CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant, Luis A. Valenzuela, appeals after he pled no contest in February 2001 to one count of sexual battery by restraint (Pen. Code,[1] § 243.4, subd. (c)). A charge that defendant had committed a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years old (§ 288, subd. (a)) was dismissed as part of the plea negotiation. Defendant was sentenced to three years in state prison.

T.W., the presumed father (Father) of dependent child O.W., appealed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court. He contends that one of the jurisdictional findings was erroneously sustained based solely on uncorroborated hearsay evidence. We conclude the contention lacks merit and we affirm.

Defendant and appellant Ronnie Macon (defendant) was convicted of three counts of committing a forcible lewd act upon a child under 14 years old (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)[1]) and three counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under 14 years old (§ 288, subd. (a)). On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant’s acts of prior sexual abuse, and Evidence Code section 1108 violates the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the United States Constitution. We affirm the judgment.

Minor M.H. appeals from a juvenile court disposition order that placed her in camp for a maximum of three years two months and gave her 18 days of predisposition credit. The parties agree that the juvenile court aggregated the maximum period of confinement on minor’s two sustained Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petitions, but failed to aggregate her predisposition credit. We modify the order to give minor predisposition credit on both petitions.

Defendant Mark Cons appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of 11 counts of second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.)[1] He argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to present evidence of third-party culpability and that the three counts based on a robbery of a Taco Bell restaurant were not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm the judgment, modifying some of the fees and fines.

Robert Kaufman, Stacey Nicholas, and John Barnett (collectively defendants) appeal from an order denying their special motion to strike the underlying complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP; Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).[1] We conclude that defendants did not meet their burden of showing that the conduct forming the basis of the underlying complaint involved petitioning activity within the meaning of section 425.16, and affirm the trial court’s order.

Defendant Gary Albert Thompson was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459. He was sentenced to six years in state prison. Execution of sentence was suspended. Defendant was placed on five years’ probation on the condition, among others, that he serve 345 days in the county jail. We modify the judgment and affirm as modified.

Defendant and appellant Carlos L. Gallardo appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his convictions for second degree murder, attempted murder, shooting from a motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Gallardo was sentenced to a prison term of 72 years to life, plus 20 years.
Gallardo contends: (1) the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury on self-defense; and (2) his concurrent sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm should have been stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.[1] Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tyler Jenkins appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury on one count of voluntary manslaughter and one count of negligent shooting at a motor vehicle. (Pen. Code, §§ 192, subd. (a), 246.3.)[1] We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Jose Abel Gomez appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to four counts of committing a lewd act upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subds. (a), (c)(1)). Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, Gomez was sentenced to five years in prison. He contends the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by denying his requests to represent himself. We affirm.

Edson Camacho (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered in favor of respondents Lorraine and Ronald Colvin as trustees of the Colvin Family Trust, following an order granting respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend. Appellant contends that a valid cause of action was stated in his verified first amended complaint (FAC), and the trial court erred in granting the motion. We agree with respondents that critical allegations in the FAC contradict factual allegations contained in the original verified complaint, and appellant’s attempt to “plead around” those allegations fails. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted appellant Scott Ryan Modest of seven felonies, including forcible sexual penetration (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (a)(1)(A))[1] and forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2). The jury also found true the allegation that appellant had sexually assaulted more than one victim (§ 667.61). The court sentenced appellant to 15 years to life on each count for a total state prison term of 105 years to life.
On appeal, appellant contends the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal Constitutions. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant Huy Quoc Le was convicted by a jury of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187)[1] which also found that Le had personally used a firearm in the commission of that offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Le was sentenced to 40 years to life.
On appeal, Le contends: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a pinpoint instruction detailing how evidence of his mental impairment should be considered in evaluating imperfect self-defense; (2) the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury that absence of provocation and imperfect self-defense are elements of murder to be proved by the prosecution; and (3) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on mutual combat (CALCRIM No. 3471) and contrived self-defense (CALCRIM No. 3472). Le also argues he is entitled to reversal due to the cumulative effect of these purported errors.
As explained below, we find no merit to Le’s claims and shall affirm.

We conclude for the reasons discussed in our opinion that the trial court erred in declaring the amended judgment void. We therefore reverse the trial court’s postjudgment order vacating the amended judgment, and remand for the court to reinstate that amended judgment.