CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Elias Delatorre Martinez was charged in a felony complaint with one count of possession of methamphetamine, a felony, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a), and one count of possession of controlled substance paraphernalia, a misdemeanor, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11364. Before a preliminary hearing was conducted, defendant pleaded guilty to the felony count; the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss the misdemeanor count. In the guilty plea form, defendant stated that on September 30, 2011, he â€

On August 11, 2010, appellant, Frank Olgin, was charged in an amended information with the following transactionally related counts on March 24, 2010: robbery of an inhabited dwelling in concert (Pen. Code, § 213, subd. (a)(1)(A), count one),[1] three counts of assault with a firearm against, respectively, Narisha Molatore, Eliseo Snay, and Isiah Purvis (§ 245, subd. (a)(2), counts two, three, four), false imprisonment of Narisha Molatore, Eliseo Snay, and Isiah Purvis (§ 236, count five), and first degree burglary of Isiah Purvis's dwelling (§ 460, subd. (a), count six). All six counts alleged a gun use enhancement as to Olgin (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).[2] The amended information alleged four additional first degree burglary counts (counts seven, eight, ten, and eleven) and theft of a firearm (§ 487, subd. (d), count nine). Counts seven through eleven involved four transactionally unrelated burglaries from counts one through six.

On December 23, 2010, the trial court issued a harassment injunction (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6) enjoining defendant Darla Friel from harassing plaintiff Michael Towe. The injunction expired, by its terms, on December 23, 2011.
Friel appeals. However, because the injunction has expired, the appeal is moot and must be dismissed. (See Zigas v. Superior Court (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 841.)

The Riverside County District Attorney filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging that defendant and appellant D.T. (minor) committed a robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), and resisted arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). An amended petition was filed alleging grand theft of a person. (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c).) Minor admitted the grand theft, and the juvenile court dismissed the other two allegations. Minor's counsel requested that minor be evaluated to determine if he qualified as both a ward of the court and a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.1. The probation department concluded that minor's father was not suitable to take care of minor, and that there were no other relatives available to take care of him. The court subsequently declared minor both a ward and dependent of the court and placed him on probation.
On appeal, minor contends that a probation condition requiring him not to be in the City of Desert Hot Springs, unless accompanied by an adult, is unconstitutional. The People concede and we agree that the condition should be modified to include a knowledge requirement. Otherwise, we affirm.

Defendant and appellant, Israel F. (minor), appeals from the juvenile court's ruling finding true the allegation that he committed a forcible lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1).)[1] Specifically, minor argues the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he acted with the intent to sexually arouse himself, which is a required element of the above crime. As discussed post, the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's finding.

A jury found defendant and appellant David Alexander Barton guilty of two counts of receiving stolen property. (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a), counts 2 & 3.)[1] [2] Defendant admitted that he had served four prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced him to a total term of seven years in state prison, consisting of the upper term of three years on count 2, the upper term of three years on count 3, to run concurrent with count 2, and one year for each of the prison priors. The court awarded him 213 days of presentence custody credits (125 actual plus 88 conduct).

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Patrick Mike Nugent, Jr., of possessing a nunchaku, billy club, and cane sword. (Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a)(1), counts 1-3.)[1] The jury also convicted defendant of being an active gang participant (§ 186.22, subd. (a), count 4) and found that the three weapon possession counts were for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subd. (b)).

Elizabeth C. seeks writ review of juvenile court orders terminating her reunification services regarding her children, Dante C., Jesus C.P., Daniela P. and Nayeli P., and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing. Jesus R.P. (the father) seeks review of the orders regarding the three younger children, Jesus, Daniela and Nayeli. Elizabeth contends the court erred by terminating her services. She argues the Agency did not provide reasonable services in that no effort was made to address her cognitive impairment, and there was a substantial probability the children could have been returned to her custody by the 18-month date. The father joins in and adopts by reference each of Elizabeth's arguments. We deny the petitions.

C.W. appeals the findings and orders entered at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing held under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 360, subdivision (d) and 361, subdivision (c). Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.

Natasha H. appeals findings and orders entered at a permanency plan and selection hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held that review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting [her] custody of a child or [her] status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny appellant's requests to review the record for error and to address the Anders issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
Citing In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, Natasha's counsel asks this court to exercise its discretion to provide her client the opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. Counsel also asks this court to order counsel to brief any arguable issue. (Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75, 88.) The requests are denied.

Elizabeth C. appeals findings and orders entered at a permanency plan and selection hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.

Esmeralda M. appeals the orders entered at the termination of parental rights hearing held under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his [or her] custody of a child or his [or her] status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny Esmeralda's request to review the record for error and to address her Anders issue. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
Citing In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, Esmeralda's counsel also asks this court to exercise its discretion to provide her the opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied.

Jesse Wagner appeals an order denying his petition for writ of mandate that apparently sought release of certain public records held by the San Diego County Sheriff's Department (County). On appeal, he contends the trial court: (1) erred because it had no discretion under Code of Civil Procedure[1] section 583.420 to dismiss his petition for lack of prosecution; and (2) violated his constitutional due process rights by dismissing his petition without adequate notice.

In this case the record shows the owner of a large vacation rental home in the Pacific Beach community in San Diego made a number of unpermitted, noncompliant and dangerous additions and alterations to the home. However, when, in following up on a complaint, city compliance officers asked the owner about the changes, he flatly denied that any unpermitted or noncompliant addition or alteration had been made and engaged in a series of dilatory actions which delayed the compliance officers' ability to identify the noncompliant conditions. The owner's dishonest dilatory response, coupled with his previous history of building code violations, largely foreclose his contention that an administrative hearing officer was compelled to accept, as credible, photographic and other evidence he produced of remedial work he argued he performed on the home. The credibility of the evidence the owner produced was further undermined by the fact that although the city instructed him to obtain permits for the remedial work and then have the work approved by city inspectors, he failed to do so.
Given the undisputed evidence of the dangerous conditions the owner created and the unconvincing evidence of remediation, the hearing officer was fully justified in imposing $500 a day fine on the owner from the time the city served a notice of violation, 60 percent of which was suspended on condition the owner bring the home into full compliance. Thus we affirm the trial court's order denying the owner's petition for a writ of mandate, by which he sought to set aside the fine.