CA Unpub Decisions

Michal Wawrzynski appeals the judgment entered after the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend and later granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the City of San Diego (the City) in response to Wawrzynski's third amended complaint challenging the City's recently enacted regulations of the pedicab business. On appeal, Wawrzynski contends the regulations are preempted by state law, effectuate uncompensated takings of his property and violate his procedural due process rights. We affirm the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Axis Surplus Insurance Company (Axis) appeals an order granting Glencoe Insurance Ltd.'s (Glencoe) motion to tax costs. We affirm.

James Murphy -- a former lifeguard for the City of San Diego (the City) -- appeals the trial court's ruling denying his motion for a new trial or in the alternative for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) in his lawsuit against the City and Sergeant Edward Harris of the City's lifeguard service. Appearing in pro propria persona, Murphy contends that the trial court erred in denying his posttrial motions with respect to his defamation cause of action against Sergeant Harris because the evidence established that Sergeant Harris maliciously lied about Murphy having "missed rescues" as a lifeguard. We conclude that Murphy's contention is without merit, and accordingly we affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Daniel Torres asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We find no arguable error and no entitlement to additional presentence credit. We will affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Anthony Richardo Turner asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We find no arguable error and no entitlement to additional presentence credit. We will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Kathryn Jessica Spiak entered a negotiated plea of no contest to second degree murder and admitted a knife-use allegation. The trial court sentenced her to 16 years to life in state prison in accordance with the plea.

Appointed counsel for defendant Raul Moreno Maciel, Jr., asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We find no arguable error and no entitlement to additional presentence credit. We will affirm the judgment.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).[1] Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we affirm the judgment.
Defendant David John Schaeffer was charged in case No. 10F1752 (â€

Appointed counsel for defendant Bill Vernon Webb asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We find no arguable error and no entitlement to additional presentence credit. We will affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant John Arlan Godown asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We find no arguable error and no entitlement to additional presentence credit. We will affirm the judgment.

An investigation of cell phone and wire communications revealed defendant Clint Wayne Wardlow dealt in methamphetamine and cocaine. An information charged defendant with conspiracy to sell a controlled substance. (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1); Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a).) Defendant entered a plea of no contest. The court sentenced defendant to seven years in state prison and ordered him to register as a narcotics offender. Defendant appeals, arguing the court erred in ordering him to register, since conspiracy is not a qualifying offense under Health and Safety Code section 11590. We shall affirm the judgment.

This case tenders the question whether a complete property settlement entered into after the dissolution of a marriage waives the right of a spouse to property that would pass pursuant to the terms of a will executed before the settlement but after the dissolution. We hold that in these circumstances the settlement waives the testamentary rights under the will by virtue of the express provisions of Probate Code sections 141 and 145.[1]

Y.R. (mother) and C.L. (father) appeal from the jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g) of the Welfare and Institutions Code[1] as to their now 16-year-old daughter, R.L. Father also challenges the court's dispositional findings and orders, contending that the Department of Children and Family Services did not meet its burden of clear and convincing proof for R.L.'s removal, informal supervision could have adequately protected R.L., and the court abused its discretion when it ordered only monitored visitation for father. Father contends jurisdiction under subdivision (b) could not be based on his inability to control R.L.'s behavior in the absence of any credible evidence that he abused or neglected R.L. Mother concedes that she did not financially support R.L., but contends that jurisdiction under subdivision (g) was improper because father adequately provided for R.L. We affirm.

A jury convicted Raymond Campos of receiving stolen property and being under the influence of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a); Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a).) The trial court found Campos suffered a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and a prior conviction with a prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Campos to an aggregate term of six years in state prison. We affirm.