to notify police of his new address in violation of Penal Code section 290.013, subdivision (a), with an admitted strike prior and two prison priors.[1] (§§ 667.5, subd. (b)-(i) & 1170.12.) After the court denied his Romero[2] motion, he was sentenced to 32 months in prison. Because he was arrested by police from the City of San Jose, the court, at sentencing and without objection, imposed a booking fee of $129.75 under Government Code section 29550.1. This section, unlike Government Code sections 29550 and 29550.2, does not contain a provision concerning a defendant's ability to pay. The court also, without objection, awarded a total of 615 days of pre-sentence credit, of which 204 days were conduct credit calculated under former code section 4019, subdivision (f).[3]
On appeal, Vasquez challenges the booking fee under principles of equal protection, contending that an ability-to-pay provision should be read into Government Code section 29550.1 and that the record contains insufficient evidence of his ability to pay. He alternatively claims ineffective assistance of counsel for his attorney's failure to have objected to the booking fee below. Through supplemental briefing, he also contends on equal protection grounds that he is entitled to additional conduct credit based on legislative changes to section 4019, expressly operative to crimes committed on or after October 1, 2011. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Javier Antonio Castro pleaded guilty in 1997 to one count of transporting, selling, or offering to sell marijuana. He was granted probation on the condition that he serve six months in county jail. Thirteen years later, federal proceedings were initiated to remove him from this country based upon his having been previously convicted of violating a law related to a controlled substance. In March 2011, defendant brought a motion to vacate the 1997 conviction, claiming that prior to pleading guilty to the drug offense, he had not been advised concerning the immigration consequences of that plea. The court denied the motion.
Defendant claims that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to vacate the conviction. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion and will therefore affirm the order entered on the denial of the motion to vacate.

Plaintiff Raymond A. Hopper (plaintiff) appeals from an order granting in part his motion for an award of attorney's fees and costs from defendant Sears, Roebuck and Co. (defendant). Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to an award of all his reasonably incurred attorney's fees and costs, and that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding only $6,245.54 of his requested $35,287.46. As we find no abuse of discretion, we will affirm the trial court's order.

Defendant Franciso Javier Rivas was charged with seven counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger than defendant. The sex crimes involved defendant's preteen niece. Defendant was convicted after a bench trial of six of the charges. He was sentenced to a total prison term of 90 years to life, based upon six consecutive terms of 15 years-to-life.
Defendant claims that the court erred by imposing consecutive sentences on the six convictions. That sentencing (defendant argues) was based upon the erroneous view that the court was required under Penal Code section 667.6[1] to impose consecutive sentences. We conclude that there was no error. We will therefore affirm the judgment.