CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant, Alfredo Salomon, was convicted of: five counts of criminal threats (Pen. Code,[1] § 422); five counts of resisting an executive officer (§ 69); methamphetamine possession (Health & Saf., § 11377, subd. (a)); and firearm possession by a felon. (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court found defendant had: sustained two prior convictions within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (b) through (i) and 1170.12; sustained one prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1); and had served a prior separate prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Defendant was sentenced to 2 life terms, 30 years to life consecutive to 25 years to life. We affirm the judgment and remand with directions.

V.S. (mother) seeks writ relief (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (l);[1] Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the order terminating her reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing to consider selection and implementation of a permanent plan for her son D.S. (born 2009). We deny the petition.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant Ruben Valenzuela, Jr., pleaded guilty to sexual penetration of a child who is 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)), which carries a prison term of 15 years to life.[1] In exchange, the remaining three counts were dismissed: two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child (§ 269, subds. (a)(5)) and (a)(1)) (counts two and three) and a count of a forcible lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)) (count four). Defendant unsuccessfully moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction and obtained a certificate of probable cause. (§ 1237.5.)
On appeal, defendant contends that it was an abuse of discretion to deny his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because, at the time he pleaded, he was unaware that he had valid grounds to challenge a search warrant and that he would not have entered the plea if he had been aware of those grounds. The search warrant, which issued in December 2009, had authorized the search of defendant's residence for "[p]hotos,videos and images depicting child erotica or child pornography" and "[d]airies, journals, letters and notes referencing sexual fantasies, sexual inclinations and sex with minors" among other items. In support of the motion to withdraw his plea, defendant had argued the search warrant was based upon "stale" information because the affidavit indicated that the last time the victim had seen anything inappropriate at his residence was "during the latter part of December 2008."
Defendant's waiver of the right to appeal precludes our review of his appellate contention.

Defendants and Cross-complainants FAMU Corporation and So Young Nam appeal from a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and Cross-defendant Southern Counties Oil Co. According to defendants' opening brief, the judgment was based upon plaintiff allegedly having delivered fuel to a gasoline station operated by FAMU; Nam allegedly guaranteed the debt. Unfortunately for defendants the scanty record they designated does not even substantiate this contention. Defendants complain about the denial of a motion to continue the trial and reopen discovery. Although they did not furnish us with copies of any motion to continue or evidence filed in support of such a motion, they did provide a reporter's transcript of a hearing where a motion to continue the trial was discussed. We will therefore address this contention but conclude there is no showing the trial court abused its discretion and thus affirm the judgment.
Defendants raise four additional grounds for reversal of the judgment. None of these contentions are supported by the limited records supplied to us. We therefore cannot consider these issues.

Defendant Kristi Michelle McGowan used the navigation system in a car she had rented from defendant The Hertz Corporation, as she drove to a business meeting. She failed to stop at a red light and her car collided with a car driven by plaintiff Trent J. Ford. He sued McGowan, her employer, defendant Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated (Morgan Stanley), The Hertz Corporation, and defendant Hertz Claims Management Corporation for damages he alleged he suffered as a result of the accident. (We refer to The Hertz Corporation and Hertz Claims Management Corporation collectively as the Hertz defendants.)
Plaintiff's first amended complaint asserted, inter alia, the Hertz defendants were negligent and strictly liable to plaintiff for his damages because the navigation system McGowan used did not automatically become disabled upon the motion of the rental car and the Hertz defendants failed to warn McGowan that her use of the navigation system, while driving, might result in her causing a traffic accident. The trial court sustained the Hertz defendants' demurrer to those claims without leave to amend.

Robert R. (father) appeals from the juvenile court's order continuing dependency jurisdiction over his three sons. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 364; all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise noted.) Father contends the juvenile court erred in continuing jurisdiction because he resolved the domestic violence issue that prompted the initial assumption of jurisdiction. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that jurisdictional conditions still existed, and were likely to exist if the court terminated jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm the court's order.

Robert R. (father) appeals from the juvenile court's order continuing dependency jurisdiction over his three sons. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 364; all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise noted.) Father contends the juvenile court erred in continuing jurisdiction because he resolved the domestic violence issue that prompted the initial assumption of jurisdiction. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that jurisdictional conditions still existed, and were likely to exist if the court terminated jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm the court's order.

Appellant/defendant Gustavo Armenta was arrested and charged with three counts of infliction of corporal injury on his wife, T.A. Defendant's neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. E., were witnesses to the charged offenses and to prior incidents of domestic violence, and were subpoenaed to appear as witnesses at defendant's scheduled trial. While his case was pending, defendant allegedly threatened to harm Mr. and Mrs. E. if they testified against him. Defendant subsequently entered into a negotiated disposition, and he was placed on probation. As a condition of probation, the court issued an order prohibiting defendant from having any contact with T.A., Mr. E., and/or Mrs. E.
As we will explain post, Mr. and Mrs. E. reported that defendant continued to threaten them, and the People sought to revoke defendant's probation. However, the court had mistakenly terminated the protective order as to Mr. and Mrs. E. The court decided to reinstate defendant on probation, but again issued a protective order as to Mr. and Mrs. E. as a condition of defendant's probation.
On appeal, defendant contends the superior court lacked jurisdiction to issue the protective order as to Mr. and Mrs. E. because they were not victims of domestic violence, and such an order was not appropriate as a condition of his probation. We will affirm.

Defendant Anthony Lamont English stands convicted, following a jury trial, of selling or furnishing marijuana for the benefit of or in association with a criminal street gang (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a); Pen. Code,[1] § 186.22, subd. (b)(1); count 1), possessing marijuana for sale for the benefit of or in association with a criminal street gang (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359; § 186.22, subd. (b)(1); count 2), and actively participating in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 3). He was sentenced to a total unstayed term of five years in prison and ordered to pay various fees and fines.[2] For the reasons that follow, we reject his claims of error and affirm.

On the night of December 1, 2009, Gerald McCarter (Gerald)[1] arrived at a residence he owned on West Belmont in Fresno County and found the front door was broken open. He produced his nine-millimeter handgun, entered the residence, and found appellant/defendant Archie Dews (Archie) and his brother, codefendant Clarence Dews (Clarence), inside the house. Gerald fired a warning shot and held them at gunpoint until sheriff's deputies arrived, and defendants were arrested for burglary. When they were searched, they were in possession of personal property which had been taken from Gerald's house.

On the night of December 1, 2009, Gerald McCarter (Gerald)[1] arrived at a residence he owned on West Belmont in Fresno County and found the front door was broken open. He produced his nine-millimeter handgun, entered the residence, and found appellant/defendant Clarence Dews (Clarence), and his brother, codefendant Archie Dews (Archie) inside the house. Gerald fired a warning shot and held them at gunpoint until sheriff's deputies arrived, and defendants were arrested for burglary. When they were searched, they were found in possession of personal property which had been taken from Gerald's house.

On July 5, 2009, Luis Arvizo (defendant) fatally stabbed Feliciano Martinez. A jury convicted him of second degree murder involving the use of a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and he was sentenced to 15 years to life plus one year in prison. He now appeals, claiming the trial court erred by failing to rule on his objections to the probation officer's report (RPO). We affirm.

In 2008, in Merced County Superior Court case No. MF49092 (case No. MF49092) appellant, Daniel Phillip Compian, pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a) (section 11377(a)). The court placed appellant on three years' Proposition 36 drug‑treatment probation, i.e., probation under the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000 (Pen. Code, § 1210 et seq.), with various terms and conditions, including that appellant pay a restitution fine of $200.

A jury convicted appellant, Crystal Lee Parker, of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)), a lesser included offense of the first degree murder offense charged in count 1, and found true a personal use of a deadly weapon enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
On August 13, 2010, the court sentenced Parker to an 11-year term, the upper term of 11 years on her manslaughter conviction and a stayed one-year term on the arming enhancement.
On appeal, Parker contends the court committed Batson/Wheeler[1] error. We will affirm.