CA Unpub Decisions

This case is before us on appeal for the second time. In the original appeal, we affirmed the conviction of defendant and appellant Tredis Ferguson, struck a fine from the judgment, and remanded the case to the trial court to hold an in camera hearing under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).[1] On remand, the trial court granted discovery under Pitchess, held a hearing to determine if there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable result to defendant had the discovery been available at trial, and denied a motion to vacate the conviction.
Defendant contends he was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of his original motion under Pitchess, which deprived him of the opportunity to impeach Officer Jeffrey Dohlen, the primary prosecution witness. He also argues the trial court applied the wrong standard in assessing prejudice, it is reasonably probable there would have been a different result had Officer Dohlen been impeached, and he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. We affirm.

Appellant Domingo Manriques appeals from his conviction and sentence of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years. (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a).) Before this court he claims that the lower court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence of incriminating statements he made during a police interview because he had invoked his right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. Further, appellant contends that the trial court’s order that he submit to a blood test pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.1 is unlawful. As we shall explain, the evidence in the record supports the court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress his incriminatory statements to police and any error with respect to the blood testing order was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

After duping a lender into funding his purchase of real property—by using another person’s name and good credit—George Nelson now complains that the loan servicing agent did not properly credit his payments on the loan. The problem is that the lender has never had a contractual relationship with Nelson. As a result, notices regarding the loan were sent to the named borrower, not to Nelson, and the loan servicing agent refused to discuss the loan with Nelson because his name is not on the promissory note nor on the deed of trust.
Nelson’s claims are barred by res judicata, in any event. After Nelson filed a bankruptcy petition in 2010, the mortgagee asserted a claim. In response, Nelson objected that his payments on the loan were not properly credited by the servicing agent. Nelson and the lender settled their dispute in the bankruptcy court. Nelson is estopped from relitigating whether his loan payments were mishandled: this matter was raised in the bankruptcy court, and was (or should have been) resolved there.

Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by granting respondents’ postjudgment motion for attorney fees. We find no error in the trial court’s decision as respondents were clearly the prevailing parties. Accordingly, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)) and the jury found he used a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Five prior prison terms, within the meaning of section 667.5, were found true by the trial court. Appellant was sentenced to a 5-year determinate term plus a consecutive indeterminate term of 25 years to life.
Appellant contends reversal of the judgment is necessary because the trial court erred by: admitting the testimony of a former codefendant (Crystal Harmon); admitting Harmon’s plea agreement; denying his motion to dismiss the information; and denying his motion for a new trial. The contentions lack merit and the judgment is affirmed.

Maria Del Rosario Martinez appeals a judgment following her conviction of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a))[1] (count 2); second degree robbery (§ 211) (count 3); unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) (count 4); possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd (a)(1)) (count 7); possession of a controlled substance--cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) (count 10); and possession of a controlled substance‑‑methamphetamine (id., § 11377, subd. (a)) (count 11); with findings that a principal in the carjacking and robbery offenses was armed with a firearm.
Emmanuel Vasquez appeals a judgment following his conviction of carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)); second degree robbery (§ 211); unlawful driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); armed criminal action (§ 12023); possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)); and possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)); with findings that in committing carjacking and robbery, Vasquez personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced Vasquez to an aggregate prison term of 21 years 4 months. Martinez received an aggregate sentence of 13 years. Both of their sentences included a one-year consecutive sentence based on trial court findings that Martinez and Vasquez had each served a prior prison term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) In sentencing Martinez, the court imposed two $570 drug program fund fees (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.7), a $200 restitution fine, and a $2,000 parole revocation fine (§§ 1202.4, 1202.45).

Plaintiff and respondent Mercator Property Consultants Pty, Ltd. (Mercator) obtained a judgment in Australia against defendant and appellant Robby Sumampow (Sumampow), an Indonesian citizen. When Sumampow failed to pay the Australian judgment, Mercator brought an action for recognition and enforcement of the judgment against properties Sumampow owned in California—a house at 809 North Rexford Drive in Beverly Hills and a condominium at 10590 Wilshire Boulevard, unit 706, in Los Angeles (the California properties). After Sumampow contended in the litigation that he no longer owned the California properties, having transferred them to his daughter Iefenn Sumampow (Iefenn) and son Ievan Sumampow (Ievan), Mercator filed an amended complaint seeking to “avoid” the transfer of the properties on the ground that the transfers were fraudulent. After a court trial, the trial court entered judgment for Mercator. On appeal, Sumampow contends the trial court erred when it excluded his expert witness on Indonesian law, when it found that his children were not necessary and indispensible parties to the fraudulent transfer cause of action, and when it recognized the Australian judgment without a showing that the Australian judgment was final and without providing him an “opportunity to present his case.” We affirm.

An attorney has sued his former client in a dispute over fees. The attorney was limited to a quantum meruit recovery, because there was no written retainer agreement or contingent fee agreement. A jury awarded him $29,625. None of the attorney’s challenges to the trial court’s rulings have any merit, apart from his claim for costs as the prevailing party. We remand the case for a determination of costs. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

Marque Clark appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of multiple sex crimes against a child under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger than him.[1] He contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it declined to suppress his confession (statements he made after he took a polygraph examination and was told he failed it).[2] Clark argues that his confession was involuntary and its admission—and the admission of other evidence “tainted” by the involuntary confession—was error. We disagree and affirm the judgment as modified, after correction of sentencing errors.

Eddie Victor Villa filed a petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition naming the Santa Clara County Superior Court as respondent and the People of the State of California as real party in interest. Petitioner requested that this court direct respondent to vacate its order denying him access to the witnesses’ contact information. We denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted his petition for review, and transferred the matter to this court with directions to vacate our order and to issue an alternative writ. We stayed all further proceedings in the matter pending our review of the petition and issued an order for the real party to show cause why the petition should not be granted. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to authorize pretrial disclosure of the witnesses’ contact information. Accordingly, the petition is denied, and the alternative writ is discharged.

A jury found defendant Michael Douglas Reulman guilty of misdemeanor assault (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241, subd. (a)).[1] The trial court suspended imposition of sentence, placed defendant on probation for three years, and ordered various fines and fees. On appeal, defendant challenges the imposition of the monthly probation supervision fee of $110 (§ 1203.1b) and the criminal justice administration fee of $259.50 (Gov. Code, § 29550 et seq.). We reverse and remand the matter to the trial court for a determination of defendant’s ability to pay these fees.

Steven Hunter, defendant and appellant, appeals from a judgment after a court trial in a partition action. The trial court found that Hunter and Carolyn Lockard, plaintiff and respondent, each owned a one-half interest in rural real property in Watsonville. The court ordered partition by sale, and made other orders regarding the costs of partition that were to be deducted from the sale proceeds.
On appeal, Hunter challenges two of the trial court’s factual findings on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. First, Hunter challenges the court’s finding that he was entitled to reimbursement from Lockard of only $15,386.35 as a cost of partition, which was half of the amount the trial court determined that he paid toward the parties’ mutual obligations for property taxes and for their mortgage, a home equity line of credit ($30,772.69). Hunter does not claim that we was entitled to recoup more than half that amount he paid but contends the calculation of the amounts he paid for taxes and mortgage was inadequate and thus the evidence supported a higher reimbursement award. Second, Hunter challenges the court’s finding that Lockard was entitled to $5,000 in attorney fees as a cost of partition.
We conclude that Hunter has forfeited his challenge to the amounts awarded for sums he paid to meet the mutual obligations of the parties by failing to move for a new trial and that there was substantial evidence to support the attorney fees award to Lockard. We will therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant Cedric Sample appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422) and violating a court order (Pen. Code, § 273.6). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. (c)). Defendant contends: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of a prior act of domestic violence; (2) the trial court erred by refusing his request to modify CALCRIM No. 1300; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct; and (4) the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by depriving him of a jury trial on the prior conviction allegations. We affirm.

This is the second appeal for defendant Perry Davis Hamm, who was convicted by jury of two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288.5)[1] in a case involving the sexual abuse of sisters M.B. and J.B.[2] The court originally sentenced defendant to prison for 15 years to life on the first count and imposed a concurrent sentence of 15 years to life on the second count pursuant to the “One Strike” law based on the jury’s finding that there was more than one victim (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (e)(5)).
In the first appeal (People v. Hamm, (Jul. 21, 2010, H033927) [non pub. opn.]), we rejected defendant’s contention that his trial counsel was ineffective and his claims of instructional and cumulative error. However, we questioned the propriety of sentencing defendant under the One Strike law, since his offenses were completed years before continuous sexual abuse of a child was added to the One Strike statute as a triggering offense. We therefore asked the parties to brief the question whether punishing a violation of section 288.5 that was completed before that offense was added to the One Strike law violated constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. After reviewing the parties’ supplemental briefs, we concluded that sentencing defendant pursuant to the One Strike law violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws, reversed the judgment, and remand for resentencing.